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Part One 
Context, Theories and Methods  
‘He thought that, unlike most people, he had simply refused to let himself be 
brainwashed by newspapers, television, eschatologists and philosophies into believing 
that ‘in spite of everything’ this was an acceptable world simply because it existed. It 
would never become acceptable. Beloved maybe, acceptable never’. 
Cees Nooteboom, Rituals, 1980 
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Part One. Context, Theories and Methods  
Chapter 1. Introduction 
























Kant	in	his	essay	‘Perpetual	Peace’.1 Kant came to the conclusion that a peace alliance based 
on	mutual	recognition	of	the	status	quo	(reciprocity)	was	required	and	was	a	consequence	
of	the	natural	interdependence	between	states.	According	to	Kant,	a	system	was	needed	that	
would ensure that states that disturb the peace are called to order by a collective of states, 
coercively	if	necessary	(the	concept	of	collective	security). 





1  Kant, I., ‘Perpetual Peace’, Cosimo Classics, September 2010.
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first	intergovernmental	organizations.2	This	League	of	Nations	was	a	first	step	toward	
institutionalised	international	cooperation	in	the	field	of	security.	Unfortunately,	it	did	not	
























it came to security and defence. 
2 The League of Nations was an intergovernmental organization founded by a Covenant on 10 January 1920 as a result of 
the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War. The principal aim was to maintain world peace, including preventing 
wars through the concept of collective security and disarmament and settling international disputes through negotiation 
and arbitration. The League of Nations was dissolved in 1946.
3 Though the concept has become commonly used, the academic discourse on multilateralism has been fragmented, 
as claimed by Koops. For an elaboration on the development of the concept, see: Koops, J.A., The European Union as 
an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO and the United Nations’, Brussels 
University Press, 2011, p. 66-78.
4 Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly, 32 (4), December 1988.
5 Ruggie, J. G. (eds.), ‘Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form’, Columbia University Press, 
1993.
6 Walt, S. M., ‘The origins of Alliances’, Cornell University Press, 1987, p. 199. 
7 Mearsheimer, J. J., ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’, New York: W. W. Norton, 2001. 
8 Mitrany, D. ‘A working Peace System’, in: Nelsen, B. F., Stub, A. (eds.), ‘The European Union. Readings on the Theory and 
Practice of European Integration’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014, p. 105-123. 
9 Keohane, R. O., Nye, J. S., ‘Power and Interdependence’, Longman 2001. 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 17
After	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	institutionalised	international	cooperation	increased	in	the	





















and division of labour in the OSCE18 area, came to fruition.  
	 Initiatives	to	create	a	wider	European	security	architecture	emerged	in	several	states	
and	were	forwarded	by	German	politicians,	like	Genscher,	Adenauer	and	Kohl,	who	sought	
Westbindung and, simultaneously, Ostbindung,	alongside	political	leaders	from	the	US,	Russia	
10 A liberal world order can be defined as an institutional order established in the aftermath of the Second World War. 
During the Cold War it was comprised of Western states and after the end of the Cold War it became a global order, 
with some exceptions. According to Ikenberry this order can be characterized as an open and rule-based order built 
around multilateral institutions, alliances, strategic partners and client states, where decisions are based on consent and 
organized around agreed rules and institutions that allocate rights and limit the exercise of power, see: Ikenberry, G. J., 
‘Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order’, Princeton University Press, 2012.
11 In general, a summit of an international organizations is defined as a gathering of state and non-state actors of the 
members or partners of the various organizations.
12 CSCE, ‘Charter of Paris For a New Europe’ (presented at CSCE Paris Summit, November 1990), 1-29.
13 The development of the European security architecture will be elaborated further in Chapter 5. 
14  NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 3.
15 The aim of the Vienna Congress was to provide a long-term peace plan for Europe by settling critical issues arising from 
the French revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1814-1815). The Conference of Versailles was the peace conference held 
after the end of World War I to set the peace terms for the defeated powers (1919-1920).
16 CSCE, ‘The Challenges of Change’, (CSCE Summit of Heads of State or Government 1992, Helsinki, July 1992), par. 23.
17 Garton Ash, T., ‘Europe’s Endangered Liberal Order’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 2, (March/April), p. 64. 
18 The CSCE was institutionalised into the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the Budapest 
Summit ‘Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’ in December 1994. For convenience, the term ‘OSCE’ will be used in 
general.   
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the traditional dichotomy presented by the realist-liberal debate particularly in relation to 
the	analysis	of	paths	of	change	of	international	organizations.
19 Genscher H. D., Statement at OSCE Congress, 6 November 2009. 
20 US President Bush before the end of the Cold War. 
21 US President Clinton Strategy on Foreign Relations, made by the national security advisor Lake, September 1993. 
22 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, p. 5.





































23 The 1999 NATO operation Allied Force was executed without a UN mandate which led to dissatisfaction among member 
states. 
24 These conflicts and crises are subject matters of this research and will be elaborated in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
25 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, p. 7.  
26  Rumsfeld, D., Washington Post, 18 October 2001. 
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organizations.	Nevertheless,	the	‘organizations-in-crisis	literature’27 or the question ‘Is the 
OSCE still alive?28	has	had	its	fair	share	of	attention	in	the	press	and	has	not	gone	unnoticed	





























27 This statement was derived from; Thies, W. J., ‘Why NATO Endures’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2009, p. 3-14.  
28 Socor, V., ‘Is the OSCE Still Alive?’, Wall Street Journal, Nov 5, 2004. 
29 The Dutch (1 June 2005) and the French (29 May 2005) voted ‘no’ in a consultative referendum on the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe.
30 European political doctrine that advocates disengagement from the EU and shows resistance towards the European 
integration process.
31 Brexit is the blending of British and exit, referring to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU after a 
referendum in June 2016 in which 51,9 % of the British people voted for leave.
32 Grexit refers to a Greek withdrawal from the Eurozone as a hypothetical scenario as a result of the Greek government-
debt crisis in 2012.
33 Nexit refers to a possible scenario in which the Netherlands would leave the EU suggested by some Dutch political parties 
in 2017. 
34  Elaboration in Chapter 5. 
35  Clegg, S. R., Hardy, C., ‘Studying Organization: Theory and Method’, SAGE publications, 1999, p. 15. 









tension within EU states, between members and between the member states and the 
EU itself. This will be elaborated upon in what follows. There was even talk of a crisis of 
multilateralism;	that	Europe	and	the	world	were	heading	toward	a	system	of	fragmentation	
and	the	end	of	the	Westphalian	system;	an	era	of	post-multilateralism	marking	the	end	of	
the liberal world order.36




system,	resulting	in	nationalism,	radicalism,	polarisation	and	fragmentation.37 This not 
only	because	some	of	the	bigger	states	choose	to	pursue	national	interest	at	the	expense	














36  Luce, E., Financial Times, 11 June 2018. 
37  Heisbourg, F., ‘War and Peace After the Age of Liberal Globalisation’, Survival, 60:1, 2018, p. 214. 
38  Zarif, M. J., speech to Munich Security Conference, 19 February 2017. 
39  Russian minister of foreign affairs, speech to Munich Security Conference, 19 February 2017. 
40  Ikenberry, J. G., ‘Liberal Leviathan. The origins, crisis and transformation of the American World Order’, 2012. 
41  Freedman, L., ‘The Future of War. A History’, London, Allen lane, 2017. 
42  Kissinger, H., ‘World Order’, Penguin Press, 2014. 
43  Mazar, M. J., ‘Testing the Value of the Post-war International Order’, Rand Corporation, January 2018. 
44  Kagan, R., ‘The Return of History and the End of Dreams’, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008, p. 86.
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overcome	by	maintaining	a	multilateral	order,	which	itself	necessitates	the	strengthening	







last seventy years. And, since the end of the Cold War, many policy initiatives have led to 
the	broadening	of	the	scope	of	tasks	and	a	strengthening	of	the	institutional	structures	of	
these	organizations.	There	even	continues	to	be	debate	about	the	possibility	of	establishing	





















45  German Federal Chancellor Merkel, speech to Munich Security Conference, 18 February 2017.
46  For instance: Acharya, A., ‘The End of the American World Order’, Polity Press, 2018.
47  Speech of French president Macron on a visit to the former Western Front in Verdun, 5 November 2018. 
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The	cases	selected	for	the	analysis	of	the	paths	of	change	of	security	organizations	




































48 In this research, the UN, the EU, NATO and the OSCE are conceptualised as organizations in which organs are set up, 
exemplified by the NAC of NATO and the Commission of the EU, as will be elaborated in Chapter 2. 
49 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, p. 22.
50 These paths will be elaborated in Chapter 2, section 2.5. 
51 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’, International 
Organization Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999.











the phenomenon is observed. Therefore, to identify the actors and mechanisms at play, the 


















included formal rules and the institutional structure. This has been at the heart of the 
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1.4 Research Strategy 
The	research	questions	presented	above	reflect	the	theoretical	assumptions	of	
institutionalism, as it pertains to political science. Institutionalism emphasises the 
role	of	(international)	organizations	and	is	characterised	by	the	analysis	of	the	‘world	of	
institutions’.	Peters	goes	so	far	as	to	claim	that	the	roots	of	political	science	lie	in	the	study	




























52 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing 
Group, New York, 2012, p. 1.
53 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984. 
54 Inter-organizationalism studies the relationship between international organizations and will be elaborated upon in 
Chapter 2. 
55 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, p. 22.
56 Stated by historical institutionalism. 
57 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing 
Group, New York, 2012, p. 77-82.
































themselves shape those preferences and that power. Institutions are therefore constitutive 
58 Keohane, R. O., Nye, J.S., ‘Power and Interdependence’, Longman 2001. 
59 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations’, International 
Organization Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999.
60 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing 
Group, New York, 2012, p. 150. 
61 Barnett, M. N., Finnemore, M., ‘Rules for the World. International Organizations in Global Politics’, Cornell University 
Press, 2004, p. 6. 
62 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2012, p. 130.
63 Ibid, p. 131.
64 The definition of institutions ranging from formal to informal will be elaborated upon in Chapter 2. 































The research presented here is based on that literature and derives its main concepts from 
a	combination	of	different	approaches	within	institutionalism.	The	choice	was	made	to	






65  Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly, 32 (4), December 1988.
66  Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International 
Publishing Group, New York, 2012, p. 184.









here	is	that	a	combined	analysis	of	organizational	change	is	necessary.67 This need for a 
combination	of	approaches	was	already	identified	by	Roth	in	1987,	‘…the	several	approaches	
should be viewed more as complementary rather than competitive explanations for 






















67 Streeck, W., Thelen, K., ‘Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies’, Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p. 3.  
68 Roth, P. A., ‘Meaning and Method in the Social Sciences: A Case for Methodological Pluralism’, Cornell University Press, 
New York, 1989, p. 125. 
69 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing 
Group, New York, 2012, p. 2. 
70 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002. p. 108.
71 In Chapter 2 an elaboration will be given on the complementary aspects of the different approaches within new 
institutionalism.  







 Subsequently, on the basis of this overview of concepts, a conceptual and analytical 
framework	will	be	distilled	that	will	guide,	order	and	structure	the	description	and	






























of this combined research framework is fourfold. 





literature, as will be described in the research overview in Chapter 2, which deals with 
the	analysis	of	international	organizations	in	general	and	security	organizations	in	the	
European security architecture in particular.  





boundary that is set between more realist and liberal approaches to institutionalism. 
Because the European institutional security architecture is so complex and involves both 
state and non-state actors, a framework is needed that can account for a multiplicity of 
agents	and	structures	that	drive	paths	of	change	of	international	security	organizations.	 










































Within this wider security architecture, NATO, the EU and to a lesser extent the OSCE, are 
the	most	important	security	organizations	in	terms	of	foreign,	security	and	defence	policy	











 Furthermore, the proposed research is relevant to the European and Dutch armed 
forces,	as	these	armed	forces	are	engaged	in	the	conduct	of	civilian	and	military	missions	
72 ‘Veiligheid in een wereld van verbindingen. Een strategische visie op het defensiebeleid’, WRR rapport, Den Haag, 2017, hoofdstuk; 
‘Strategische Monitor 2017/2018’, HCSS/Clingendael. 
73  The MH17 crash In Ukraine on the 17th of July 2014. Already on the 18th of July the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission  
pre-positioned in Donetsk and the OSCE remained involved as a mediator between the different parties. 
74 ‘Wereldwijd voor een veilig Nederland - Geïntegreerde Buitenland- en Veiligheidsstrategie, 2018-2022’, Ministerie van 
Buitenlandse Zaken, 20 maart 2018. 
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and	operations,	under	the	auspices	of	NATO,	the	EU	and/or	coalitions	of	willing	and	able	
executed	under	NATO	or	EU	flag.			










are combined in a complex institutional security environment. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 2, in this environment, the distinction between what constitutes internal versus 







approaches of institutionalism will be opened and explored.  






















 First, this study relies on a combined theoretical research framework, described 
above, based on the synthesis of three approaches to institutionalism in one framework. 














complementary aspects of the approaches within new institutionalism. 















research questions will also be answered, and the theoretical and policy implications of the 
study will be outlined.
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Chapter 2
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Chapter 2. Change in Security Organizations:  















Second, in section three, the relevant concepts will be addressed. These are, international 
security	cooperation	and	organizations,	respectively,	and	their	paths	of	change,	the	main	
concept. Third, in section four, the debates on and development of new institutionalism, 
the theoretical lens that will be used to analyse the observations within the European 














1  Kant, I., ‘Perpetual Peace’, Cosimo Classics, September 2010. 
























separately	using	one	theoretical	framework.10 Examples include the extensive research 
2 For an overview, see: Fioretos, O. (eds.), ‘International Politics and Institutions in Time’, Oxford University Press, United 
Kingdom, 2017, Chapter 1. 
3 Katzenstein, P. J., Keohane, R. O, Krasner, S. D., ‘International Organization and the Study of World Politics’, International 
Organization, Vol. 52, No. 4, 1998.
4 Ruggie, J. G., ‘Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution’, International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3, Summer 1992, p. 
561. 
5 Duffield, J., ‘What are international institutions?’, International Studies Review, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, United 
Kingdom, 2007.
6 Mearsheimer, J. J., ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, Vol.19, No. 3, Winter 1994/5.
7 Biermann, R., ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting’, 
The Review of International Organizations, June 2008, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008, p. 151. 
8 Koops, J. A., ‘The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO 
and the United Nations’, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 88-89.
9 For an elaboration on legal aspects of NATO-EU cooperation, see: Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO Relationship’, 2006; 
Wessel, R. A., Wouters, J.,  ‘Multilevel Regulation and the EU: the Interplay between Global, European, and National 
Normative Processes’, 2008; Wessel, R., ‘The Legal Framework for the Participation of the European Union in 
International Institutions’, Journal of European Integration, 2011. 
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2.2.3 Research on Security Organizations  
As	the	research	on	EU’s	security	and	defence	policy	has	been	extensive,	below	a	brief	
overview divided between the more realist, liberal and constructivist perspectives.14 
	 First,	EU’s	development	as	a	security	actor	and	the	concept	of	European	security15 has 
been	contested	by	the	more	realist	state	centric	academics	claiming	the	denial	of	the	EU	as	
an	effective	global	power.	It	was	stated	that	the	increase	of	EU’s	security	and	defence	policy	
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12 Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., ‘Rules for the world. International Organisations in Global Politics’, Cornell University Press, 
2004. 
13  Mahoney, J., Thelen, K., ‘Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency and Power’, Cambridge University Press, 
2009.
14 For an extensive overview, see:  Hyde-Price, A., ‘Realism: a dissident voice in the study of the CSDP’, chapter 2; Jorgensen, 
K.E., Aarstad, A.K., ‘Liberal, constructivist and critical studies of European security’, chapter 3, in: Biscop, S., Whitman, 
R.G., ‘The Routledge Handbook on European Security’, Routledge Handbooks, 2013.
15 Cooper, R., ‘The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century’, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1 Jan. 2004. 
16 For example: Mearsheimer, J. J., ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’, W.W. Norton, New York, 2001; Kagan, R., ‘Of 
Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order’, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003; Hyde-Price, A., 
‘European Security in the Twenty-First Century: The Challenge of Multipolarity’, Routledge, London, 2007; Rynning, S., 
‘Realism and the Common Security and Defence policy’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2010.  
17 For example: Grieco, J., Powell, R., Snidal, D., ‘The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation’, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3 (Sep., 1993); Missiroli, A., ‘European Security Policy: The Challenge of Coherence’, 
Eur. Foreign Aff. Rev., 6, 2001. 
18 Lindley French, J., ‘In the shade of Locarno? Why European defence is failing’, International Affairs, Volume 78, Issue 4, 
October 2002; Menon, A., ‘From crisis to catharsis: ESDP after Iraq’, International Affairs, Volume 80, Issue 4, July 2004. 
19 Howorth, J., ‘Decision-making in Security and Defence Policy: Towards Supranational Inter-governmentalism?’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, Sage Publications, 2012; Vanhoonacker, S., Dijkstra, H., Maurer, H., ‘Understanding the Role 
of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence   Policy: The State of the Art’, European Integration online Papers, 
Vol. 14, 2010; Hofmann, S. C., ‘CSDP: approaching transgovernmentalism?’, in: Kurowska, X., Breuer, F. (eds.), ‘Explaining 
The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy: Theory in Action’, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012; Menon 2011; 
Jorgensen, K. E., Aarstadt, A. K., ‘Liberal, constructivist and Critical Studies’ of European security’, in: Biscop, S., Whitman 
R. (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of European Security, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.
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Finally,	constructivist	academics	focussed	on	identity	perspectives,	emphasized	EU’s	












limited theoretical consideration. On the other hand, this was contested, for example by 
Webber	who	contradicted	this	supposedly	undertheorized	NATO’s	path	of	change.26 
 Like the EU, the academic debate on NATO can be divided between realist27, liberal28 
and constructivist perspectives.29 Webber even plead for a necessity of theoretical pluralism 
20 Meyer, C. O., ‘Convergence Towards a European Strategic Culture? A Constructivist Framework for Explaining Changing 
Norms’, European Journal of International relations, December 1, 2005. 
21  Manners, I., ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Market studies, 16 December 2002; 
Manners, I., ‘Normative Power Europe Reconsidered: beyond the Crossroads’, Journal Of European Public Policy, volume 
13, 2006; Sjursen, H. (ed.), ‘Special issue: What Kind of Power? European Foreign Policy in Perspective’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, 18 (8), 2006; Whitman, R. (ed.), Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives’, 
London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011.
22 Keukeleire, S., Delreux, T., ´The Foreign Policy of the European Union ,́ The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 326. 
23 For example: Duffield, J., ‘NATO’s Functions after the Cold War’, Political Science Quarterly 109, 1994-1995, p. 763-787; 
McCalla, R., ‘NATO’s Persistence after the Cold War’, International Organization 50, Summer 1996, p. 445-475; Wijk, 
R., ‘NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium. The Battle for Consensus’, Brassey’s, London, 1997; Wallander, C. A., 
‘Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, International Organization 54, Autumn 2000; Kaplan, L., 
NATO divided, NATO United, Praeger, 2004. 
24 For an overview of the NATO ‘in-crisis-literature’, see: Thies, W. J., ‘Why NATO Endures’, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2009, p. 3-14.
25 Barany, Z., Rauchhaus, R., ‘Explaining NATO’s resilience: Is International Relations Theory Useful?’,  Contemporary 
Security Policy, Volu me 32, Issue 2, 2011, p. 287.   
26 For an extensive overview on theorizing NATO: Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. 
Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 32-46.
27 For example: Waltz, K., ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 25(1), 2000; Kagan, R., ‘Of 
Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order’, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003; Rupp, R., NATO after 
9/11: An Alliance in Continuing Decline’, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006. 
28 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions: Security Institutions Over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, 1999; Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, 
International Organization, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001. 
29 For example; Moore, R., ‘NATO’s Mission for the New Millennium: A Value-based-approach to Building Security’, Contemporary 
Security Policy, Vol. 32 (1), 2002; Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Functional Form, Identity-driven Cooperation: Institutional designs and 
effects in Post-Cold War NATO’, in: Acharya, A., Johnston, A. I. (eds.), ‘Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in 
Comparative Perspective’, Cambridge, University Press, 2007; Risse-Kappen, T., ‘Collective identity in a Democratic Community: 
The case of NATO’, in: Katzenstein (ed.), ‘The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics’, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1996; Sjursen, H., ‘On the Identity of NATO’, International Affairs, Vol. 80 (4), 2004. 














However, this literature does not explore the drivers and dynamics that underlie 
change	in	a	truly	comparative	manner,	based	on	a	single	set	of	indicators,	which	is	the	










consequences of international institutions, their development in practice and theoretical 
consequences’.35	This	highlights	the	need	for	comparative	analysis,	as	argued	here.	
30 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, p. 31-32. 
31 Ibid, p. 22-30. 
32 Exemplified by: Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, New York: International Peace 
Institute, June 2016; Hill. W. H., ‘OSCE Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Past and Future’, OSCE Security Days Event, 
National War College Washington DC., 16 September 2013; Lanz, D., ‘Charting the Ups-and-downs of OSCE Mediation’, in 
Security and Human Rights, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, Volume 27, Nos. 3-4, 2016.
33 Exemplified by: Shakirov, O., ‘NoSCE or Next Generation OSCE?’, Security and Human Rights 27, 2016.
34 Duffield, J., ‘What are international institutions?’, International Studies Review, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, United 
Kingdom, 2007, p. 2. 
35 Ibid, p. 16.
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2.2.4 Research on Interaction between Security Organizations 
The	focus	of	this	research	is	the	analysis	of	change	in	security	organizations	individually	









Dimaggio	and	Powell37 and March and Olsen38,  who addressed processes of isomorphism 
between	organizations.39	From	there	the	research	further	developed.	Scott	and	Meyer	
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‘The Influence of International Institutions on the EU. When Multilateralism hits Brussels’, Palgrave Studies in European 
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the area of security and defence,53 let alone on the relation between other international 
organizations.	Furthermore,	these	works	have	been	largely	empirical,	descriptive	analyses	
of	strategy,	political	decisions	and/or	operations	of	several	security	organizations,	
44 Blavoukos, S., Bourantonis, D., ‘The EU Presence in International Organizations’, London, New York, Routledge, 2011, p. 
177. 
45 Biermann, R., ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting’, 
The Review of International Organizations, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008.
46  Brosig, M., ‘Overlap and Interplay between International Organisations: Theories and Approaches’, South African Journal 
of International Affairs, Volume 18, 2011. 
47 Orsini, A. (ed.) ‘The European Union with (in) International Organizations. Commitment, Consistency and Effects across 
Time’, Routledge, 2014, p. 8.
48 Idem.
49 Raustiala, K., Victor, D. G., ‘The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources’, International Organization, Cambridge 
University Press, Vol. 58, No. 2 (Spring, 2004), p. 279.
50  Alter, K. J., Meunier, S., ‘Nested and Overlapping Regimes in the Transatlantic Banana Trade Dispute’, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Taylor & Francis, 2006. 
51 Hofmann, S. C., ‘Why Institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, vol.49, nr.1, 2011, p 103. 
52 Ojanen, H., ‘Inter-organisational relations as a factor shaping the EU’s external identity’, UPI Working Papers, 49, 2004, p. 
9.  
53 Koops, J. A., ‘The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO 
and the United Nations’, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 88. 






basis of similar indicators. 













and	competition	between	international	organizations’.57 The extensive work on inter-
organisational	relations	done	by	Biermann	and	Koops,	in	particular,	has	revealed	an	
increase	in	‘…empirical	and	policy-oriented	interest,	but	relatively	speaking	a	lack	of	a	







54 Moller, B., ‘European Security. The roles of Regional Security Organisations’, Ashgate, 2012, p. 43.
55 Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., ‘Conclusion’, in: Biermann, R., Koops. J. A., ‘The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organisational 
Relations in World Politics’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017.
56 Koops, J. A., ‘The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO 
and the United Nations’, Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 439. 
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Challenges’, in: Biermann, R., Koops. J. A., ‘The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organisational Relations in World Politics’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 2.  
59 Biermann, R., Koops, J. A., ‘Conclusion’, in: Biermann, R., Koops. J. A., ‘The Palgrave Handbook of Inter-organisational 
Relations in World Politics’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 678.













the EU, WEU and NATO. This research has added value, particularly when it is conducted 
comparatively,	as	Yost’s	research	has	shown.62


















discussed. Next, the theoretical approaches needed to analyse the varied cooperation 
schemes	of	security	organizations	and	the	deductively	developed	research	framework	
for	the	analysis	of	change	in	security	organizations	will	be	presented.	First,	however,	an	
60 Biermann, R., ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security Institutions Interacting’, 
The Review of International Organizations, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008, p. 1. 
61 Ibid, p. 174. 
62 Yost, D. S., ‘NATO and International Organisations’, Forum Paper Series, NATO Defence College, 2007.  
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64 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, p. 2. 
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the Law of Treaties adopted, the 23rd of May 1969, which defines an international organization as an intergovernmental 
organization (art. 2, 1. (i)) excluding non-governmental organizations.
66 Krasner, S. D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, 1983, p. 2. 












to particular issues areas.72 The theory of new institutionalism was, in fact, developed in 
part	to	analyse,	define	and	explain	the	persistence	and/or	change	of	institutions.73 Within 
the	institutionalist	literature,	March	and	Olsen	define	an	institution	as	a	collection	of	




67 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing 
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of International Regimes’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004 ; Koremonos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘ The 
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70 Streeck, W., Thelen, K., ‘Beyond Continuity. Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies’, Oxford University 
Press, 2005, p. 8.  
71 For an elaboration on the various definitions, see:  Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. 
Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford University Press, New York, 1999, p. 1-3; Pease, K. K. S., ‘International 
Organizations’, Pearson, United States, 2012, p. 2-5; Rittberger, V., Mayer, P., ‘Regime Theory and international relations’, 
Clarendon Press, 1993; Moller, B., ‘European Security. The roles of Regional Security Organizations’, Ashgate, 2012, p. 43-
47; Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, International Organization, 
Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 761; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, 
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72 For an elaboration on regimes, see: Krasner, S. D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, 1983; Keohane, R. O., 
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Group, 2012, p. 183. 
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Security Council, the EU Commission and the North Atlantic Council of NATO. 
2.3.3 Form and Level of Cooperation in International Organizations
The	concept	of	an	international	organization	described	above	reveals	a	variety	of	schemes	
of	cooperation	in	level	and	form.	The	development	and	definition	of	these	schemes	will	be	














76  Duffield, J., ‘What are International Institutions?’, International Studies Review, 2007, p. 7.
77  Ibid, p. 7-8. 
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the	cooperation	schemes	are	moulded.	Flexible	or	differentiated	cooperation82 refers to 
different	pace	or	speed	of	cooperation	within	an	organization,	exemplified	by	opt-out	and	










79 These levels of cooperation will be further addressed in section 2.5.
80 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, International Organization, 
Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 761-763.
81 Pros and cons of homogenic and heterogenic organizations; Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of 
International Institutions’, International Organization, Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 770.
82 Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., Schimmelfennig, F., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 7-11.
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2 (June 1996), p. 283-295.
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breaking	also	leads	to	loss	of	legitimacy	and	relevance	of	an	organization.89 Possible causes 
of de-institutionalisation are many90 and will be referred to in this work where applicable.91 
	 Finally,	the	different	theoretical	lenses	chosen	for	the	analysis	of	change	address	these	
changes	in	form	and	level	differently	which	will	be	elaborated	in	section	2.5	and	Chapter	3.
2.3.4 International Organizations as Actors in their own Right
Scholars	of	institutionalism	state	that	states	‘…have	become	the	great	rationalizers	of	




of	other	actors	in	eliciting	change	in	international	(security)	organizations,93 the units of 




elaborated upon below. 
	 A	fundamental	debate	that	has	been	ongoing	throughout	the	history	of	social	
science	research	is	that	which	deals	with	‘structure’	versus	‘agency’.	The	debate	has	
87 For an elaboration on de-institutionalization and dysfunctional institutionalisation, see: Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional 
Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 37; Scott, 
W.R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 166.  
88 Scott, W.R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 166. 
89 For an elaboration on legitimacy and the loss of legitimacy of organizations, see: Lipset, S.  M., ‘Consensus and Conflict. 
Essays in Political Sociology’, New Brunswick Oxford, Transaction Books, 1985, p. 64; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and 
Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 71-72; Scheuer, J. D., Scheuer, J.D., ‘The 
autonomy of change. A Neo-Institutionalist perspective’, Copenhagen Business School Press, 2008, p. 59.
90 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014. p. 166-167.
91 Ibid, p. 210. 
92 Dimaggio, P. J., Powell, W. W., ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in 
Organizational Fields’, American Sociological Review, vol. 48, 1983, p. 147. 
93 This debate will be elaborated on in this chapter, when there is referred to international organizations, international 
security organizations are included.  
94 For an elaboration on actorness of international organizations, see: Barnett, M., Finnemore, M., ‘The Politics, Power, 
and Pathologies of International Organizations’, International Organization  Vol. 53, No. 4, 1999, p. 1-10; Scott, W. 
R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 49-52; Kirchner, E. J., 
Dominguez, R., ‘The Security Governance of regional Organizations’, Routledge, 2011, p. 1-7; Koops, J. A., The European 
Union as an Integrative power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective multilateralism’ towards NATO and the United Nations’, 
Brussels University Press, Brussels, 2011, p. 97.  
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resources’	and	having	causal	power.97 In other words, ‘…the debate refers to the question of 
whether	the	building	of	social	science	theory	should	start	with	the	behaviour	of	individual	

















structural, coercive power other than that of the nation state remains a popular view in 
international	politics.	Organizations,	then,	are	viewed	as	structures	without	any	agency	
at	all.	Adherents	of	this	viewpoint	reason	that	prominent	actors	in	political	settings	are	
individuals and, therefore, the only appropriate foci for analysis are individuals and their 
95 Further elaboration on the subject: Giddens, A., ‘The constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration’, Polity 
Press, 2016; Archer, M., ‘Culture and Agency: The Place of Culture in Social Theory’, Cambridge University press, 1996, p. 
xii; Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 93; Hay, M. C., 
‘Structure and Agency’, in D. Marsh and G. Stoker (eds.), ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Macmillan, 1995, p. 189.
96 Giddens, A., ‘The Constitution of Society. Outline of the Theory of Structuration’, Polity Press, Cambridge, UK, 2016, p. 25. 
97 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage publications, 2014, p. 94.
98 Blatter, J., Haverland, M., ‘Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014, p. 7.  
99 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage publications, 2014, p. 93. 
100 Idem.
101 Ibid, p. 95.





structures, have become popular topics of study. The sharpest debate between scholars 
of political science, has centred upon the question of whether or not ‘…international 
institutions	really	matter’103	and	whether	or	not	organizations	have	agency,	as	was	














accepted by states in order to reduce their own insecurity and transaction costs as well 
as unpredictability.106	As	such,	these	organizations	both	mould	and	are	moulded	by	the	
behaviour of individual member states.107	Peters	refers	to	this	as	the	‘dance	of	diplomacy’.108 
States	are	willing	to	accept	constraints	on	their	behaviour	if	there	are	equal	constraints	




of	international	regimes	and	organizations’.109 Consequently, international cooperation 
102 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing 
Group, 2012, p. 14.  
103 Koremenos, B., Lipson, C., Snidal, D., ‘The Rationale Design of International Institutions’, International Organization, 
Volume 55, Issue 04, September 2001, p. 761. 
104 Krasner, S. D., ‘International Regimes’, Cornell University Press, 1983; Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions: Two 
Approaches’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988, p. 379-396; Rittberger, V., Mayer, P., ‘Regime 
Theory and International Relations’, Oxford University press, USA, 1993. 
105 For an elaboration on the concept, see: Hooghe, L., Marks, G., ‘Multi-level Governance and European Integration’, 
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001; Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New 
Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012, p. 160. 
106 zasenclever, A., Mayer, P., Rittberger, V., ‘Theories of International Regimes’, Cambridge University Press 1997, p. 37.  
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does produce rules and structures. Some of these rules are self-imposed by states, like 
those	inherent	in	the	EU.	Other	rules	are	imposed	by	international	organizations,	by	













organizations	are	able	to	act	in	ways	not	dictated	by	states’.112 This does not mean that 
international	organizations	neglect	the	demands	of	states,	but	they	can	act	for	different	
reasons;	in	other	words,	‘correlation	is	not	causation’.113 Furthermore, international 
organizations	do	set	the	agenda	in	their	policy	domain,	as	a	result	of	their	mandate,	









like Mearsheimer claimed117, or impersonal policy machinery manipulated by other actors. 
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Reinalda, B., ‘Routledge History of International Organizations: From 1815 to the Present Day’, Routledge, 2009, p. 9; Hurd, 
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volume 2, 2011, p. 17 and p. 23.
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2.3.5 Security and the Security Environment 
As	security	organizations	are	the	central	focus	of	this	research,	the	concept	of	security	
itself needs exploration before any institutionalised form of security cooperation can be 
















special powers to deal with threats.   
	 Hence,	there	are	multiple	understandings	of	security.	Levy	has	identified	more	than	
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other words, a strict distinction between internal and external security is not tenable.126 
Furthermore, insecurity is not the exclusive purview of the military and does not relate only 
to	the	use	of	force;	it	affects	all	sectors,	which	demands	a	broad	conceptualisation	of	(in)
security.	This	conceptualisation	of	security	has	been	developed	further	since	the	1990s,	as	
a result of wars in Europe and Africa, and in response to the various security threats that 
extend	beyond	the	conventional	threat	of	hostile	state(s).
	 Along	the	development	of	the	(in-)security	concept	the	concept	of	crisis	management	
has developed as well. The scope of tasks and actors involved expanded, beyond the 
containment of military escalation labelled as the comprehensive approach and further 
along	as	an	integrated	approach.127 Furthermore, in contrast to the more traditional concept 
122  Williams, P. D., Security Studies. An Introduction‘, Routledge, 2018, p. 4-5.
123  Buzan, B., Wilde, J., Waever, O., ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 31.
124  Buzan, B., Hansen, L., ‘The Evolution of International Security Studies’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 9.
125  Buzan, B., Wilde, J., Waever, O., ‘Security: A New Framework for Analysis’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 32.
126 For an elaboration on the sovereignty debate, see: Aarts, T., ‘Constructing Sovereignty between Politics and Law’, Routledge, 
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of	state	security,	the	concept	of	human	security	has	emerged.128 The policy concept of the 









result, blur the division between internal and external security. In other words, in the Euro-
Atlantic area, the line of division between what is external and what is essentially internal 
has	ceased	to	exist	because	most	conflicts	here	have	erupted	within	and	cross-border	and	
not between states. 





a central authority above states. It is assumed that security cooperation takes the form of 
pure	intergovernmental	or	even	ad-hoc	cooperation	solely	for	the	purposes	of	forwarding	









freedom	of	action’.134 Today, an increase in international cooperation, in various forms 
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and	at	various	levels,	is	observed	and	described	by	Howorth	as	‘intergovernmental-
supranationalism’,	especially	in	the	security	and	defence	domain.135 So, in the context 























prompted Deutsch to describe NATO as a security community in 1957, whose sense of 
community	rested	upon	the	extreme	unlikelihood	of	violence	or	aggression	between	the	
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survival, …, the ability of an institution to thrive, or even to survive, depends on its 
adaptability’.141	In	addition,	they	stipulate	that	‘form	follows	function’;	if	change	is	to	be	
successful, ‘the relationship between function and institutional form is important for 
institutional	theory	because	it	provides	the	basis	for	explaining	variation	in	institutional	






























141 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, p. 12.
142 Ibid, p. 7.
143 Wallander, C. A., ‘Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, International organization, volume 54, 
Issue 04, September 2000, p. 709. 
144 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, p. 7.
145 Fawcett, L., ‘Regional Organizations’, in: Williams, P. D., Security Studies. An Introduction‘, Routledge, 2018, p. 284.
146 Ibid, p. 296. 





















organization,	the	concept	of	collective	defence	applies.149 Both concepts are applied 
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security	system	is	based	on	the	premise	of	the	‘indivisibility	of	peace’151, as Claude describes 




world peace.  











instruments, such as military sanctions or interventions to enforce the peace.154 In other 
words, a collective security system entails a paradox, as it requires a certain amount of 
military power to prevent war. In an ideal world, there would be an authority above the 






a system of collective security to work. First of all, for deterrence to work, potential 
aggressors	must	believe	in	the	capacity	of	(the	members	of)	the	organization	to	punish	acts	
of	aggression.	Second,	there	must	be	a	high	degree	of	political	consensus	among	the	main	
151 For an elaboration on the development of the concept of collective security, see: Claude Jr., I. L., ‘Collective Security as 
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D. M., Williams, P., & Shafritz, J. M. (Belmont, 2006), p. 289-302; Aleksovski, S., Bakreski, O., Avramovska, B., ‘Collective 
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of Social Sciences, Rome-Italy, Vol 5, No 27 December 2014, p. 274-282; Wilson, G., ‘The United Nations and Collective 
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authority to establish it.155	Fourth,	a	collective	security	system	should	be	impartial;	in	other	
words,	it	should	react	in	the	same	way	to	any	aggressor	within	the	system	regardless	of	





did not survive, as it could not withstand the Second World War and the system of alliances 
that	would	emerge	again.	The	second	system	of	international	security	cooperation,	the	
UN,	was	created	after	the	Second	World	War158, and is, to date, the example of a system of 
collective	security	that	facilitates	the	peaceful	settlement	of	disputes.	
Cooperative Security
In addition to collective security as a system of community values, another similar system 
can	be	identified,	namely	cooperative	security.	A	system	of	cooperative	security,	like	
collective security, aims to prevent war and crisis on the basis of the principle of indivisible 
peace	(the	Kantian	system).	However,	there	is	one	main	difference	between	collective	
security and cooperative security. In a system of collective security, all states are united in 
a	collective	pact	and	are	obliged	to	take	action	against	any	aggressor;	this	is	not	the	case	




involves activities that improve the broader security environment, but that fall short of 
the use of violence. It is based on the principles of comprehensive and indivisible peace.159 
Cooperative	security	can	be	defined	as	‘…sustained	efforts	to	reduce	the	risk	of	war	that	are	
not	directed	against	a	specific	state	or	coalition	of	states’.160
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security system is the OSCE, which adopted the principles of cooperative security with the 















its members. Secondly, cooperation is voluntary. Basically, cooperation between two or 
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approaches within new institutionalism will be explored in relation to the analysis of 
change	in	international	security	organizations.







 This section provides a discussion of the relevant debates and variety of approaches 
within new institutionalism that relate to the questions posed in Chapter 1. First, a short 
explanation will be provided of the development of institutionalism as a theory, which 
can	be	divided,	roughly,	into	old	and	new	institutionalism.	This	will	be	followed	by	a	
discussion of the three selected approaches within the theory of institutionalism, namely 
rational choice, historical institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism.170 and their 
explanation	of	how	and	why	change	takes	place.	
166  Ibid, p. 12.
167  Weitsman, A., ‘Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War’, Stanford University Press, 2004, p. 27. 
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Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action’, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Hall, Taylor, 1996; Peters, B. G., 
‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012; Scott, 
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After	the	explanation	of	each	of	the	approaches	separately,	the	differences	between	these	
approaches will be addressed. 
2.4.2 History of Theorising Institutions and Institutional Thinking 
Analysis	of	organizations	and	institutions	is	at	the	heart	of	many	disciplines	like	
political science and public administration and has produced multiple approaches. 























decision-making’173 and structures. As Selznick states, institutions are more than their 
structure	and	they	adapt	to	their	environment	to	survive,	as	legitimacy	is	crucial.174
 In the seventies, institutionalism was rediscovered and renewed by March and 
Olsen.175	They	claimed	that	the	‘…resurgence	of	concern	with	institutions	is	a	cumulative	
consequence of the modern transformation of social institutions and persistent 
commentary from their observers. Social, political, and economic institutions have 
become	larger,	considerably	more	complex	and	resourceful,	and	prima	facie	more	
171 Peters, G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism.’, The Continuum International Publishing 
Group, 2012, p. 3.  
172 Ibid, p. 7.  
173 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2002, p. 90. 
174 Selznick, P., ‘Foundations of the Theory of Organization’, American Sociological Review 13 (1), 1948, p. 25–35.
175 March, J. G., Olsen, J. P., ‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 78, Nr. 3, 1984.


















on this assumption, new institutionalists emphasised that political institutions played a 
more	autonomous	role	in	shaping	political	outcomes.	They	argued	that	‘the	organization	
of	political	life	makes	a	difference’,182 that institutions ‘are political actors in their own 
right’183 and that they have the ability to shape other actors. In other words, institutions 
matter.	Consideration	of	the	impact	of	institutions	on	actors	was	later	followed	by	the	
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All	this	resulted	in	a	different	methodological	approach,	one	that	contrasted	with	
old	institutionalists	‘…experimenting	with	deductive	approaches	that	start	from	




historical institutionalism, and constructivist institutionalism, will be elaborated upon 
below. 
2.4.3 Theorising the Concept of Change 





transaction-cost approach.187 In other words, actors use institutions to maximize their 
utility.	Institutions,	then,	are	seen	as	a	means	of	streamlining	actors’	rational	behaviour,	
which is primarily focused on utility maximisation. For rational choice theorists, 
institutions	are	equal	to	governance	or	rule	systems	and	represent	constructed	orders	
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(as	they	are	determined	by	considerations	of	utility	maximisation).	Political	institutions	
influence	behaviour	by	affecting	‘the	structure	of	a	situation’	in	which	individuals	select	
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Change According to Historical Institutionalism  
The	second	approach	that	will	be	used	for	the	analysis	of	paths	of	change	of	organizations	
is historical institutionalism. Historical institutionalism can be explained as an 
evolutionary theory that traces ‘…the evolution of an institutional form and [asks] how 
it	affects	the	actors’	preferences	and	behaviour’.199 In contrast to other institutionalist 
schools,	historical	institutionalism	is	based	on	historical	reconstruction:	‘Although	




an institution. ‘Policies are path dependent and once launched on that path they continue 
along	until	some	sufficiently	strong	political	force	deflects	them	from	it’.201 Historical 
institutionalism deals with the questions of where institutions come from and when they 
were	created,	the	so-called	‘formative	moment’	and	the	path	of	the	institution	following	
that formative moment, not only the process itself and the possible outcome.202	As	Scott	
argues,	‘…institutions	do	not	emerge	in	a	vacuum;	they	always	challenge,	borrow	from,	
and,	to	varying	degrees	displace	prior	institutions’.203 Institutions, once established, have a 
‘…continuing	effect	on	subsequent	decision-making	and	institutional	episodes’.204 In other 
words,	‘’…the	historical	institutionalists	do	provide	an	avenue	of	looking	at	policy	across	
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time,	while	other	institutionalist	approaches	are	more	bound	in	time	and	even	in	space’.205 
As such, historical institutionalism focuses on the nature and evolution of institutions and 
examines the ways in which these institutions shape or are shaped. 
	 With	regard	to	change,	specifically,	the	phenomenon	under	study	here,	historical	
institutionalism assumes that institutions are resistant. The main focus of historical 
institutionalism	is	this	persistence	of	patterns	and	organizations	by	virtue	of	their	initial	
creation. Inspired by the old institutionalists, the basic idea is that institutions only 
change	in	so-called	‘path-dependent’	ways	that	flow	from	the	formation	and	creation	of	an	
institution.	Furthermore,	it	is	argued	that	if	they	do	change,	it	is	not	in	response	to	shocks	
and will not take place quickly.206 Path dependency implies that early decisions related to 
institutional	design	create	incentives	as	by-products	that	encourage	actors	to	maintain	
policy	and	institutional	choices	that	were	made	when	the	organization	was	created	or	
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and the way institutions act based on norms of behaviour, as some ideas are considered 
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are always areas of uncertainty in the interpretation and application of rules since ‘…rules 
are	adapted	by	actors	seeking	to	make	sense	of	changing	environments’223 and rules work 
by	specifying	‘appropriate’	behaviour.224 Hence, while institutions may represent stable 
environments,	these	are	environments	in	which	ongoing	discussion	takes	place,	which	may	
result	in	the	reversal	of	stable	patterns	and	fixed	rules.225 In this sense, the constructivist 
institutionalist	approach	is	more	open	to	the	prospect	of	change	than	any	of	the	other	












institutional survival, the constructivists imply that it is necessary to maintain ‘…some 
openness to policy ideas and discourses that are not central to the status quo within the 
institution’,	which	means	that	the	more	open	an	institution	is	in	terms	of	its	action	the	
more successful it is.227 As such, it may be that, as a result of this necessary openness and 
inter-activeness,	different	actors	yield	different	outcomes	in	processes	of	change.		
In contrast to the other approaches selected for this research, constructivists have a 
distinctive research focus on international institutions, which will be elaborated upon 
more	extensively	in	this	dissertation.	The	work	of	Barnett	and	Finnemore,	in	particular,	
became	a	prime	example	of	the	constructivist	theory	of	international	organizations	
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box	of	organizations	and	inter-state	bargaining.229 The central aim of ‘…constructivist 
theorising	of	international	organizations	has	been	to	understand	how	and	why	they	behave	













the ability of an international bureaucracy, such as a secretariat, to behave in ways that are 
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to	the	disadvantage	of	member	state	governments’.238 This may also lead to the opposite 
situation,	in	which	bureaucracies	can	cause	inefficient,	ineffective,	repressive,	and	










2.4.4 Consistency and Difference between the Approaches within New Institutionalism 
In the sections above, three approaches of new institutionalism have been discussed: 
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familiar and comfortable they become with it, the more hesitant they are to deviate from 
it’.240	On	the	other	hand,	if	change	is	observed	in	selected	organizations	in	terms	of	task	
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Consistencies and Complementarities
The	following	consistencies	can	be	observed	between	the	different	approaches.	
 For one, they all focus on institutional and political structures that are of importance 
to	analysing	the	development	of	organizations.	Within	institutionalism,	organizations	
are normatively and historically embedded.243 Another common denominator within 




actors shape the international political, social, and economic order. Nevertheless, the 
opposite	is	claimed	to	be	true	as	well	because	although	organizations	are	designed	by	





fact, complemented by the constructivist claim that ‘…political culture, discourse and 
‘the	social	construction	of	interests	and	identities	matter’.245 For constructivists, it is 
interesting	to	trace	the	impact	of	ideas	and	the	process	by	which	certain	ideas	are	accepted,	
becoming	constative	norms,	and	rejected.	As	ideas	lead	actors	to	make	certain	choices,	
the institutionalisation of ideas can reconstruct the interests of both state and non-
state actors. Furthermore, within the security and defence policy domain, states have an 
important	role	to	play;	this	is	accounted	for	by	rational	institutionalists,	but	this	does	not	
mean that other actors have to be excluded from analysis. Constructivist scholars are more 
open	to	considering	the	impact	of	a	diverse	range	of	actors	and	their	role	in	processes	
of	change,	which	they	argue	are	too	focused	on	structural	causes	and	material	costs.	




the policy outcomes and vice versa, which could link the approaches of rational choice 
and	constructivist	institutionalism.	At	some	point,	a	common	agreement	on	building	
or	breaking	the	mandate	and	tasks	of	institutions	is	achieved;	when	this	happens	is	an	
unanswered question within the constructivists approach.
 Second, in contrast with the rational choice approach, historical institutionalists 
analyse international cooperation over time as ‘…the notion that institutions, once created, 
243 Lowndes, V., ‘Institutionalism’, p. 101, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002. 
244 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing 
Group, 2012, p. 184.
245 Risse, T., ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’, in; Wiener, A., Diez, T., ‘European Integration Theory’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2005, p. 146. 
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are	indeed	‘sticky’	and	persist	over	time’.246 The analysis of institutions over time applies 
specifically	to	one	of	the	most	studied	organizations	included	in	this	project,	namely	the	
EU,	as	‘…	much	of	the	rational	choice	literature	on	the	EU	arguably	underemphasises	the	
central point of the early neo-functionalist literature, namely the concept of European 
integration	as	a	process	which	does	indeed	unfold	over	time,	often	as	a	result	of	the	





cases selected date back to the Cold War. 
 Third, both the historical and constructivist perspectives adhere to the view that 
institutions	can	progressively	take	on	a	life	of	their	own	and	exert	influence	both	on	
the institutional process and on the outcome of these activities.248 For constructivists, 
in	each	step	of	institution	building,	ideas	can	be	continuously	causative,	directing	
the	process	along.249 And this factor, ideas, can be connected ‘…to historical causes of 
an	institutionalist	logic	of	path	dependence’,	which	to	a	certain	extent	necessitates	a	












institutionalists, institutions are not only comprised of structures. They are also seen as 
mechanisms	by	which	individuals,	organs	and	these	institutions	themselves	achieve	goals.	
These	goals	can	vary,	be	more	or	less	stable	and	may	even	be	conflictual;	this	is	in	contrast	
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reducing	transaction	costs	and	insecurity.255 Nevertheless, this research sees international 
organizations	as	actors	in	their	own	right	and	in	addition	to	states.	The	constructivist	
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2.4.6 Combining New Institutionalist Approaches
Several	scholars	have	attempted	to	combine	different	approaches	by	building	on	their	
similarities.258 Scharpf reasons that each approach separately is incomplete and that they 
should be combined to provide a more complete explanation.259	Peters	agrees,	stating	
that	‘…some	blending	of	the	strands	of	theory	should	be	viewed	more	as	complementary	
rather	than	competitive	explanations	for	political	phenomena’.260 In other words, none 
of the approaches can fully explain all possible processes observed and, as such, there is a 
need	to	combine	several	of	the	approaches	to	get	a	complete	perspective	on	the	structural	
characteristics	of	a	political	system.	Likewise,	according	to	Thelen,	there	is	even	evidence	
of	an	initial	convergence	in	the	different	approaches.261 Like Scharpf, Thelen criticises the 
257 Idem. Derived from Hall and Soskice’ research on the varieties of capitalism, claiming that change can only be understood 
by analysing the relationships among institutions. Hall, P. A., Soskice, D., ‘An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism’, p. 
1-70, in: Hall, P. A., Soskice, D., (eds.), ‘Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage’, 
Oxford University Press, New York, 2001.  
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259  Scharpf, F. W., ‘Games Real Actors Play’, Westview Press, 1997, p. 318. 
260 Peters, B. G., ‘Institutional Theory in Political Science. The New Institutionalism’, The Continuum International Publishing 
Group, New York, 2005, p. 2. 
261  Thelen, K., ‘Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics’, Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci., 1999, 2:369-404, p. 371.  














reconstruction’.265 An emphasis on ideas, combined with an emphasis on structure put 
forward by other institutionalist approaches can provide a more complete interpretation of 
the	complexities	of	institutional	life	than	any	individual	approach	can.	Hence,	it	is	argued	
here that while no one of the selected approaches performs well in isolation, when they are 
combined, they are well positioned to explain the research puzzle and help identify causal 
factors	related	to	change.
2.4.7 Conclusion 










the choice of a research framework that includes aspects of rational choice, historical 
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institutionalism,	and	constructivist	institutionalism	to	analyze	change	in	the	European	
security	organizations,	with	the	aim	of	contributing	to	the	theory	of	institutionalism.	


























cooperation. Finally, it has to be mentioned that, in contrast with other research, this 
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described empirically in Chapter 5. 
Deepening 
The	path	of	deepening	is	broadly	defined	as	an	increase	in	the	scope	and	level	of	cooperation	
and	integration	in	terms	of	institution-building,	democratic	legitimacy,	and	policies.272 It is 
understood	as	a	process	of	‘vertical	integration’,	incorporating	the	transfer	of	competences	
and	shift	of	decision-making	power	from	the	national	level	to	the	level	of	the	organization,	




level of institutionalisation and the form of international cooperation. 274	In	short,	deepening	
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approaches within the theory of new institutionalism and make up the proposed, 
combined	research	framework.	In	sum,	the	actors	or	mechanisms	that	drive	change,	
elaborated	upon	above,	can	be	distinguished	on	the	basis	of	the	different	approaches	
within new institutionalism. 
	 The	first	set	of	drivers	are	state-focused	drivers.	Institutionalism	does	highlight	
the	choices	of	states,	based	on	the	rational-actor	model,	oscillating	between	conflict	





in the realm of security. Based on the rational actor assumption and derived from rational 
choice	theory,	state	actors	are	seen	as	being	driven	by	national	interests,	including	
the	protection	of	sovereignty,	territory,	resources,	and	economic	interests.	To	defend	






determine their actions based on values and norms and are driven by power of their 
interests,	including	survival.	Rules	and	structures	then	embody	these	values	and	norms,	as	
well as power relationships. 
	 Furthermore,	in	addition	to	actors,	mechanisms	can	cause	change	as	well,	as	

















derived from the theoretical lenses that make up this framework, are illustrated in the 
table	below	(Table	2.1).	This	framework	will	be	expanded	with	the	causes	and	criteria	for	
analysing	change	in	Chapter	3.	
Change Actors Process of Change 
Rational choice institutionalism State Stable and unstable.
Utility maximisation: change is instrumental 
and dependent on state interest. 
Historical institutionalism State and mechanism Stable and path dependent. 
According to legitimacy of organization;  
the logic of appropriateness. 
Result of change is a punctuated equilibrium 
with possible critical junctures.
Constructivist institutionalism State, non-state and mechanism Chaotic 
and constant.
Varies in form and level: from 
institutionalisation to de-institutionalisation. 
Table 2.1: Combined research framework derived from the theoretical lenses of new institutionalism encompassing the actors and 








2.6 Conclusion  




















Chapter 2 - Change in Security Organizations: The Research Framework 87
Chapter 3
89





methods of analysis, as stated by Bennet ‘…qualitative researchers need to continue to 
work	on	techniques	for	reliably	assessing	the	identities,	preferences,	and	perceptions	
of actors that are of interest to constructivists, rational choice theorists, and political 
psychologists’.1	The	challenge	of	this	research	is	to	explain	the	dynamics	of	the	paths	
of	change	of	the	European	security	organizations	from	1990	to	2016	individually	and	in	












3.2 The Unit of Analysis  
 
The international arena is observed as a domain of anarchy where states are the main 
actors, and usually the only actors with power, as claimed by some theories of political 
science,	including	different	approaches	within	new	institutionalism,	which	is	the	
theoretical lens of this research. The basic question within institutionalism is related 
to	the	structure-agency	division;	the	paradox	that,	although	institutions	are	human	
creations, once they are created they constrain the activity of the individuals within them, 
perhaps even the individuals who created them.2	As	a	result,	the	argument	of	international	
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development as units of analysis.   
	 Besides	the	agent-structure	debate,	another	debate	within	institutionalism,	as	
in	other	social	sciences,	is	engaged	with	the	level	of	analysis	of	social	phenomena.	


























security architecture are related to the way these levels intermesh.5 Thus, in this research, 
3 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage publications, 2014, p. 203. 
4 This analysis can be seen as an extension of the level of analysis approach, first popularized in the field of international 
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contemporary and differentiated approach towards evaluating for instance the EU as an international actor, see:  Koops, 
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International Organizations in World Politics: Core Concepts and Challenges’, in: Biermann, R., Koops. J. A., ‘The Palgrave 
Handbook of Inter-Organizational Relations in World Politics’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, p. 3-5.  









levels of national and international authority. In other words, hierarchical.  
	 In	addition,	in	defining	the	levels	relevant	for	this	research,	the	key	underlining	
dimension is the scope of the phenomenon it encompasses, whether measured in terms 
of	space,	time	or	numbers	affected.	In	this	research,	space	is	reflected	by	the	‘events’	in	the	





3.3 Multiple Case Study  
In this research, the case study method was chosen. The case study method in this research 
is	a	comparative	case	study	between	three	interrelated	security	organizations,	which	will	





the research overview of Chapter 2. Therefore, this research not only focuses on the path 
of	change	of	each	security	organization	separately,	but	comparatively	as	well,	as	possible	
causes	and	dynamics	of	change	could	be	neglected.	The	comparative	case	study	method	can	
contribute to the theory of new institutionalism, as it could have implications on theory 
development	and	could	‘establish,	strengthen,	or	weaken	historical	explanations	of	a	
case’.10 Given the explorative nature of this research, and the complexity and richness of the 
context,	a	case	study	approach	is	the	most	appropriate	research	strategy.11  
	 The	case	study	method	comprises	several	potential	weaknesses,	as	unfolded	by	George	
6  Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage Publications, 2014, p. 105.
7  Ibid, p. 92.
8 George, A. L., Bennet, A., ‘Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences’, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 69.
9 For an elaboration on this method: George, A. L. and McKeown, T. J., ‘Case Studies and Theories of Organizational 
Decision-making’, Advances in Information Processing in Organization, 2 (1), 1985; King, G.,  Keohane, R. O., Verba, 
S, ‘Designing Social inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research’, Princeton, 1994;  Yin, R. K., Pollack, M. A., 
‘International Relations Theory and European integration’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2001, p. 238.  
10 George, A. L., Bennet, A., ‘Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences’, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 109.
11 Ibid, complete work. 
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and Bennet.12	However,	the	strength	of	the	case	study	method	includes	conceptual	validity,	










most important criteria for the case selection is its relevance to the research aim.16 For the 
method	to	collect	the	data	required	for	the	research	aim,	the	method	of	process	tracing	
was	chosen	to	ask	how	a	particular	outcome	(change	of	security	organizations)	came	about	
and to uncover causal mechanisms posited by theoretical informed propositions.17 It is 




as possible within the context of the phenomenon to be analysed.19  
	 Furthermore,	the	research	of	the	paths	of	change	of	security	cooperation	and	
organizations	is	to	some	extent	restricted	by	limited	analysis,	as	the	information	provided	
is inexhaustible. This research therefore concentrates on a few selected cases, which 
allows a broader set of theoretical approaches to be taken into account and more complete 
empirical evidence to be collected.20 




12 Possible weaknesses of case study method: case selection bias, lack of representativeness and potential lack of 
independence of cases, in: George, A. L., Bennet, A., ‘Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences’, MIT 
Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 22-34.
13 George, A. L., Bennet, A., ‘Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences’, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 
19-22. 
14 Blatter, J., Haverland, M., ‘Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014. 
15 George, A. L., Bennet, A., ‘Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences’, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 27.
16  Ibid, p. 83.
17  Ibid, p. 153. 
18 Blatter, J., Haverland, M., ‘Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014, p. 25.
19  Idem. 
20  Ibid, p. 8.
21  Idem.
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The	three	cases	selected	in	this	research	are	intended	to	ensure	sufficient	variety	to	











collective security, can be traced in all three selected cases.   
	 On	the	other	hand,	although	these	organizations	overlap	in	tasks,	members	and	
partnerships,	to	a	certain	extent	they	differ	as	well	with	regard	to	history,	mandate,	
autonomy and authority, institutionalization, members and partners, operations and 









case and cross-case analyses. Chapters 4 to 6 consist of a comprehensive analysis of each 
organization	separately,	in	terms	of	broadening,	widening	and	deepening,	to	assess	the	
character	of	their	paths	of	change	in	terms	of	level	and	form.	Furthermore,	each	chapter	






the CoE is not included, as the CoE lacks elements of defence policy tasks and functions. 
Furthermore, the WEU used to be a part of the European security architecture as a separate 
unit,	but	will	be	addressed	within	the	context	of	the	EU,	as	the	WEU	has	become	an	integral	
part of the EU. 
In conclusion, the variations between the units of analysis as described earlier are 
theoretically	interesting.	Systematically	reconstructing	and	comparing	the	paths	of	change	
of	the	security	organizations	will	allow	a	comprehensive	assessment	to	be	reached	with	
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respect	to	whether	the	assumptions	account	for	a	convincing	logic.	The	methods	for	
collecting	the	data	required	for	the	research	strategy	will	be	elaborated	on	below.
3.4 Research Methods: Structured Focused Comparison and Process Tracing 
The analysis is performed by the method of structured focused comparison. To be more 
precise,	a	chronological	comparative	perspective	on	the	variation	of	the	paths	of	change	
between	related	international	(security)	organizations.	In	this	research,	the	method	of	





 Furthermore, the method of structured focused comparison can be used for 
comparative	case	studies	when	the	results	of	the	individual	cases	are	drawn	together	within	
a common theoretical framework, as is the method in this research. Below, the three 
substantive components of this method will be discussed. 
Structured Focused Comparison 
Structured
The method is structured, because the analysis of the case studies in this research refers to the 
systematic	comparison	of	change,	as	these	cases	are	analysed	in	a	similarly	structured	way.	
	 First,	in	every	identified	path	of	change,	either	broadening,	widening	or	deepening,	














22 Pierson, P., ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science Review, volume 
94, issue 2, 2000, p. 261-262.
23 BÖrzel, T. A., ‘Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope’, Journal of European Public Policy, Routledge, 
12:2 April 2005, p. 220. 
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the	paths	of	change	of	the	selected	organizations	will	be	executed	in	the	form	of	treaties,	
agreements,	and	so	forth,	together	with	a	varied	overture	of	expert	assessments.	Primary	











of analysis will serve to establish whether practice is in line with the theoretical framework. 
In	addition,	key	member	state	decision-making	documents	that	were	prepared	or	published	





paths of international cooperation responded to the same events in the presented security 
environment. 
 Fourth, the method is structured, as the scope of the phenomenon, whether measured 














24 Kohlbacher, F., ‘The Use of Qualitative Content Analysis in Case Study Research’, Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 7 (1), 
2006, p. 1-30.
25 Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage publications, 2014, p. 92.
26 Further elaboration on the subject: Scott, W. R., ‘Institutions and Organizations. Ideas, Interests, and Identities’, Sage 
Publications, 2014, p. 95. 
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data based on the research aim and the theoretically founded research question based on 
the theory of new institutionalism and a limited set of approaches within it, presented in 
Chapter 2.  
The research method is also focused, because the research framework is built from 
specifically	selected	approaches	within	new	institutionalism,	because	these	security	
organizations	act	in	a	dense	and	complex	institutional	security	environment	comprising	




is applied to see whether the causal processes can be properly explained by the variation 
between the cases.  
	 Finally,	the	research	method	is	focused,	as	it	analyses	specific	aspects	of	the	cases,	
the	indicators	of	the	paths	of	change	of	the	selected	security	organizations,	which	will	be	













and constructivist institutionalism, three of the mainstream approaches of new 
institutionalism	to	explain	change,	the	question	arises	as	to	why	three	theories	instead	









theoretically informed assumptions and to reveal possible causal paths and synthesize 
multiple causal chains. 
 As the research framework is built from three approaches within new institutionalism, 
another	question	concerns	the	explanatory	power	of	these	different	approaches	when	
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assessing	security	organizations	of	the	European	security	architecture.	In	other	words,	do	












 Central to this approach is a theory-led interpretation of the cases. In other words, a 
thorough	reflection	on	the	relationship	between	empirical	evidence	and	abstract	concepts.	
It is assumed that empirical observations can be used as proof for the correctness of 
assumptions	and	for	checking	the	relevance	of	concepts	and	theories	in	their	empirical	
context.27	So	this	research	engages	in	a	detailed	assessment	of	empirical	material	in	a	way	




‘specify	indicators	for	the	mechanisms’.28 Indeed, the crucial factor that contributes to a 
credible	testing	of	the	assumptions	is	to	have	a	clear	prescription	of	the	indicators	of	the	
causal	chains	offered	by	the	theoretical	explanations	of	change	apart	from	the	general	
criteria in form and level presented in section 2.5. Therefore, in the reconstruction of 
the	paths	of	change,	in	addition	to	the	who	or	what	question	elaborated	on	in	section	
2.3,	the	how	or	why	questions	were	involved	in	these	paths	and	will	be	analysed	through	
the theoretically formed assumptions and criteria, which provided the focus of the 
research.	And	whether	the	causal	mechanisms,	suggested	by	the	assumptions	drawn	
from each theoretical approach, are present in the selected cases. Hence, this combined 




to analyse the theory of new institutionalism and can be advanced out of empirical practice 
27 Blatter, J., Haverland, M., ‘Designing Case Studies. Explanatory Approaches in Small-N Research’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014. 
28 Panke, D., ‘Process Tracing: Testing Multiple Hypotheses with a Small Number of Cases’, in: Exadaktylos, T., Radaelli, C., 
‘Research Design in European Studies’, the Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics, 2012, p. 129. 
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and the proposed causal mechanisms based on the observed developments within the 
European security architecture and the results thereof. 
Change Actor Process Cause Criteria 
Rational choice 
institutionalism 










Events: cooperation or 
conflict.
Transaction cost 




Balance of state power. 

























Historical development.  












Variation in form and level 













Interest and legitimacy 
of actors. 
Events: cooperation or 
conflict. 
Strength and weakness 
of bureaucratic rules/
structure, actors and 
processes. 
Values and norms. 
Old and new actors.
Other actors: state and 
non-state.
Balance of state and 
organizational power.
(in) Stable institutional 
development.
Values and norms. 
Influence of other 
institutions, organs, officials 
and states.
Variation in form and level 





supranational within and 
between institutions. 
Variation in form and level 
within, between and outside 
the institutions.
Table 3.1: Combined research framework derived from the theoretical lenses of new institutionalism encompassing the actors, 
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therefore	an	unreliable	basis	for	the	validity	and	reliability	of	analysing	phenomena	in	this	
environment.	Consequently,	analysing	events	over	time	with	the	method	of	process	tracing	




applied for within-case analysis as well as comparative case study analysis if the results of 
the	individual	cases	are	drawn	together	within	a	common	theoretical	framework,	which	is	
the case in this research.30 
	 Third,	the	method	of	process	tracing	is	applied	by	tracing	the	links	between	possible	
causes	and	observed	outcomes	of	change	by	examining	histories,	documents	and	other	
sources. This research comprises historical analysis linked to the analysis of relevant 
discourses. It also makes it possible to see whether the chosen approaches within new 
institutionalism apply to the cases. 
	 Finally,	process	tracing	can	show	whether	the	variation	between	the	cases	can	be	





















29  Yin, R. K., ‘Case Study Research. Design and Methods’, Sage Publications, 2003, p. 125-127.
30 George, A. L., Bennet, A., ‘Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences’, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 
179. 
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theoretical approach of new institutionalism. Nevertheless, some remarks have to be made 
with	regard	to	important	limitations	of	this	method.	
	 First,	the	objective	of	this	research	is	not	to	establish	a	new	theory	of	institutionalism	




















end of the liberal world order are included, these observations and related conclusions are 
tentative,	as	not	all	key	moments	could	be	addressed,	such	as	the	marginal	attention	in	
this	research	to	the	election	of	US	President	Trump	in	2016	and	possible	consequences	for	










one of the recommendations for further research in Chapter 8.
31 Yin, R. K., ‘Case Study Research. Design and Methods’, Sage Publications, 2003, p. 117.
32 Rathbun, B. C., ‘Interviewing and Qualitative Field Methods: Pragmatism and Practicalities’, in: Box-Steffensmeier, J. M., 
Brady, H. E., Collier, D., ‘The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology’, Oxford University Press, August 2008, p. 690.
33 George, A. L., Bennet, A., ‘Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences’, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005, p. 
95. 
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Part Two 
Context, Cases and Analysis  
‘How can you improve human nature until you have changed the system? The other; what 
is the use of changing the system before you have improved human nature?’. 
George Orwell, 1984, 1949 
102
103





















are asked and the same type of data is used. These sub-questions are derived from the main 
research	question:	How	and	why	have	the	European	security	organizations,	namely	the	EU,	
the	OSCE	and	NATO,	changed	in	terms	of	broadening,	widening	and	deepening	individually	



















encompassed a broad perspective on security from its creation and broadened its scope 
































referred to as the level of institutionalization. This level can vary from informal to formal 
and	high-institutionalized	cooperation.1The	categorisation	in	level	thus	refers	to	the	
organs	that	an	organization	has	actually	built,	listed	in	the	treaties,	strategies,	operational	




NATO, the EU and the OSCE, will be addressed below.
 
4.3 The NATO Path of Broadening 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In	the	Cold	War,	the	two	explicit	examples	of	traditional	collective	defence	organizations	
within the European security architecture were the WEU and NATO. In those days, collective 







4.3.2 Narrow Perspective on Security and Defence   
 
The Creation of NATO: The Cold War
Both	NATO	and	the	WEU	were	created	as	traditional	collective	defence	organizations,	
implying	the	indivisibility	of	security	of	all	members,	but	in	which	cooperation	is	
voluntary, as described in Chapter 2. At their foundation, the mandates of NATO and the 
WEU	as	collective	defence	organizations	were	based	on	Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter,4 which, 
1 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 3. 
2 BÖrzel, T. A., ‘Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope’, Journal of European Public Policy, Routledge, 
April 2005, p. 220. 
3 Although many collective self-defense treaties have been established after the end of the Cold War, see: Reichard, M., 
‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 179.
4 Article 51, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, hereafter ‘UN Charter’; 
‘Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack 
occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be 
immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the 
Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.’
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5 For an elaboration on Article 51 of the UN Charter: Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political 
Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 173. 
6 Article 5, the North Atlantic Treaty, hereafter ‘Washington Treaty’, 1949; ‘The Parties agree that an armed attack against 
one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they 
agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking 
forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of 
armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area’.
7 Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 
2006, p. 190. 
8 For an elaboration on the historical path of NATO Article 5, see: Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and 
Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 180-183.
9 The Paris Agreements (1954); recognition of the Federal Republic of Germany as a sovereign state. Germany and Italy 
accede to the Brussels Treaty and the WEU. In 1955 Germany joined NATO.
10 For an elaboration on Germanys position within NATO during and after the Cold War: Longhurst, K., ‘Stunde Null and 
the ‘construction’ of West German strategic culture’, p. 25-50, in: Longhurst, K., ‘ Germany and the Use of Force: The 
Evolution of German Security Policy 1990-2003’, University Press Scholar Ship, October 2004.
11 Deutsch, K. W. et al., ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of 
Historical Experience’, Princeton University Press, 1957. 
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and the creation of military capabilities in parallel with norms and values: solidarity 
became the backbone of the NATO alliance.12
Within the other alliance of the European security architecture, the WEU, the concept of 
collective	defence	was	likewise	laid	down	in	Article	5	of	its	founding	treaty,	the	Treaty	of	
Brussels	(1948)13, and, similar to NATO, was based on Article 51 of the UN Charter.14 However, 
in	contrast	to	NATO,	the	WEU	Treaty	did	oblige	states	to	assist	one	another.	Nevertheless,	
though	this	obligation	was	written	in	the	Treaty,	in	practice	it	did	not	have	the	military	





territory. Consequently, NATO has never had a formal internal security task. In other words, 







After the Cold War
The	end	of	the	Cold	War	brought	profound	changes	in	the	European	security	architecture	
such	as	the	dismantling	of	the	WP,	restoration	of	sovereignty	in	Central	and	Eastern	
European states, the return of independence to the Baltic Republics, the departure of 
Soviet	forces	from	Hungary	and	Czechoslovakia	and	a	complete	withdrawal	from	Poland	
and	Germany	by	1994	and	the	reunification	of	Germany.	All	these	events	generated	a	
widespread expectation that NATO, as the opponent of the WP, would disappear.17 However, 
the	opposite	became	the	reality;	NATO	survived	and	as	early	as	1991	had	redefined	its	core	
12 Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 
2006, p. 191. 
13  WEU, ‘Treaty Between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland’, 1948, Brussels, hereafter ‘Treaty of Brussels’. 
14 Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty; ‘If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, 
the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power’.
15 For an elaboration on the Brussels Treaty Article 5, see: Biscop, ‘De integratie van de WEU in de Europese Unie. Europa op 
weg naar een Europese Defencie Organisatie’, Leuven, 2000; Eekelen, van, W., ‘Debating European Security, 1948-1998’, 
Den Haag, 1998; Bloed, A., Wessel, A., (red.), ‘The Changing Functions of the Western European Union. Introduction 
and Basic Documents’, Dordrecht, 1994; Duke, S., ‘The Elusive Quest for European security: from EDC to CFSP’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2000, p. 13–14. 
16 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, p. 26.  
17 For an elaboration on the different views see Chapter 5, section 5.6.





with more credit than other international bodies such as the WEU, the European Union 







of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness to act collectively in the common 
defence	remain	central	to	the	Alliance’s	security	objectives’.21 More importantly, this 
strategic	concept	broadened	NATO’s	mandate,	which	permitted	the	Alliance	to	conduct	
a	much	wider	range	of	tasks	and	adopted	a	broader	concept	of	security	stating	that	‘…















18  Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, p. 2-3. 
19  Ibid, p. 4. 
20 Article 2, Washington Treaty, 1949: ‘The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly 
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles 
upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to 
eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all 
of them’. 
21 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, November 1991, Rome, par. 30, Hereafter NATO Strategic 
Concept 1991.   
22  NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 8.
23  NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 31.
24  NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 5.
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Operation Allied Force in 1999,29	the	out-of-area	debate	was	on	the	table	again,	
recapitulated	by	some	as	a	question	of	going	‘out	of	area	or	out	of	business’.30 Operation 
Allied Force in particular led to debate between the NATO allies, because the operation was 










operations were to be made on a case-by-case basis, preferably with a UN mandate. 
25 IFOR; Implementation Force in Bosnia Herzegovina from 1995. SFOR; Stabilization Force in Bosnia Herzegovina from 
1996. KFOR; Kosovo Force, from 1999.
26 For an elaboration on the out-of-area issue, see: Thies, W. J., ‘Why NATO Endures’, Cambridge University Press, New York, 
2009, p. 202-239.
27 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense   of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 111.
28 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, p. 50. 
29 NATO Kosovo air campaign, from March 24 to June 10, 1999. 
30 The out-of-area or out-of-business phrase already dates from before the end of the Cold War: Sherwood Randall, E., ‘The 
out-of-area debate: the Atlantic alliance and challenges beyond Europe’, Rand corporation, 1985. 
31 Sperling, J., Webber, M., ‘NATO: from Kosovo to Kabul’, International Affairs, Volume 85, Issue 3, May 2009, Pages 
491–511.
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However,	the	NATO	strategy	of	1999	did	show	that	opinions	and	interests	had	changed	
and	‘placed	no	formal	geographic	limitations	on	NATO’s	activities,	nor	did	it	identify	a	










Collective Defence: The Article 5 Task 
The end of the Cold War and the threat from the WP alliance had led to a reduction in the 














32 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 148.
33 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, Washington DC, April 24, 1999.  Hereafter NATO Strategic 
Concept 1999. 
34 NATO Strategic Concept 1999. 
35 For instance: The US embassy in Nairobi Kenia, was bombed on August 7, 1998. The USS Cole, a guided missile destroyer 
of the US Navy, was bombed by a suicide attack of the terrorist group Al Quada, 12 October 2000.
36 NATO Strategic Concept 1999, par. 24: ‘Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would 
be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global 
context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage 
and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers 
of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting 
the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington 
Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind.’
37  Ibid, par. 29. 
38  NATO Strategic Concept 1999.
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39 Carpenter, T. G., ‘NATO’s New strategic concept: coherent blueprint or conceptual muddle?’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
23:3, p. 7-28.  
40 The attacks on 11 September 2001 were four coordinated terrorist attacks by the Islamic group of Al Qaeda against the US. 
41 Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 
2006, p. 187.
42 NATO Update, ‘Invocation of Article 5 confirmed’, 2001. Available at:  http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2001/1001/
e1002a.htm, accessed 14-06-17. 
43  Invocation of Article 5 after 9/11 lead to the deployment of NATO’s Standing Naval Force Mediterranean 
(STANAVFORMED) and the deployment of five NATO AWACS to support the US air force: Operation Active Endeavor. 
Initially an Article 5 operation in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks against the US. Terminated in October 2016 and 
succeeded by Operation Sea Guardian, set at the Warsaw Summit, 2016. 
44 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, the European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 185-187. 
45 North Atlantic Council, Prague Summit Declaration, November 2002, par. 4.
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the scope of NATO tasks.46	As	well	as	the	broadening	of	Article	5	as	a	result	of	9/11,	there	was	
a	diminishment	of	Article	6,	linked	to	Article	5,	as	an	armed	attack	was	not	directly	the	most	
imminent threat.47





crisis,	and	thus	directly	linked	to	it’.49 In that sense, a possible invocation of collective 














responsibility to Article 4.51	The	Lisbon	Strategic	Concept	of	2010	again	broadened	the	
collective	defence	Article	5,	as	a	direct	conventional	military	attack	on	a	NATO	member	was	
46 Gärtner, H., Cuthbertson, I. (eds.), ‘European Security and Transatlantic Relations after 9/11 and the Iraq War’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005, p. 135. 
47 NATO Washington Treaty, 1949, Article 6: ‘For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is 
deemed to include an armed attack:  on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian 
Departments of France, on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in the North 
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer; on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these 
territories or any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed on the date when 
the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer’.
48 Article 4, Washington Treaty, 1949; ‘The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the 
territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened’.
49 Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 
2006, p. 187. 
50 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 3.
51 NATO Strategic Concept 1999, par. 24; ‘Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies, from whatever direction, would 
be covered by Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty. However, Alliance security must also take account of the global 
context. Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, including acts of terrorism, sabotage 
and organised crime, and by the disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of large numbers 
of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, can also pose problems for security and stability affecting 
the Alliance. Arrangements exist within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington 
Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to risks of this kind’.
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presumed less likely.52	In	contrast,	non-conventional	threats	emerged	and	consequently	




















after	Syrian	attacks	on	Turkey.57 Furthermore, the Baltic states invoked Article 4 in March 
2014	as	a	response	to	the	extraterritorial	crisis	in	Crimea	(Ukraine).	In	all	these	cases,	
the consultation mechanism of Article 4 subsequently became more important, but the 





52 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, ‘Active Engagement, Modern Defense’, Lisbon, November 2010.
53 Global NATO refers to expanding NATO protection by including all democracies around the world, such as: Australia, 
India, Japan. Daalder, I., Goldgeier, J., ‘Global NATO’, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, September/October, 
Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. – Oct. 2006), p. 105-113. 
54 Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 
2006, p. 100. 
55  NATO Press conference, 3 August 2009.
56 For an elaboration on NATO as a political organization, see: Michel, L., ‘NATO f: Au revoir to Consensus?’ National Defense 
University, US National Defense   University Strategic Forum, No. 2 August 2003; Hendrickson, R. C.,’NATO’s Secretary-
General: Organizational Leadership in Shaping Alliance Strategy’, in: Aybet, G., Moore, R. R., ‘NATO in search of a vision’, 
Georgetown University Press, 2010; Mouritzen, H., ‘In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the Grips of Nations’, Defense & 
Security Analysis, 18 October 2013, p. 346. 
57 3 October 2012, artillery shell fired from Syria by the Syrian Army killed five and injured at least ten Turkish citizens in 
Turkey. ‘Turkey-Syria border tension’, The Guardian, London, retrieved October 5, 2012.
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as a fourth operational domain.60	However,	a	joint	definition	of	hybrid	warfare,	as	a	
result	of	the	debate	of	a	strategy	and	common	approach	among	the	NATO	allies,	had	been	
problematic	due	to	the	continuing	conflict	among	the	allies	regarding		NATO’s	tasks	and	
priorities. In the end, an enhanced cyber defence policy was approved, which stated that 
cyber defence would become part of collective defence and, as a result, could lead to the 
invocation of Article 5.61	Nevertheless,	it	was	acknowledged	that	NATO	could	not	provide	





cyber	defence,	maritime	security	and	training	exercises.63 Over forty measures to advance 
NATO-EU	cooperation	in	agreed	areas	were	approved	by	NATO	foreign	ministers	in	
December	2016.	Close	cooperation	between	NATO	and	the	EU,	not	the	OSCE,	had	become	
58 North Atlantic Council, ´The Wales Declaration on the Transatlantic Bond ,́ Wales Summit, September 5 2014. Hereafter 
NATO Wales Declaration 2014, par. 13. 
59 NATO Wales Summit, September 2014, par. 13.
60 Hybrid warfare: NATO Wales Summit, September 2014, para 13. Cyberspace accepted as a domain of operations: NATO 
Warsaw Summit, July 2016, par. 70-71. 
61 North Atlantic Council, ‘The Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security’, Warsaw Summit, July 2016. Hereafter NATO 
Warsaw Summit 2016, par. 70-71. 
62 See: Pindjak, P., ‘Deterring Hybrid Warfare: A Chance for NATO and the EU to work Together?’, Romanian Military 
Thinking, Jan-Mar 2015, Issue 1, p. 175-178; Giegerich, B., ‘Hybrid Warfare and the Changing Character of Conflict’, 
Connections, Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes, Vol. 15, No. 2 
(Spring 2016), p. 65-72. 
63  Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary 
General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw, 8 July 2016.
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oofdstuk 4                           O
p zoek naar staat en eenheid
an important element in the development of an international comprehensive approach to 
non-conventional	threats	and	crisis	management,	which	required	the	application	of	both	
military	and	civilian	means.	This	was	in	contrast	to	the	Berlin	Plus	agreements,	which	were	
focused on military cooperation and a one-way cooperation procedure: from NATO to the 








4.3.3 Broad Perspective on Security and Defence  







Cold War, Article 2 mandated NATO with a post-Westphalian approach to international 
governance	and	opened	the	doors	for	further	broadening	of	NATO’s	mandate.64 




of a broader concept of security, as detailed above.66	Furthermore,	it	was	agreed	in	Rome	
that,	as	well	as	collective	defence,	dialogue	and	cooperation	within	Europe	as	a	whole	was	




detail in Chapter 5. 
64 Article 2, Washington Treaty, 1949;  ‘The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly 
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles 
upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to 
eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all 
of them’. 
65  NATO Strategic Concept 1991. 
66  In contrast with the EU treaties, NATO strategic concepts are not legally binding, but political documents.  
67 NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 34. 
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with employability worldwide,69 which thus ended the out-of-area debate.70 
	 In	2003,	the	concept	of	out-of-area	operations	moved	beyond	the	Euro-Atlantic	area,	













consequences for the NATO mandate. 
Broadening Collective Defence and Crisis Management Operations 
Ever	since	the	beginning	of	the	1990s,	a	debate	has	been	ongoing	between	NATO	allies	with	
regard	to	the	NATO	scope	of	tasks	of	Article	5	and	non-Article	5	operations,	such	as	crisis	
management	operations	under	UN	and	OSCE	auspices.72 So-called non-Article 5 operations 
would	lead	to	a	broadening	of	NATO’s	mandate	and	this	resulted	in	debates	between	the	
NATO allies.73 
68 Approved by NATO Defence ministers, Brussels, 12-13 June 2003.
69 NATO Defence ministers, Brussels, 12-13 June 2003: ‘In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able 
to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed…’
70 Acknowledging that acts of terrorism, from whatever direction, posed a direct threat to NATO member states. 
71 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 184-188. 
72 As a result of the broadening of NATO’s tasks, the new tasks were mostly referred to as crisis management operations, 
as did the WEU and EU (e.g. the Petersberg tasks), instead of peacekeeping which was the terminology used for UN 
operations. Later on, more often the term crisis response operations was used to include non-military tasks, like training.
73 For an elaboration on the diversity of the NATO tasks, see; Yost, D. S, ‘NATO Transformed: The Alliance’s New Roles in 
International Security’, United States Institute of Peace, 1999, p. 272-286.  
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From	the	Treaty	and	summits,	a	difference	between	Article	5	and	non-Article	5	operations	
can	be	distinguished	in	the	phrasing	of	Article	5:	‘…the	attack	from	outside...’.	What	differed	






 A broader approach to non-Article 5 operations was subsequently adopted, as was 
stated	in	2010:	‘NATO’s	role	in	crisis	management	goes	beyond	military	operations	aimed	
at	deterring	and	defending	against	threats	to	Alliance	territory	and	the	safety	and	security	
of Allied populations. A crisis can be political, military or humanitarian and can also arise 
from	a	natural	disaster	or	as	a	consequence	of	technological	disruptions’.75	Though	this	
broad	perception	on	security	was	not	backed	up	institutionally,	by	providing	NATO	with	the	
necessary civil means, which will be elaborated on below. Articles 4 and 5 therefore meant 
the	difference	between	territorial	defence	and	expeditionary	capabilities,	which	in	practice	
were hardly mutually exclusive or contradictory.76	The	idea	was	that,	in	an	increasingly	
globalised	world,	instability	along	NATO’s	periphery	was	not	without	implications	for	the	
security of its members. For some of the NATO members, especially the former WP states, 




boundary between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations was abandoned. It was concluded 
that	if	there	was	a	need	for	a	differentiation	between	the	operations,	this	would	be	decided	
upon by the rationale for the operation, in other words case by case. ‘Allies decide on a 
case-by-case	basis	and	by	consensus,	to	contribute	to	effective	conflict	prevention	and	to	
engage	actively	in	crisis	management,	including	non-Article	5	response	operations.	Some	
operations may also include partners, non-NATO countries and other international actors. 
NATO	recognises	that	the	military	alone	cannot	resolve	a	crisis	or	conflict,	and	lessons	
learned from previous operations make it clear that a comprehensive political, civilian and 
military	approach	is	necessary	for	effective	crisis	management’,	which	broadened	NATO’s	
mandate	and	flexibility	in	the	choice	for	operations.77 
Even Broader than Collective Defence and Crisis Management Operations 
After	the	broadening	of	NATO	tasks	in	the	1990s,	with	crisis	management	and	the	lessons	
of	the	interventions	in	the	Balkans	and	Afghanistan,	a	broader	approach	to	security	was	
74 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2016, p. 150.
75 ‘Employing an appropriate mix of political and military tools to help manage emerging crises. NATO is an enabler 
which helps members and partners train and operate together’, Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-article5 Crisis Response 
Operations, AJP-3.4(A), 15 October 2010.
76  NATO, ‘Allied Joint Doctrine for Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations’, AJP-3.4(A), 15 October 2010. 
77 NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010, par. 8-9.
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again	introduced	in	2006	at	the	Riga	Summit.78 The ISAF operation proved the necessity for 





approach and cyber and hybrid tasks, as was stressed above. One of the priorities contested 
between the allies was to obtain the capability of a broader mandate and even civilian 
competences for NATO. To the allies of the former WP, it was necessary to focus on the 
Alliance’s	collective	defence	task,	as	security	in	the	near	area	for	these	allies	had	the	highest	
priority.	These	allies	assumed	that	any	other	tasks	were	a	distraction	for	NATO	regarding	
budget,	focus	and	capabilities	and	had	no	priority.79 On the other hand, the US was in 
favour	of	a	strong	NATO	crisis	management	capacity,	including	military	and	civil	capabilities	
needed	for	the	operations	and	in	competition	with	other	security	organizations.80 For other 
allies, who were members of both NATO and the EU, a distinct division of labour had to be 






to	remain	a	pure	collective	defence	organization.81 France had always been a proponent 
of	strengthening	a	broad	EU	CSDP,	but	not	of	NATO	developing	a	broad	range	of	civil	and	








78 For an elaboration on the NATO comprehensive approach: Wendling, C., ‘The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military 
Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective’, IRSEM, 2010; Sloan, R. S., ‘Permanent Alliance? NATO and 
the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama’, The Continuum International Publishing Group, 2010, New York; 
Hazelbag, L. J., ‘De geïntegreerde benadering in Afghanistan: tussen ambitie en praktijk’, Dissertatie, Erasmus Universiteit 
Rotterdam, 2016, p. 359-376.  
79 Coning, C., de, Friis, K., ‘Coherence and Coordination. The limits of the Comprehensive Approach’, Journal of International 
Peacekeeping,15, 2011, p. 248-251.
80 Hofmann, S.  C., ‘Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP’, 
Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, No. 1, Mar. 2009, p. 45-52.
81 Irondelle, B., Merand, F., ‘France’s return to NATO: the death knell for ESDP?’, European Security Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2010; 
Fortmann, M., Haglund, D., Hlatky, S., von, ‘France’s ‘return’ to NATO: Implications for Transatlantic Relations’, European 
Security, Taylor & Francis, 2010.
82 Holmberg, A., ‘The changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy’, European 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2011, p. 531. 
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broad approach towards its tasks, both internally and externally. It needs to develop further 






view of the comprehensive approach, while some of the states had tried to maintain a 
clear	distinction	between	the	EBAO	and	the	comprehensive	approach,	using	the	EBAO	as	
an internal NATO concept and the comprehensive approach as an international concept to 















involved in the security arena, such as the UN and NGOs.89 To NATO, this comprehensive 
83 NATO Secretary General Rasmussen, August 3, 2009.
84 In NATO jargon at first more broad operations were referred to as ‘Effect Based Approach to Operations’ and ‘Full 
Spectrum Operations’ instead of a comprehensive approach. 
85 Wendling, C., ‘The Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective’, 
IRSEM, 2010, p. 41. 
86 Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, p. 50.
87 The Comprehensive Political Guidance, November 2006, par. 5 and 6: ‘The Alliance will continue to follow the broad 
approach to security of the 1999 Strategic Concept and perform the fundamental security tasks it set out, namely 
security, consultation, deterrence and defence , crisis management, and partnership.’ Available at: https://www.nato.int/
cps/ic/natohq/official_texts_56425.htm, accessed 2-3-2018. 
88 NATO Riga Summit Declaration, November 2006:  ‘In order to undertake the full range of missions, the Alliance must 
have the capability to launch and sustain concurrent major joint operations and smaller operations for collective defence 
and crisis response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance; it is likely that NATO will 
need to carry out a greater number of smaller demanding and different operations, and the Alliance must retain the 
capability to conduct large-scale high-intensity operations’. Confirmed at the NATO Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, 2009. 
89 NATO non-military operations: training Iraqi security forces, logistical support to the African Union in Darfur, Tsunami 
relief efforts in Indonesia, relief of the earthquake in Pakistan (2005) and hurricane Katrina (2006). AWACS protection for 
international sporting events like the Olympic Games in Greece 2004. In most of these operations NATO is backing the 
UN.
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approach	entailed	civil-military	cooperation,	which	did	go	further	than	the	2003	NATO	













complex environment, as NATO ‘…feels itself forced to take on certain civilian tasks in the 
absence	of	civilian	actors	in	the	field…’,	although	NATO	was	not	always	equipped	to	perform	
all the activities required.95 
	 The	broadening	of	tasks	raised	another	issue	of	discord	between	the	NATO	allies,	
for both Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations. As NATO operations functioned on the 





between the member states as to how broad the scope of NATO tasks should be, a need for 
a comprehensive approach within the European security architecture resulted in inter-
organizational	cooperation.	This	was	illustrated	by	the	2009	Strasbourg/Kehl	Summit	that	
highlighted	a	need	for	stronger	coordination	with	the	UN	and	the	EU.	This	coordination	
90 NATO Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC) Doctrine, June 2003, AJP-9. 
91 North Atlantic Council, Riga Summit, November, 2006, par. 20: ‘We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other 
international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and African Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meeting these new challenges, 
combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively. In our operations today in Afghanistan and the Western 
Balkans, our armed forces are working alongside many other nations and organisations’. Confirmed at the Strasbourg/
Kehl Summit, 2009. 
92 North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, 2009, par. 1:  ‘We aim to strengthen our cooperation with other 
international actors, including the United Nations, European Union, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and African Union, in order to improve our ability to deliver a comprehensive approach to meet these new challenges, 
combining civilian and military capabilities more effectively.’
93 North Atlantic Council, Strasbourg/Kehl Summit, 2009, par. 56.
94 Rynning. S., ‘NATO in Afghanistan. The Liberal Disconnect’, Stanford University Press, 2012, p. 185. 
95 Coning, C., de, Friis, K., ‘Coherence and Coordination. The limits of the Comprehensive Approach’, Journal of International 
Peacekeeping, 15, 2011, p. 249.
96 The ‘costs lie where they fall principle’ means that if a NATO country contributes to a NATO operation, it pays for these 
operations.




security architecture like France, NATO had always been perceived as a US-dominated 
organization.	This	perception	was	mirrored	within	the	EU,	where	some	officials	were	
reluctant to expand the military role of the EU, as the EU had other tasks to perform and 
could deliver a much broader security approach than NATO. One example was the operation 
in	Afghanistan	from	2003	onwards,	as	EU	officials	were	opponents	of	the	EU	working	under	
NATO and US domination.97 
	 For	that	reason,	therefore,	although	a	broader	approach	was	taken	at	the	Strasbourg/
Kehl	Summit,	the	Summit	likewise	demonstrated	that	for	a	genuine	comprehensive	
approach, NATO lacked the comprehensive capacity. Similar to 1991, as a compromise, 
NATO	chose	for	the	European	security	architecture	to	take	a	genuine	comprehensive	
approach to the Euro-Atlantic security provision instead of a pure NATO approach. 
Consequently, the resolution of the debates between the NATO allies was the combination 
of	acceptance	of	the	necessity	to	cooperate	with	other	actors	in	the	field	together	with	





explored in Chapter 5.99  
	 All	in	all,	NATO	adopted	a	broader	approach	to	security	and	acknowledged	formally	
that purely military operations would not win the peace. Simultaneously, it was accepted 
that NATO alone did not have the mandate or the capabilities to address all the problems 
inherent	in	conflict	situations,	resulting	in	the	acknowledgement	that	to	address	conflicts,	
it	was	necessary	to	cooperate	with	other	organizations.		






approach,	which	was	claimed	to	be	necessary	for	effective	crisis	management.101 As a result, 
it was accepted that NATO could in principal participate, contribute or in some cases be 
the	lead	organization	in	all	sorts	of	operations	around	the	globe,	which	broadened	NATO’s	
97 For an elaboration on EU officials and EU missions and operations, see: Smith, M. E., ‘Europe’s Common Security and 
Defence Policy. Capacity-Building, Experiential Learning, and Institutional Change’, Cambridge University Press, 2017.
98 To date, NATO’s definition of a comprehensive approach remains vague in terms of strategy and capacities. 
99 Holmberg, A., ‘The Changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy’, European 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2011, p. 540.
100  NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010, par. 1.
101  Ibid, par. 8-9. 










to train and develop local forces in crisis zones and also the capacity to identify and train 
civilian	specialists	from	member	states	made	available	for	rapid	deployment.	Though	these	









concept of resilience and the question of how to address resilience by the member states, 
was	linked	to	Article	5.	The	aim	of	highlighting	Article	3	was	the	link	that	emerged	as	a	result	




Article 3 meant that an appeal could be made to capacities such as civil preparedness and 
cooperation	with	civil	authorities,	the	private	sector,	other	international	organizations	and	
partner states.106   
102  Ibid, par. 9.
103  Flockhart T. (ed.), ‘Cooperative Security: NATO’s Partnership Policy in a Changing World’, DIIS Report 2014:01, 
Copenhagen, p. 134.
104  Exemplified by the cyber-attacks on Estonia in 2007.
105  NATO Washington Treaty, 1949, Article 3; ‘In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, 
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack’.
106 Rühle, M., ‘Deterrence: what it can (and cannot) do, NATO Review, 20 April 2015. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/
articles/2015/04/20/deterrence-what-it-can-and-cannot-do/index.html. Accessed 1 April 2017; Shea, J., ‘Resilience: a core 
element of collective defence’, NATO Review, 30 March 2016. https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/
resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html. Accessed 1 April 2017. Brinkel, T, ‘The Resilient Mind-Set and 
Deterrence’, Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies 2017, Springer, 2017.
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on resilience in Article 3 linked national security more closely to the NATO task of collective 
defence.	Furthermore,	NATO’s	prime	task	had	never	been	invoked	for	the	tasks	for	which	
it	was	mandated,	due	to	debate	amongst	the	members	and	the	paradox	that	arose	as	a	
















on in Chapter 2.110 NATO did embrace cooperative security and adopted a comprehensive 
approach concept, but this did not result in an internal security task as the traditional 
concept	of	cooperative	security	implies.	For	instance,	NATO	had	no	official	role	in	the	area	
of	migration		or	in	countering	terrorism	in	the	homeland	of	one	of	the	member	states.	
107 NATO Strategic Concept, 1999, par. 3. 
108 The 1999 Strategic Concept, the year of NATO’s 50th anniversary, allied leaders adopted commitment of members to common defense   
and peace and stability of the wider Euro-Atlantic area. It was based on a broad definition of security which recognized the importance of 
political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the defense   dimension. It identified the new risks that had emerged 
since the end of the Cold War, which included terrorism, ethnic conflict, human rights abuses, political instability, economic fragility, and 
the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of delivery. The document stated that the Alliance’s fundamental 
tasks were security, consultation, and deterrence and defense , adding that crisis management and partnership were also essential to 
enhancing security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
109  NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010.
110 NATO defines cooperative security as follows: ‘The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and security 
developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through 
partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-
proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies 
that meet NATO’s standards’. NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010, par. 4c. 
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cooperative security task shows that it is permeated militarily in a restricted manner by 
cooperation,	exercises,	training	and	education,	but	did	not	evolve	that	much	institutionally,	


















civil military capability. 
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4.4.2 A Narrow Perspective on Security and Defence  










to accommodate the rearmament of Germany in 1954. The Brussels Treaty had a similar 
clause	as	NATO’s	Article	5	of	the	Washington	Treaty.112	German	rearmament	was	at	first	
planned	within	the	new	setup	of	a	European	Defence	Community	(EDC)	within	the	European	
integration	process,	a	French	initiative.113 In 1954, this plan failed as a result of the refusal of 
the	French	Parliament	to	ratify	the	agreement	because	of	the	supranational	aspects.114 
111 For an elaboration on the development of defence within the EU during the Cold War, see: Segers. M., ‘Reis naar het 
continent. Nederland en de Europese integratie, 1950 tot heden’, Prometheus, 2013; Middelaar. L., ‘De passage naar 
Europa. Geschiedenis van een begin’, Historische uitgeverij, 2009; Howorth, J., ‘Security and Defence Policy in the 
European Union’, The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 1-7. 
112 Modified Brussels Treaty on 23 October 1954, Paris Accords, Article 5: ‘If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the 
object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of 
the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power’. 
113 The Treaty establishing the European Defence Community, also known as the Treaty of Paris, was signed on 27 May 1952, but rejected 
by the French and Italian parliaments. The treaty was based on the plan of the French prime minister Pleven (‘the Pleven Plan’). 
114 For an extensive overview of the development of a defence component in the European integration process and the 
development of the WEU organization see: Eekelen, van, W., ‘Debating European Security, 1948-1998’, Den Haag, 1998;  
Bloed, A., Wessel, A., (red.), ‘The Changing Functions of the Western European Union. Introduction and Basic Documents’, 
Dordrecht, 1994; Duke, S., ‘The Elusive Quest for European Security: from EDC to CFSP’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, p. 13–14; 
Howorth, J., ‘Security and Defence Policy in the European Union’, The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 1-7. 
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From	the	eighties	onwards,	the	WEU	provided	the	platform	for	discussing	European	security	
and	defence	matters	outside	the	EU,	as	defence	debates	within	the	EU	were	a	no-go	for	the	
UK. At the same time, the Europeans felt the need to carry more of the burden for European 
security	themselves	in	relation	to	the	US.	This	even	resulted	in	joint	actions	by	the	WEU	in	
an operational role in the Gulf and Balkans wars.115 













security actor. The European states and the EU had to establish a position within a new 








The future of the EU as a security actor therefore always remained an issue between the 
European allies, labelled by Howorth as the Euro-Atlantic Security Dilemma.120 These 
debates	ranged	between	the	option	of	an	autonomous	EU	independent	of	NATO	and	the	US	
to	a	complementary	EU	strengthening	NATO	within	the	European	security	architecture.		
 As a result, the European initiatives of Maastricht were not backed by any institutional 
developments or capabilities, especially not in the defence domain.
115  Actions in the Gulf from 1988-1990, followed by actions related to the war in Yugoslavia from 1992-1996, such as 
Operation Sharp Guard together with NATO in the Adriatic Sea, and actions in South-East Europe from 1997-2001 on the 
Danube together with the OSCE, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania, Croatia and Kosovo. 
116  The Gulf War included a coalition of 35 states against Iraq in response to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait and 
lasted from August 1990 to February 1991. 
117  From June 1991, violent conflicts in Yugoslavia broke out as a result of several wars of independence and ethnic conflicts. 
118  The Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Maastricht, Article 2.
119  Ibid, article J.4.
120  Howorth, J., ‘Security and Defence Policy in the European Union’, The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 3.
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The traditional opponents, the more transatlantic states, such as the UK and the 
Netherlands,	feared	competition	with	NATO	if	a	genuine	‘D’	in	the	EU’s	scope	of	tasks	
and institutional structure was created. However, the traditional proponents, France and 
Germany,	were	in	favour	and	several	proposals	saw	the	light	of	day	with	regard	to	a	more	
common EU defence capability, but none of them was realised.121 A compromise between 
the Transatlanticists and Europeanists was found in Article J.4 of the TEU: ‘The Union 
requests	the	Western	European	Union	(WEU),	which	is	an	integral	part	of	the	development	





Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established 




NATO, on the one hand allowed European forces to act in crisis situations, which were not 
in the interest of the US, and to use US assets via NATO. On the other hand, this was an 
opportunity for the US to keep European forces linked to the US.124 The compromise would 
remain	leading	in	US-EU	defence	relations,	labelled	as	‘separable	but	not	separate’.	The	











121  For instance, the German-French proposal and four other members of the WEU to the EU IGC of 1997, see: Reichard, M., 
‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 2006, p. 193-194. 
122  Treaty on the European Union, Article J4. 
123 For an elaboration on the development of the position of the WEU in relation to NATO and EU, see: Drent, M., ‘A 
Europeanisation of the Security Structure. The Security Identities of the United Kingdom and Germany’, Dissertation, 
University of Groningen, the Netherlands, 7 October 2010, p. 44-46.
124  Howorth, J., ‘Security and Defence Policy in the European Union’, The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 6. 
125  NATO, ‘Defence Ministers Meeting’, Berlin, M-NAC-1(96)63, June 1996. 
126  Howorth, J., ‘Security and Defence Policy in the European Union’, The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 6.
127 Keukeleire, S., ‘Het buitenlands beleid van de Europese Unie: de diversiteit en praktijk van het buitenlands beleid en van de 
communautaire methode als toetssteen voor het externe beleid van de EG, het gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid en het 
structureel buitenlands beleid van de EU’, Kluwer, 1998, p. 367-459.
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necessary	to	take	a	position	in	the	EU’s	political	and	security	domain	and	start	participating	
in	crisis	management	operations	outside	the	NATO	area.128 In addition, in other areas of the 
European	integration	process	cooperation	broadened	and	deepened,	strengthening	the	
monetary	union	and	the	enlargement	process,	which	resulted	in	a	spill-over	effect	to	the	
security and defence domain.129	As	a	result,	the	UK	and	France	proposed	boosting	European	






parliament and commission.131 For some, the concept of mutual defence felt like a natural 
identity	of	the	EU,	having	a	right	to	common	defence	as	a	result	of	the	collective	self-
defence Article 51 of the UN Charter, as was the case for the WEU and NATO. For others, 











neutral position, such as Denmark. The Scandinavian countries were in favour of a union 





128  In 1997 the German constitution was changed. 
129  The spill-over effect will be elaborated in Chapter 7.
130  See for an elaboration on the institutional development: Chapter 6.
131 Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, 
2006, p. 195-203.
132 For an elaboration on the position of the UK in the EU’s CSDP, see: Wallace, W., ‘Europe or Anglosphere? British Foreign 
Policy Between Atlanticism and European Integration, John Stuart Mill Institute, 2005. Oliver, T., Wallace, W., ‘A bridge 
too far: The United Kingdom and the transatlantic relationship’, in: ‘The Atlantic alliance under stress: US-European 
relations after Iraq’, Cambridge University Press, 2005. Wallace, W., ‘The collapse of British foreign policy’, International 
Affairs, 81(1), 2005, p. 53-68. Cornish, P., ‘United Kingdom’, p. 371-386, in: Biehl, H., Giegerich, B., Jonas, A., (Eds.), 
‘Security Cultures in Europe. Security and Defense Policies across the Continent’, Springer, 2013.  





task.133   




states and the UK.134 This idea contained the abolition of the WEU and the creation of a 
new	defence	pillar,	which	meant	that	the	decision-making	aspects	of	the	WEU	would	be	
transferred to the EU, while the military functions would be subsumed into NATO, with the 
possibility for opponents to opt out. This idea was never realised, however. Another idea 





declined by the US.136  








strategy	of	pre-emptive	strikes	(2002).137 As a result, Paris and Berlin pushed for a mutual 
defence commitment to be part of the constitution.138 Opponents, the transatlanticists, the 
neutrals	and	NATO	officials139	argued	that	it	would	undermine	the	Alliance	and	that	the	EU	
would never be able to defend its own territory. 
133  Duke, S., ‘The EU, NATO and the Lisbon treaty: still divided within a common city’, 2011, p. 10.
134  Ibid, p. 11-12. 
135  France, Germany and Belgium vetoed the US-UK Iraq invasion within the NATO Council, 11 February 2003. 
136 Black, I., ‘NATO bid to defuse EU defence row’, The Guardian, 2003, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/
oct/21/nato.politics, accessed on 14 August 2017.
137 The pre-emptive strike concept dated from the Bush Doctrine (2001) which referred to various related foreign policy 
principles of US President George W. Bush: it contained the policy that the US had the right to secure itself against 
countries that harbour or give aid to terrorist groups.
138  French Minister Dominique de Villepin and German Minister Joschka Fischer, November 2003.
139 See for instance: Mayer, S., ‘Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU transform Provision of 
External Security’, Contemporary Security Policy, Volume 32, No. 2, August 2011, p. 308-333. 
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However,	though	partially	restrained	by	the	US,	the	UK	and	the	EU-neutral	countries,	the	
concept of common defence140	was	finally	introduced	with	the	mutual	defence	clause	in	the	
Treaty	of	Lisbon	of	2009.	The	mutual	defence	clause,	better	known	as	Article	42.7,	stated	that	
‘…Member	States	shall	have	towards	it	an	obligation	of	aid	and	assistance	by	all	the	means	
in	their	power,	in	accordance	with	Article	51	of	the	UN	Charter…’.	141 With this, the possibility 
was created of military assistance from EU member states on national territory of other 





















 On the other hand, Article 42.7 did not result in an institutionalized military 
headquarters	or	assigned	troops144 and the unanimity rule prevailed.145	So,	the	EU’s	
common	defence	was	limited	from	the	beginning	with	regard	to	strategy,	planning	and	
institutional	building.	Furthermore,	Article	42.7	did	not	apply	to	all	EU	member	states,	
140 Within the Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, 13 December 2007, common defence is labelled as mutual defence. 
141 The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
13 December 2007, Article 42.7, the Mutual Defense Clause: ‘If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its 
territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their 
power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the 
security and defense policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with 
commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the 
foundation of their collective defense and the forum for its implementation’. 
142  From June 2010, the WEU Treaty was cancelled and the WEU was abolished from June 2011 after one year’s postponement.
143  Except for Denmark and Sweden, with the general opt-out for mutual CSDP.
144 With the Treaty of Lisbon, the Petersberg tasks were enlarged with disarmament, military advice and assistance, conflict 
prevention and post-conflict stabilisation. 
145 Treaty of Lisbon, 1997, Article 28 A4; ‘Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those 
initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously’.
























from the concept of common defence aimed at threats from outside the territory, as Article 





would	be	obliged	to	assist	one	another.150 As a result, the EU adopted a broader approach 





146  Sweden, Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland and Malta are not NATO members. 
147  Parkes, R., ‘Migration and terrorism: the new frontiers for European solidarity’, EUISS, Brief 37, December 2015. 
148  Declaration on combatting Terrorism, European Council, Brussels, 25 March 2004. 
149  Treaty of Lisbon, 2009, Article 222. 
150  At the Council meeting of 24 June 2014, further elaboration of the solidarity concept was implemented.
151  Duke, S., ‘The EU, NATO and the Lisbon Treaty: still divided within a common city’, 2011, p. 10.
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In	comparison,	the	EU’s	responsibility	with	regard	to	the	solidarity	clause	lies	within	
the EU territory is not part of the CSDP and therefore falls under the competence of the 
EU:	the	EU	organs	in	contrast	with	the	mutual	defence	clause.	This	meant	supranational	
decision-making,	with	the	Commission’s	instruments	and	budget	at	the	EU’s	disposal.	In	
contrast, the mutual defence clause has been embedded within the CFSP and is therefore 
intergovernmental	under	the	authority	of	the	Council,	and	thus	the	member	states,	with	no	
explicit	role	for	the	other	EU	organs	according	to	the	Treaty	of	Lisbon.152 Furthermore, the 
competences of the solidarity clause were limited to the territory of the EU member states, 
whereas	the	EU’s	mutual	defence	clause	has	not	been	limited	geographically,	as	it	is	there	to	









request, no further measures were taken.154 
4.4.3 Broad Perspective on Security  










152  For an elaboration on the involvement of the EU institutions in CSDP, see: Rehrl, J. (Ed.), ‘Handbook on CSDP. The 
Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union’, Third edition, 2016, Chapter 2.  
153  17 November 2015. 
154 For an elaboration on the French invocation of Article 42.7, see: Biscop, S., ‘The European Union and Mutual Assistance: 
More than Defence’, The International Spectator, Taylor and Francis group, 2016.  
155 Western European Union Council of Ministers, ‘Petersberg Declaration’, Bonn, 19 June 1992, II. Par. 4: Humanitarian and 
rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management. In 2002 the tasks were expanded 
with joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention task and post-conflict 
stabilisation. The Petersberg tasks incorporated; humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat 
forces in crisis management, which in 2002 were expanded with joint disarmament operations, military advice and 
assistance tasks, conflict prevention task and post-conflict stabilisation, Article 43 of the Treaty of the EU. 
156  Helsinki European Council Meeting, 10-11 December 1999. 
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Apart	from	the	military	side	of	crisis	management,	from	the	1990s	many	initiatives	were	
adopted	on	the	civil	side,	broadening	the	EU’s	scope	of	tasks	by	treaties,	strategies,	
institutionalization and capabilities. This was evidenced by the adoption of an EU 
framework	on	combating	terrorism	in	2001,	followed	by	the	EU	counterterrorism	strategy	
of	2005.157	In	2002,	at	the	European	Council	of	Seville,	a	comprehensive	approach	was	












Cooperation	on	Internal	Security	(COSI).164 In addition, a so-called European Civil 
Protection	Force	(ECPF)	was	created,	which	was	mandated	for	a	terrorist	attack	or	natural	
disaster within and outside EU territory.165 Furthermore, as well as the European Security 
Strategy	(ESS)	of	2003,166 which addressed threats from outside the EU, the Council adopted 
an	Internal	European	Security	Strategy	(ISS)	for	the	European	Union,	addressing	threats	







157 Rehrl, J. (Ed.), ‘Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union’, Third edition, 2016, 
p. 114-118. 
158  European Council, Seville Summit, 21-22 June 2002. 
159  European Council, Santa Maria da Feira Summit, 19–20 June 2000.
160 These capabilities were identified in four civilian priority areas: police, strengthening the rule of law and civilian 
administration, civilian protection. Additional civilian priorities developed in later years, including support for the EU 
Special Representatives, monitoring and the set–up of civilian response teams.
161  Position of EGF towards EU and other international organizations elaborated on in Chapter 6.
162  European Council, Brussels, August 2007. 
163 Rule of law (200 experts), governance, civil protection, police, monitoring of (pre/post) conflicts and support for EU 
special representatives.   
164 This cooperation incorporates police cooperation and customs, protection of the borders and judicial cooperation, 
European Council, February 25, 2010, Article71.
165  2 March 2010. 
166  The ESS will be discussed in Chapter 6.
167  European Council, Brussels, 25-26 March 2010.















model of modular cooperation, which was retained within the defence policy of the EU. 
A European Security and Defence Policy 
From	2010,	newly	emerging	threats	inside	and	outside	the	EU	had	an	impact	on	the	EU’s	
security and defence domain. Examples were the Russian invasion in Crimea and an 
increasingly	isolationist	position	of	the	US,	which	damaged	transatlantic	relations.	The	EU	
integration	process	itself	was	under	pressure	as	a	result	of	the	different	crises	the	EU	had	to	








168  Crisis management task broadened with: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue missions, military 
advice and assistance, conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post conflict stabilisation.
169  Rehrl, J. (Ed.), ‘Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union’, Third edition, 2016, 
p. 119-124.
170 The European debt crisis dated from 2009, when some of the eurozone member states (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain 
and Cyprus) were unable to repay or refinance their government debt under their national supervision without the 
assistance of other eurozone countries and the European Central Bank (ECB), European Central Bank (europa.eu), accessed 
15 September 2017.   
171 France had to deal with many terrorist attacks, but one of the most horrendous was the November 2015 Paris attacks were 
a series of co-ordinated attacks throughout France took place. The bombings in Belgium occurred at Brussels Airport in 
Zaventem and Maalbeek metro station in Brussels, 22 March 2016. Germany had to deal with several terrorist attacks, like 
the one in Berlin on the Christmas market, 19 December 2016. 
172 EU Commission report, ‘Study on the Feasibility of Establishing a Mechanism for the Relocation of Beneficiaries of 
International Protection’, July 2010, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/e-library/docs/pdf/final_
report_relocation_of_refugees_en.pdf, accessed 20 February 2015. 
173 European Council conclusions, 16 June 2015. 























such as the UK and the Netherlands. The US demand for more European responsibility was 
accompanied by US distrust towards new EU security and defence   initiatives, such as the 
Permanent	Structured	Cooperation	(PESCO)	and	the	European	Defence	Fund	(EDF),	which	
will be explored in Chapter 6. On the other hand, the European distrust towards the US 
strengthened	as	a	result	of	the	US	rebalancing	of	its	interests	directed	at	the	Asian	pacific	
and	the	US	position	on	issues	outside	the	transatlantic	area,	illustrated	by	the	differences	




174 European Union, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe – A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign 
and Security Policy’, June 2016, available at: https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/3eaae2cf-9ac5-
11e6-868c-01aa75ed71a1, accessed 20 February 2015. 
175  Ibid, p. 19. 
176  Ibid, p. 10-11. 
177  Ibid, p. 20. 
178  The Iran nuclear deal was an agreement between the Islamic Republic of Iran, the permanent members of the UNSC, 
Germany and the EU established in 2015.
179  Debates on the concept of strategic autonomy, see: Biscop, S., ‘Fighting for Europe. European Strategic Autonomy 
and the use of Force’, January 2019, available at: www.egmontinstitute.be/fighting-for-europe-european-strategic-
autonomy-and-the-use-of-force/ ; Fiott, D., ‘Strategic Autonomy towards ‘European Sovereignty‘ in Defence?’, The EU 
Institute for Security Studies, November 2018.  
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The	broadening	of	the	EU	scope	of	tasks	did	not	end	with	the	adoption	of	the	EUGS	in	2016.	
In	April	2016,	the	EU	adopted	a	hybrid	policy,	including	joint	communication	on	countering	
hybrid threats in order to activate an EU response and to build on European solidarity, 
mutual assistance and the Lisbon Treaty. This hybrid policy was institutionalized by a hybrid 
fusion	cell,	a	hybrid	centre	of	excellence	and	support	to	the	member	states	with	regard	to	
resilience	and	strategic	communication	for	countering	hybrid	warfare.180 The adoption of 
hybrid policy and its institutionalization was in connection with NATO, as was the creation 
of the cyber domain, which will be elaborated on in Chapter 6.





experiences of missions and operations, and paradoxically in competition and, at the same 
time, linked to NATO. 
	 From	its	creation,	EU’s	CSDP	followed	a	broad	approach	to	security	and	defence,	built	
on mainly civilian but also military aspects. The development of the EU as a civilian power 
has been easier than that of a military power, because of the assumed competition with 
NATO and because most of the civilian instruments, capabilities and funds were already 











mandate was accompanied by instruments and funds of the Commission, especially in the 
internal	security	domain,	which	was	increasingly	linked	to	the	external	domain	of	security	







180  Foreign Affairs Council, ‘Council Conclusions on adoption of hybrid policy’, 2016, available at:   https://www.consilium.
europa.eu/en/meetings/fac/2016/04/18-19/, accessed 17 April 2017.  









a common defence task. Furthermore, the EU adopted a mandate with both internal and 
external	security,	in	contrast	to	the	NATO	and	OSCE	paths	of	broadening.	Finally,	in	respect	
of	crisis	management	and	the	civilian	aspect	of	security,	the	EU	had	a	more	far-reaching	




4.5 The OSCE Path of Broadening 
4.5.1 Introduction  
Ever	since	its	founding	in	1975,	the	OSCE	has	been	built	on	the	concept	of	cooperative	
security, as was described in Chapter 2, and a broad approach to security. On the one hand, 
this	concerned	the	‘indivisible	security’,	implying	that	security	of	one	state	cannot	be	at	








4.5.2 A Narrow Perspective on Security and Defence  








181  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Helsinki 1975. Hereafter CSCE, Helsinki Final Act, 1975. 
182  CSCE Helsinki Final Act, 1975. 
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interpreted as policy domains in which the OSCE holds its mandate: cooperation in the 




Final Act.184 This task concerned arms control and military transparency and was mandated 
within	the	organization’s	territory,	even	though	weapons	of	mass	destruction	had	always	




the CFE Treaty to the new security architecture. This CFE treaty limited the conventional 
weapons and postures of the members of the former two military alliances. In addition, in 












	 Finally,	the	CFE	treaty	was	paralysed	by	the	Russian	withdrawal	in	2007.188 In response, 
NATO	countries	ceased	to	be	bound	by	the	CFE	information	exchange	and	inspection	
183  Idem.
184  See the CSBM’s, CSCE Helsinki Final Act, 1975.
185  A legal document signed on 19 November 1990, by 22 countries from NATO and the former WP including the SU. 
186  OSCE Istanbul Document 1999, 18-19 November 1999. Hereafter OSCE Istanbul Summit Declaration, December 1999. 
187  NATO members refused to ratify the revised CFE accord until Russia fulfilled commitments it made to Georgia and 
Moldova when the adapted CFE Treaty was concluded at the OSCE Summit Istanbul, 1999.
188 Russia suspended its participation in the Treaty in 2007 as a reaction to the crisis in Georgia and Ukraine and the positions 
of the Baltic states as NATO members. From the Russian side, the suspension included the end of the limitation of the 
number of conventional weapons. See: Arms Control Association, ‘The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty 




4.5.3 Broad Perspective on Security and Defence   











indivisible and comprehensive security, which implied a broader approach than solely the 
military domain and included the three policy domains. The approach to security within 
the OSCE has always been that ‘…all commitments were equally applicable across the OSCE 
area	and	where	‘singularisation’	of	any	particular	situation	was	not	acceptable	and	was	
strongly	resisted…’.191 These policy domains, the OSCE mandate, were broadened at the end 
of	the	Cold	War;	this		will	be	explored	in	more	detail	below.		










and the Adapted CFE Treaty at a Glance’, 2017, available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/cfe, accessed 17-09-
2018.  In March 2015, the Russian Federation announced that it had taken the decision to completely stop its participation 
in the Treaty.
189 For an elaboration on the status of arms control possibilities within the OSCE area: Kulesa, L., ‘The Role of Arms Control in 
Future European Security’, Security and Human Rights, Brill and Nijhoff Publishers, Volume 25, 2014, No. 2, p. 221-234. 
190  CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, ‘The Challenges of Change’, 9-10 July 1992. Hereafter CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration, 
1992. 
191 Lundin, L. E., ‘Tearing Down Real and Cognitive Walls preventing OSCE Compassion for Human Security in South-Eastern 
Europe’, Security and Human Rights, Brill and Nijhoff Publishers, Volume 26, 2015, No. 1, p. 110. 
192  CSCE Paris Document 1990, ‘Charter of Paris for a New Europe’, Paris 1990. Hereafter CSCE Paris Summit Declaration, 
1990. 


































require the consent of the states directly concerned, would be limited in duration and 
193  CSCE Paris Summit Declaration, 1990. 
194  CSCE Helsinki Document 1992, ‘The Challenges of Change’, 9-10 July 1992. Hereafter CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration, 
1992.
195  UN operations I and II (UNOSOM I) in Somalia was established from April 1992. The operation was a disaster for the UN as 
the ceasefire was ignored, the fighting continued and put operations at great risk.  
196  CSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration, 1992. Chapter III, par. 17.
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in order inter alia to ensure that the role and functions of a third party military force 
in	a	conflict	area	are	consistent	with	CSCE	principles	and	objectives’.198 From there, the 




three	relating	to	human	rights	and	one	in	the	field	of	military	security.200 In practical 
terms,	this	meant	instruments	and	mechanisms,	divided	into	control	and	emergency	
















has never been invoked.202	Although	the	OSCE	had	already	played	a	role	in	peacekeeping,	
197  Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, International Peace Institute, New York, June 
2016, p. 3.
198 CSCE Rome Document 1993, ‘CSCE and the New Europe—Our Security Is Indivisible’, Rome 1993. Chapter II, par. 2. 
Hereafter CSCE Rome Summit Declaration 1993. 
199 The OSCE could provide the mandate for organizations to undertake peacekeeping and if necessary the OSCE could 
provide a coordinating framework. 
200 For an elaboration: OSCE, ‘History and Background of Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) in the OSCE, 
2004, available at: https://www.osce.org/fsc/40035, accessed 19-04-2017.
201 CSCE Budapest Document 1994, ‘Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era’, 21 December 1994. Hereafter CSCE 
Budapest Summit Declaration, 1994. 
202 For an elaboration on the background of OSCE peacekeeping mandate: Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace operations: Soft Security 
in Hard Environments’, International Peace Institute, New York, June 2016, p. 3-4.    
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demonstrated	by	the	verification	mission	in	Kosovo,203 these operations and missions 
remained	civil	in	nature.	With	regard	to	the	OSCE	path	of	broadening,	therefore,	there	has	
never	been	an	OSCE	case	of	a	military	peacekeeping	operation.	This	will	be	discussed	in	
more depth in Chapter 6. 
	 ‘Budapest’	was	followed	by	the	Lisbon	Declaration	of	1996,	which	led	to	a	Common	and	
Comprehensive Security Model for Europe in the 21st century,204	aimed	at	strengthening	
the European security architecture. In addition, the Istanbul Summit of 1999 adopted the 
Charter for European Security, which could be seen as a follow-up of the Paris Charter 
of	1990.	Together,	‘Paris’,	‘Lisbon’	and	‘Istanbul’	formed	the	foundation	of	the	OSCE	
organization	that	aimed	to	build	a	pan-European	organization,	whereby	security	in	Europe	


















of the number of states that became members of NATO and the EU, but also because of the 
broadening	of	the	scope	of	tasks	of	these	organizations	and	additional	capabilities,	which	
resulted	in	competition	between	the	organizations.	
 One of the Russian counteractions was the initiation of  what was known as the Corfu 
process	from	2008,	when	the	Russian	president	Medvedev	initiated	a	restart	of	the	OSCE	
dialogue	and	attempted	to	embed	a	discussion	of	political-military	issues	in	a	wider	security	
context,	including	aspects	of	the	human	dimension.206 The proposal was the creation of a 
renewed	OSCE	replacing	an	ever	broadening	NATO	and	EU.	Russia	even	suggested	that	this	
203  Established October 1998 and closed in June 1999. 
204 See:  OSCE, Lisbon Document, 1996, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/39539?download=true, accessed 1-7-2018.
205  For further information: OSCE, ‘OSCE Strategy to address threats to security and stability in the twenty-first century’, 
2003, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/17504?download=true, accessed 1-7-2016. 
206 Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘’Embedded security’’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 24:4, p. 589.
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207  OSCE, ‘The OSCE Concept of Comprehensive and Co-operative Security. An Overview of Major Milestones’, June 2009. 
Available at: https://www.osce.org/cpc/37592?download=true, accessed 1-7-2018.
208 OSCE Astana Commemorative Declaration 2010, ‘Towards a Security Community’, 1 December 2010. Hereafter OSCE 
Astana Ministerial Council Summit, December 2010, available at: https://www.osce.org/mc/74985, accessed 2-7-2017.
209 OSCE Vilnius Ministerial Council, 6 December 2011. 
210  For an elaboration on the Corfu process: Kropatcheva, E., ‘Russia and the role of the OSCE in European Security: a 
‘Forum’ for dialog or a ‘Battlefield’ of interest?, European Security, 21:3, 2012, p. 370-394.
211  NATO Strategic Concept, Lisbon, 2010. 
212  In 2004, 2005, 2009, 2010 and 2014 executed by the ODIHR deploying an election support team.
213  Galbreath, D. J., ‘The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’, Routledge Global Institutions, 2007, Great 
Britain, p. 118.
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Half Empty Glass  
Before	the	Crimea	crisis	of	2014,	in	2012	the	OSCE	was	once	again	mandated	with	a	broader	
approach	to	security,	addressing	new	threats	with	the	establishment	of	a	so-called	




OSCE mandate was stalled as well as the security and economic dimension of the OSCE, or 
pillars,	so	to	speak;	as	a	result,	the	human	dimension	had	become	the	core	business	of	the	
OSCE. This was partly because the other pillars were not supported as OSCE core activities 
as they were too delicate to be handled by the inclusive OSCE, and partly because they had 
been	taken	over	by	the	other	two	organizations	of	the	European	security	architecture.	
4.5.4 The OSCE Path of Broadening 





by EU members. However, the focus on state security, by some parties, was not equally 
complemented	by	a	broadening	and	strengthening	of	the	OSCE	with	an	institutional	




the	crisis	in	Yugoslavia	and	the	UN	debacle,215 resulted in a takeover by NATO in the execution 
of	crisis	management	operations	and	a	firmer	position	of	NATO	in	crisis	management	








214  Encapsulating the following issues: terrorism, organised crime, cyber threats and illicit trafficking.
215 The UN mission in Yugolsavia, UNPROFOR, formed in February 1992 failed as attacks occured against personnel and 
aircrafts, personnel was taken hostage, and finally on 12 July 1995 UNPROFOR failed to deter the Bosnian Serb attack on 
Srebrenica. After the Dayton Agreement UNPROFOR was followed by the NATO led force IFOR, from 20 December 1995.
216 For an elaboration on this process: Asmus, R. D., ‘Opening NATO’s Door, How the Alliance remade itself for a New Era’, 
Columbia University Press, New York, 2002. 
217  Ghebali, V. Y., ‘Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation’, in: European 
Security in a Global Context’, p. 63-66, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) ‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external 
dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.




































218  Ibid, p. 63.
219  Ibid, p. 64.
220  This was suggested by Switzerland in 2006, but not adopted by the other states.











Before 1990 Washington Treaty (1949) WEU Brussels Treaty (1948) Helsinki Final Act (1975)  
1990 Paris Summit: European 
security architecture and 
multilateralism, conflict 
prevention, CFE 
1991 Rome Summit: adoption of 




Development of crisis 
management mechanism 
1992 Maastricht Treaty: CFSP and 
ESDP, crisis management 
operations via Petersberg 
Declaration 
Helsinki Summit: CSCE 
as regional organization 
(Chapter VIII, UN Charter), 
peacekeeping organization 
1993 Rome Summit, from 1991 to 
1993 development of CSBMs
1994 Budapest Summit: OSCE 
legitimising organization for 
crisis management operations 
within European security 
architecture 
1996 Lisbon Summit: strengthening 
of OSCE role in European 
security architecture, CFE and 
CSBMs
1997 Petersberg tasks incorporated 
in Treaty of Maastricht
1998 St. Malo Summit (UK-FR)
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1999 Washington Summit: 
broader threat perception, 
including Article 4 and 5, DCI
Treaty of Amsterdam, HHG, 
military crisis management 
operations 
Istanbul Summit: Charter for 
European Security as follow-
up to ‘Paris’ and ‘Lisbon’
2000 Adoption of civilian crisis 
management capabilities 
2001 Invocation of Article 5 Framework for terrorism
2002 Prague Summit: Treaty 
change to Article 5, including 
terrorism. Formalisation of 
out-of-area Article 5 and 
non-Article 5 operations
Adoption of civil and military 
comprehensive approach 
2003 European Security Strategy, 
EGF
Broadening of mandate 
including terrorism, illegal 
migration and organised crime 
2005 Strategy on countering 
terrorism
2006 Riga Summit: intention 
to adopt comprehensive 
approach (CPG)
2007 CPCC Russian withdrawal from CFE
2008 CHG, revised ESS Corfu process: Russian 
attempt to strengthen the 
OSCE 
2009 Adoption of CPG Treaty of Lisbon: mutual 
defence (Article 42.7), 
solidarity clause (Article 222), 
PESCO
Revised concept of 
comprehensive and 
cooperative security
2010 Lisbon Summit: 
institutionalization of 
civil-military capability in 
cooperation with other 
organizations, Article 5 
and non-Article equality 5 
operations, Article 4 and 
5 link
Internal security strategy, 
COSI, ECPF
Astana Summit: rebirth ‘Paris’ 
2012 Broadening of mandate; 
including new threats, 
adoption of TNT 
2013 Cyber security strategy
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2014 Wales Summit: adoption 
of hybrid and cyber tasks, 
including Article 5
Cyber defence policy 
framework
2015 Adjusted internal security 
strategy, invocation of Article 
42.7
2016 Warsaw Summit: NATO-EU 
cooperation comprehensive 
approach, re-entry of 
Article 3 
EUGS. Hybrid policy including 
centre of excellence and 
fusion cell
Table 4.1 Overview of key moments on the paths of broadening of the different security organizations 




be followed by a comparison of the development of the broad security perspective of all 
three	organizations.			






















and Article 42.7 of the EU are not mutually exclusive. They could be activated simultaneously 
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to	bring	about	a	coordinated	EU-NATO	response.	The	EU	could,	for	example,	work	in	
partnership	with	NATO	in	border	management	and	cyber	security	within	and	outside	NATO	
and the EU. 




















holistic manner in its policy and activities, but without a military component.223 The 
comprehensive	part	of	the	OSCE’s	definition	of	security	goes	much	further	than	NATO’s	
definition	and,	at	first,	the	EU’s	definition.	Nevertheless,	through	the	first	two	decades	
of the 21st century, the EU has developed a comprehensive approach in treaties, tasks 
and	capabilities	which	competes	with	the	concept	of	the	OSCE	in	performing	its	tasks.	





cooperation with other actors. 
 Third, it was observed that the implementation of a broader security approach required 
a	strengthening	of	relations	and	coordination	with	other	actors.	However,	as	with	all	
security	organizations	of	the	European	security	architecture,	these	relations	were	weakly	
221  Holmberg, A., ‘The Changing role of NATO: exploring the implications for security governance and legitimacy’, European 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 4, December 2011, p. 540.
222  A comprehensive approach is defined differently between the organizations, see article: Wendling, C., ‘The 
Comprehensive Approach to Civil-Military Crisis Management: A Critical Analysis and Perspective’, IRSEM, 2010. 
223  Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 584.






























Explaining the Paths of Broadening 
This	chapter	analysed	the	paths	of	broadening	of	NATO,	the	EU	and	the	OSCE	individually	
and	in	comparison.	The	question	is	why	the	observed	changes	occurred	and	how	this	path	








224  NATO Wales Summit, September 2014. 
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organization	and	strengthening	or	combining	some	kind	of	common	defence	agreement	







































225  Sloan, S., ‘Is NATO Necessary but Not Sufficient?’, in: Aybet, G., Moore, R.R., ‘NATO in search of a vision’, Georgetown 
University Press, 2010, p. 268.



































indeed been dependent on state interests and membership. On the other hand, as well as 
state	interests,	the	mandate	and	performance	of	security	organizations,	as	actors,	enabled	
them	to	be	players	in	the	field,	depending	on	what	they	had	to	offer	in	terms	of	tasks,	
forms of cooperation, capabilities, funds and institutionalization. All this empowered 
226  Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, p. 26.  
227 Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, p. 198. 





















security and cooperative security were adopted but interpreted, institutionalized and 
applied	differently	by	the	individual	security	organizations.	For	NATO,	collective	defence	
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5.3.2 Membership  
 
From a Western European Organization to Enlargement within the OSCE Area  
The	end	of	the	Cold	War	set	off	a	new	road	to	enlargement	and	partnership	for	NATO.	
The	first	NATO	summit	after	the	Cold	War	was	the	Rome	Summit	in	1991,	which	stated	
2  NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, par. 3.
3  Glaser, C. L., ‘Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe’, International Security 18, summer 1993, 
p. 10.  
4  NATO Strategic Concept, 1991, par. 34. 





operations, on a case-by-case basis, to address the crisis in the Balkans. The possibility 
was	also	created	for	the	OSCE	to	address	other	crises	as	a	result	of	the	emerging	grey	zone	

















stability within the wider Europe. 
After	the	first	declarations	of	the	need	for	cooperation	and	dialogue	after	the	end	of	the	
Cold	War,	criteria	for	becoming	an	actual	member	of	NATO	were	settled	in	the	‘Study	on	
NATO	Enlargement’	of	1995,	and	have	changed	little	since	then.10 The aim of this study 
was to enhance security and extend stability, initiated by the US in close cooperation with 
Germany.11 
5  North Atlantic Council, Oslo Summit, June 1992. 
6  Including 16 NATO member states and 22 former WP members and SU republics. Predecessor of EAPC, 20 December 
1991. 
7  NATO Washington Treaty, 1949, Article 10.
8  Idem.  
9 Study on NATO Enlargement, September 1995, par.4, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_
texts_24733.htm?,  accessed 1-7-2018.
10  Ibid, whole document.
11 Before becoming a full member, candidates participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP), NATO, ‘Membership Action 
Plan’, 1999, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.htm?, accessed 1-7-2018. Combined 
with the so-called Perry Principles, articulated by the US Secretary of Defense William Perry, from February 3, 1994, to 
January 23, 1997 under the Clinton administration. 
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To	join	the	Alliance,	nations	were	expected	to	respect	the	norms	and	values	of	the	North	



















 The military criteria, such as interoperability with other NATO members, played a 
marginal	role.15	There	were	no	strict	demands	in	qualitative	or	quantitative	force	targets	








12   The Perry Principles contained four principles that underpinned NATO’s past success: collective defence, democracy, 
consensus, and cooperative security.  Applied to enlargement this meant that; new members must have forces able to 
defend the Alliance; be democratic and have free markets, put their forces under civilian control, protect human rights, 
and respect the sovereignty of others: accept that intra-Alliance consensus remains fundamental; and possesses forces 
that are interoperable with those of existing NATO members.
13 These criteria include a functioning democratic political system based on a market economy; fair treatment of minority 
populations; a commitment to resolve conflicts peacefully; an ability and willingness to make a military contribution to 
NATO operations; and a commitment to democratic civil-military relations and institutions.
14  Study on NATO enlargement, 1995, Chapter 1. 
15  Ibid, par. 43 and 44. 
16  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 39.
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The	driving	forces	and	initiatives	for	enlargement	after	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	mainly	





end of the Cold War, as a result of the incorporation of Germany, the Balkans wars and the 



















17 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 194. 
18 Dunay, P., The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements’, p. 77, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 
‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, 
Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.
19 Ruggie, J. G., ‘Consolidating the European Pillar: The key to NATO’s future’, The Washington Quarterly, January 7, 1997, p. 
109. 
20 Sarotte, M. E., ‘1989.The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe’, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, p. 1-10; 
Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense   of the West. NATO, The European union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 103-106; Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic 
Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 103-106.
21 Andrews, D. (ed.), ‘The Atlantic Alliance under Stress. US-European relations after Iraq’, Cambridge University Press, 
2005, p. 239. 
22  Speech by President Clinton, 22 October 1996.
23 Solomon, G. B., ‘The NATO enlargement Debate, 1990-1997’, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, The 
Washington Papers 174, Washington D.C., 1998, p. 122. 
24 Ruggie, J. G., ‘Consolidating the European Pillar: The key to NATO’s future’, The Washington Quarterly, January 7, 1997, p. 
109. 
25 Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 47-49.  
































delicate and was eventually blocked by Germany and France. Both countries were in favour 
of	cooperating	with	Russia	within	the	security	architecture,	not	excluding	Russia,	as	it	was	
26  Ibid, p. 45.
27  Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Croatia, Georgia and Ukraine. 
28  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 236-242.  
29  The Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria and Romania.
30  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 22.
31  Ibid, p. 45-46.  
32  North Atlantic Council, Bucharest Summit, April 2008. 


























in the NATO military command structures. As a result, President De Gaulle withdrew France 
from	the	military	structures.	In	1996,	President	Chirac	attempted	to	become	a	full	member	
of	NATO’s	Military	Committee,	proposing	that	NATO’s	southern	command	be	passed	from	
American to European leadership.37	This	proposal	stranded	in	1997	in	the	NAC	after	US	
refusal. More than ten years later, the French President Sarkozy appealed to the American 
Congress	and	in	2009	France	re-entered	NATO’s	military	structure.38
33 Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense   of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 234-236. 
34  International diplomatic crisis between Georgia and Russia began in 2008 and led to the outbreak of the Russian-
Georgian war in 2008 and the 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas dispute. 
35 NATO-Ukraine cooperation: NATO, ‘Relations with Ukraine’, 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_37750.htm#. NATO-Georgian cooperation: NATO, ‘Relations with Georgia’, 2017, available at: https://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/topics_38988.htm, accessed 12 July 2018.
36  NATO Wales Summit, September 2014.
37  Irondelle, B., Merand, F., ‘France’s return to NATO: the death knell for ESDP?’, European Security Vol. 19, No. 1, March 
2010, p. 32. 
38  10 March 2009. 





membership based on the concept of collective defence, could contribute to security 
in	the	whole	of	Europe.	As	the	London	Summit	(1990)	declared	‘We	recognise	that,	
in the new Europe, the security of every state is inseparably linked to the security of 
its	neighbours.	NATO	must	become	an	institution	where	Europeans,	Canadians	and	
Americans	work	together	not	only	for	the	common	defence,	but	to	build	new	partnerships	
with all the nations of Europe. The Atlantic Community must reach out to the countries 




























39 Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the 
meeting of the North Atlantic Council; ‘The London Declaration’, 05 July-06 July, 1990, withdrawn 19-10-2017.  
40  For an elaboration: NATO, ‘North Atlantic Cooperation Council Statement on Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation’, 
1991, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23841.htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 13 July 
2018. 





















to	include	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’.45 NATO declared in the Act to have no intentions 






bilateral and multilateral cooperation. 
41 Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 236-242.  
42  Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense   of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
press, Manchester, 2016, p. 111. 
43  Daalder, I., Goldgeier, J., ‘Global NATO’, Foreign Affairs, September/October, 2006, p. 6. 




47  The NRC evolved into a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision and joint action. 
More than 25 working groups and committees have been created to develop cooperation on terrorism, proliferation, 
peacekeeping, theatre missile defence, airspace management, civil emergencies, defence reform, logistics, scientific 
cooperation for peace and security: NATO-Russia Council, ‘About NRC’, n.d., available at: https://www.nato.int/nrc-
website/en/about/index.html, accessed 3-7-2018.
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Multilateral cooperation was conceptualised by the European Atlantic Partnership Council 
(EAPC),48	again	initiated	by	the	US	Clinton	administration,49 which replaced the NACC. The 
aim	was	to	improve	interoperability	among	member	states	and	partner	forces.	This	placed	
NATO at the centre of the European security architecture.
	 Bilateral	cooperation	was	introduced	by	the	Partnership	for	Peace	(PfP)	initiative,	
established in 1994. The aim of PfP was to support states in their transformation of 








included a possibility for PfP countries to contribute to NATO operations, as was the case 
in Kosovo and Bosnia.50	This	marked	a	shift	from	solely	multilateral	cooperation	to	the	
inclusion of bilateral cooperation. Cooperation was established in the form of Individual 
Partnership	Programs	(IPPs)	and	differentiation	with	the	PARP.51 
Enlargement	with	new	members,	supported	by	the	US	and	strengthening	the	European	
pillar within the Alliance, was perceived by the NATO members as a relevant achievement.52 
Nevertheless,	NATO’s	second	round	of	enlargement,	which	included	the	Baltic	States	
and states from the Western Balkans, necessitated a more structured approach to the 





the conditionality of defence   reform, it also included a yearly preparation to qualify for 
membership	and	contained	subjects	that	were	related	to	politics,	economy,	defence,	
finance,	intelligence	and	legal	requirements.53 Nevertheless, the MAP was built on PfP 
and	likewise	did	not	include	automatic	membership,	though	it	did	promise	cooperation	
beyond the PfP concept. Furthermore, the MAP did not substitute for full participation in 
PfP’s	planning	and	review	process.54 For example, Cyprus, as a member of the EU, is not 
48  Formerly established at the NATO meeting with partners in Sintra, Portugal, May 1997. 
49  In 2017 the EAPC included 50 members and partners of NATO.  
50  Many PfP countries participated.
51  NATO, ‘Partnership for Peace Planning and Review Process’, 2014, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/
topics_68277.htm, accessed 27 February, 2018.  
52  Paris, 27 May 1997.
53  NATO, ‘Membership Action Plan (MAP)’, 1999, available at:  https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_27444.
htm?selectedLocale=en, accessed 10 July 2018.
54  Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 126.
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yet a NATO member or a member of the PfP, as a result of the dispute with Turkey. The MAP 
therefore	resulted	in	a	further	differentiation	of	NATO’s	path	of	widening.	





formal and institutionalised fora. Furthermore, the EAPC as ‘an institution…, played an 
important	role	but	never	became	an	important	factor	in	NATO’s	decision-making	process’.55 
Secretary-General	Rasmussen	pleaded	for	the	possibility	of	differentiation	of	high	and	low	




and between the alliance and its partners. For instance, over the years, NATO had to deal 












one hand because of the overlap of members and possible consequences for the NATO 
collective	defence	guarantee	and,	on	the	other,	because	of	the	non-EU	states	that	were	
NATO	members,	but	linked	to	the	EU	by	association	agreements,	such	as	Turkey.	
55  Ibid, p. 116. 
56  Secretary General Rasmussen, 2009. 
57  Cooperation of NATO as an international organization with a state like Russia or Ukraine.
58 Turkey had vetoed Israel’s participation in NATO exercises, as well as its presence at a NATO Summit, May 2011, in protest 
of the 2010 Gaza flotilla raid by Israeli commandos, in which nine Turkish activists were killed. Furthermore, Turkish-
Israeli relations further deteriorated after the 2011 UN report justifying the Mavi Marmara marine assault, which resulted 
in Turkey expelling the Israeli ambassador and suspending military cooperation. For an elaboration on Turkey-Israel 
relations see: Arbel, D., ‘The U.S.-Turkey-Israel Triangle’, Brookings Institution, Analysis Paper, number 34, October 2014. 
59 Wallander, C. A., ‘Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, International Organisation, volume 54, 
Issue 04, September 2000, p. 722-723. 
60 Flockhart T. (eds.), ‘Cooperative Security: NATO’s Partnership Policy in a Changing World’, DIIS Report, 2014:01, 
Copenhagen, p. 136.
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Furthermore,	ever	since	the	Berlin	Plus	agreements	of	2003,	NATO	and	the	EU	were	











	 The	US	had	already	initiated	the	Mediterranean	Dialogue	(MD)63 in 1994 and the 
Istanbul	Cooperation	Initiative	(ICI)64	in	2004,	as	well	as	PfP	and	EAPC.	These	concepts	
were	comparable	but	nevertheless	different,	as	the	MD	concept	was	bi-	and	multilateral	in	












NATO	a	right	of	first	refusal	if	it	should	come	to	Article	5	operations.66 On the other 
hand,	there	were	those	who	were	not	interested	in	a	global	NATO,	as	they	were	convinced	
that this would result in competition with the UN and the EU. Germany and France, as 
61  Smith, M. A., ‘EU enlargement and NATO: The Balkan experience’, p. 7 in: Brown, D., Shepherd, A. K., ‘The security 
dimensions of EU enlargement. Wider Europe, weaker Europe?’, Manchester University Press, 2007. 
62  Kamp, K. H., Reisinger, H., ‘NATO’s Partnerships after 2014: Go West!’, NATO Research Division, No. 92, Rome, 2013. 
63  NATO, ‘Mediterranean Dialogue’, 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52927.htm, accessed 
20 may 2018. 
64  NATO, ‘Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’, 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_52956.htm, 
accessed 20 May 2018.
65  ‘NATO in the 21st Century: Towards Global Connectivity’, Speech by NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen, at the Munich 
Security Conference, 7 February 2010.
66  Sloan, S., ‘Is NATO Necessary but Not Sufficient?’, p. 270, in: Aybet, G., Moore, R. R., ‘NATO in search of a vision’, 
Georgetown University Press, 2010. 
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changed	from	enlargement	to	engagement72 with countries outside the OSCE area, such as 







OSCE territory could not therefore be compared with the partnerships inside the OSCE 






67 Until 2008, these partners were referred to as contact states. At the Bucharest Summit, 2008, the partners across the globe 
initiative was launched. This partnership programme included political cooperation at staff level and operational and 
bilateral cooperation: information, exchange, training and exercise. From 2010 these programmes were stalled under the 
(PPC).
68  Daalder, I., Goldgeier, J., ‘Global NATO’, Foreign Affairs, September/October 2006, p. 6. 
69 PATG group includes: Afghanistan, Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mongolia, New Zealand and 
Pakistan.
70 Flockhart T. (eds.), ‘Cooperative Security: NATO’s Partnership Policy in a Changing World’, DIIS Report, 2014:01, 
Copenhagen, p. 103-106. 
71  NATO Strategic Concept, 2010, par. 23. 
72  Stated at the second inauguration of US President Obama, 21 January 2013. 
73  Howorth, J., ‘Security and Defence Policy in the European Union’, The European Union Series, 2nd edition, 2014, p. 140. 
74 Shreer, B., ‘Beyond Afghanistan NATO’s Global Partnerships in the Asia-Pacific’, Research Paper, NATO Defense   College, 
Rome, no. 75, April 2012.
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consultation that was developed inside the ISAF operation. All operational issues were 
also considered in partner format, instead of on the basis of the primacy of a NATO format. 
With	these	group	of	partners,	NATO	had	agreed	to	strengthen	its	institutional	capacity	to	









and	Partnerships	Committee	(PPC),	which	was	initiated	in	2010.78 This platform included 
enhanced	cooperation	with	five	states,79 and these states would have authority to advise 
decision-making	processes	within	NATO	in	the	context	of	their	troop-contributing	efforts	








75 NATO, ‘Operations and missions: past and present’, 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_52060.htm, accessed 10 July 2018.
76  The PMF is one of the Partnership tools and is applied when a partner wishes to join a NATO-led operation. The PMF sets 
out principles and guidelines for the involvement of all partner countries in political consultations and decision-shaping, 
in operational planning and in command arrangements for operations to which they contribute.
77  Flockhart T. (eds.), ‘Cooperative Security: NATO’s Partnership Policy in a Changing World’, DIIS Report 2014:01, 
Copenhagen, p. 135.
78 The PCSC meets in various formats: ‘at 29’ among Allies; with partners in NATO’s regionally specific partnership 
frameworks, namely the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative; with individual non-member countries in ‘29+1’ formats; as well as in ‘29+n’ formats on particular subjects, if 
agreed by Allies.
79  Australia, Finland, Sweden, Switzerland and Jordan.
80  Contributing to the NRF.
81 NATO,’Defence and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative’, 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_132756.htm, accessed 2-3-2018. 
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the request of the partners. In addition, the Framework for the South82 and the PCSC were 
established.83 















In terms of membership, from its creation, NATO cooperation with external partners 
became	more	and	more	differentiated.	This	was	a	result	of	the	increase	in	different	
concepts	of	cooperation	and	partnership	and,	even	in	the1990s,	it	became	clear	that	many	






the other hand, the concept of collective defence and cooperative security of NATO did not 
coexist.	The	aim	of	cooperation	for	reasons	of	stability	conflicted	with	the	fact	that	Alliance	




82  A military centre for the Mediterranean was created including anti-terrorism measures at JFC, Naples.  
83  Politico-military committee responsible for all NATO’s programmes with non-member countries.
84  For an elaboration: Kamp, K. H., Reisinger, H., ‘NATO’s Partnerships after 2014: Go West!’, NATO Research Division, No. 
92, Rome, 2013.
85  Mearsheimer, J. J., ‘Back to the Future; Instability in Europe after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 
(Summer 1990), p. 43.
86  Wallander, C. A. ‘Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO After the Cold War.’ International Organization 54, no. 4 
(2000), p. 720.













From the end of the Cold War, NATO viewed three pillars as its main or most important 
tasks.	One	of	them	was	enlargement	and	partnership,	encapsulated	in	the	NATO	concept	
of	cooperative	security.	These	partnership	programmes	entailed	multiple	functions.	On	
the one hand, partnership entailed stability, reform and democratisation. On the other, 
partnership	represented	the	interests	of	the	NATO	organization	and	its	allies.	Partners	
could contribute operational capabilities that members lacked. Partnership, instead of 
membership and institutionalization, allowed the member states to deepen cooperation 
in	fields	of	mutual	interest,	such	as	peacekeeping	and	peace	enforcement,	while	denying	










This concerned the relationship with partners, but it also applied to members within 







conceptualised as the traditional approach, as was outlined in Chapter 2, or as the OSCE 
concept	of	cooperative	security.	In	contrast,	NATO	defined	the	concept	as	a	duty	to	be	
87  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 23
88  Ibid, p. 50. 
89  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 260-264.
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engaged	with	global	affairs,	which	was	implemented	in	several	partnership	programmes.90 
With	the	NSC	of	2010,	NATO	linked	enlargement	and	partnership	programmes	directly	to	































90  NATO Strategic Concept, 2010, par. 4c; ‘Cooperative security. The Alliance is affected by, and can affect, political and 
security developments beyond its borders. The Alliance will engage actively to enhance international security, through 
partnership with relevant countries and other international organizations; by contributing actively to arms control, non-
proliferation and disarmament; and by keeping the door to membership in the Alliance open to all European democracies 
that meet NATO’s standards’.
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of	cooperative	security.	These	partnership	programmes	entailed	multiple	functions.	On	
the one hand, partnership entailed stability, reform and democratisation. On the other, 
partnership	represented	the	interests	of	the	NATO	organization	and	its	allies.	Partners	
could contribute operational capabilities that members lacked. Partnership, instead of 
membership and institutionalization, allowed the member states to deepen cooperation 
in	fields	of	mutual	interest,	such	as	peacekeeping	and	peace	enforcement,	while	denying	










This concerned the relationship with partners, but it also applied to members within 







conceptualised as the traditional approach, as was outlined in Chapter 2, or as the OSCE 
concept	of	cooperative	security.	In	contrast,	NATO	defined	the	concept	as	a	duty	to	be	
87  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 23
88  Ibid, p. 50. 
89  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 260-264.
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5.4.2 Membership
 









moral and political necessity. Furthermore, Germany had a vested interest in a stable and 
prosperous middle and Eastern Europe. In contrast, France was more hesitant, as it feared 










associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members 
of	the	EU.’94	These	criteria	were	politically	and	legally	stricter	than	the	NATO	criteria	and	





92  Dunay, P., ‘The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements’, p. 76 in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 
‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, 
Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.
93  For an elaboration on pro and contra arguments on enlargement policy:  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the 
Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 64-66. 
94  Membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule 
of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well 
as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the 
candidate’s ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union. European Council, Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993. 
95  Dunay, P., ‘The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements’, p. 76, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 
‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, 
Oxon, Great Britain, 2009. 
96   European Council, Copenhagen, June 1993. 
















the	UK’s	reasoning	was	that	more	broadening	would	lead	to	less	deepening.99 On the other 
hand,	although	the	south	eastern	part	of	Europe	was	already	engaged	in	the	Stabilisation	
and	Association	Process	(SAP),	the	so-called	Barcelona	process100, the French president 
Sarkozy	initiated	and	pressed	for	stronger	cooperation	with	the	Mediterranean	and	










creation. This is usually referred to as the possibility of opt-in and opt-out for almost all 
97  European Commission, ‘Agenda 2000: for a stronger and wider Union’, COM 97, 15 July 1997.
98  It was pronounced by the Commission that Ukraine and Georgia were not ready for the EU and neither was the EU. 
Barosso, Chairman of the Commission, October 27, 2006. 
99  For an elaboration on the position of the UK towards EU integration, see: Liddle, R., ‘The Europe Dilemma: Britain and 
the Drama of EU Integration’, Bloomsbury Academic, 2014.
100  European Council, Thessaloniki, June 2003.
101  Speech of French president Sarkozy during election campaign, 16 July 2007. 
102  Including 42 states, July 2008. For an elaboration:  Union for the Mediterranean, ‘Who we are, what we do’, available at: 
https://ufmsecretariat.org/, accessed 10-9-2018, and see:  Gaub, F., Popescu, N., ‘The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of 
grey’, Chaillot Papers, no. 136, December 2015, p. 9.
103  Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: 
Interdependence, Politicization, and Differentiation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 22: 6, 2015, p. 12. 
104  Juncker, 14 July 2014. 






Membership and CSDP Cooperation
The	establishment	of	the	Copenhagen	criteria	in	the	1990s	did	not	involve	any	
requirements in the ESDP area, basically because the ESDP itself was in a constructive 
phase	and	cooperation	within	the	security	area	was	first	prioritised	within	NATO	by	the	
old members and the new aspirants.106	Until	2000,	the	aspirant	member	states	had	had	no	
problems	with	aligning	their	foreign	and	security	policy	to	the	EU,	as	it	was	linked	to	NATO.	




armed forces, and the ones that had had to create new armed forces as some of them had 




members. These interests were focused on the OSCE area, the relation between the US 
and Europe and the position of Russia.109	The	new	members’	interests	were	not	really	
prioritised	by	crisis	management	operations	far	from	home,	such	as	the	Iraq	war	of	2003	
and	operations	in	Afghanistan	and	Africa.	As	in	the	case	of	the	NATO	enlargement	path,	









105  Elaborated on in Chapter 2. 
106  Dunay, P., The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements’, p. 76, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 
‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, 
Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.
107  Dunay, P., The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements’, p. 76, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 
‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, 
Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.
108  Shepherd, A. J. K., The implications of EU enlargement for the European security and defense policy’; Smith, M.A., 
‘EU enlargement and NATO: The Balkan experience’, p. 7. In: Brown, D., Shepherd, A.K, The security dimensions of EU 
enlargement. Wider Europe, weaker Europe?’, Manchester University Press, 2007, p. 28. 
109  Idem.
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(SAA),111 linked to the SAP,112 which served as the basis for implementation of the accession 













aim of the SAA and SAP explicitly included provisions for future EU membership of the 
state involved. Both the SAP and the SAA provided the contractual framework for relations 
110  Cyprus and Malta are excluded from ESDP operations.
111  The Stabilisation and Association Agreement constitutes the framework of relations between the EU and the Western 
Balkan countries for implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Process. 
112  The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) is EU’s approach towards the Western Balkans, established with the aim 
of eventual EU membership, launched in June 1999 and strengthened at the Thessaloniki Summit, June 2003.
113  The ENP, launched in 2003 and developed throughout 2004, governs the EU’s relations with 16 of the EU’s closest Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours; Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine*, Syria, Tunisia and Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Russia takes part in Cross-Border Cooperation activities under the 
ENP, but is not a part of the ENP.  
114  In July 2003, the EU and NATO published a ‘Concerted Approach for the Western Balkans’. In 2003, the EU-led Operation 
Concordia took over the NATO-led mission, Operation Allied Harmony, in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
This mission, which ended in December 2003, was the first ‘Berlin Plus’ operation. In 2004 following the conclusion of the 
NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU deployed Operation EUFOR Althea, which again 
operated under the ‘Berlin Plus’ arrangements. In Kosovo, the NATO peacekeeping force KFOR worked with the EU’s Rule 
of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX).
115  The first SAA negotiations started in 2000 with Macedonia and Croatia. The last negotiations for SAA status started in 
2013 with Kosovo.
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between	the	EU	and	individual	states,	which	resulted	in	differentiated	agreements,	until	
their	foreseen	accession	to	the	EU.	This	foreseen	accession	was	in	contrast	with	NATO’s	





the Euro-Mediterranean area and to the Caucasus and labelled as the ENP.  The ENP was 
designed	by	Commission	officials	who	had	previously	been	in	charge	of	enlargement	
and	‘acquired	tools	for	their	new	positions’.116 The ENP replaced the former Union with 









and the comprehensive approach to security of the EU, as this was essential to them. 
Similar	to	NATO,	the	EU’s	enlargement	and	partnership	led	to	disagreement	between	the	
member	states	in	general	regarding	the	approach	towards	association,	specifically	the	








116  Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: 
Interdependence, Politicization, and Differentiation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 22: 6, 2015, p. 18.  
117  The Union for the Mediterranean consisted of 43 member states from Europe and the Mediterranean the 28 EU Member 
States and 15 Mediterranean partner countries from North Africa, Western Asia and Southern Europe. Founded on 13 July 
2008 at the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. The aim was the reinforcement of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(Euromed) that was set up in 1995 as the Barcelona Process. See: https://ec.europa.eu/info/policies/eu-enlargement_en , 
accessed 12 October 2019
118  Keukeleire. S., Delreux, T., ´The Foreign Policy of the European Union ,́ The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 250.
119  Idem.
120  Ibid, p. 244. 
121  Ibid, p. 252. 
122  Ibid, p. 261-262.  


















want to participate in the ENP and aimed for bilateral cooperation, similar to the liaison 
with	NATO.	This	was	provided	for	in	the	EU-Russia	strategic	partnership	of	2011.126 In 









123  Tolstrup, J., ‘Gatekeepers and Linkages’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 25, no. 4, 2014, p. 135. 
124  In 2010 and 2011 the EU unveiled the ‘more-for-more’ principle; the aim was that the EU would develop stronger 
partnerships with those neighbours that made more progress towards democratic reform. See: Tolstrup, J., ‘Gatekeepers 
and Linkages’, Journal of Democracy, vol. 25, no. 4, 2014, p. 126-138.
125  For an elaboration, see: European Commission, ‘Commission Guidance not on the implementation of certain provisions 
of Regulation (EU), No 833/2014, available at: https://europa.eu/newsroom/sites//newsroom/files/docs/body/1_act_
part1_v2_en.pdf. 
126  For an overview of the history of ENP: Johansson-Nogues, E., ‘The EU and Its Neighbourhood: An Overview’, in: Weber, 
K., Smith, M. E., Baun, M., ‘Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood. Partners or Periphery?’, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2015; Keukeleire. S., Delreux, T., ´The Foreign Policy of the European Union ,́ The European Union Series, 2nd 
edition, Palgrave Macmillan, UK, 2014.
127  For an elaboration on Turkey and EU accession process, see: Akgul, Acikmese, S., Triantaphyllou, D., ‘The NATO–EU–
Turkey trilogy: the impact of the Cyprus conundrum’, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Volume 12, 2012,  p. 
555-573.
128  MEP vote, 24 November 2016.
129  Gaub, F., Popescu, N., ‘The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey’, Chaillot Papers, no. 136, December 2015, p. 7. 
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Regional and Global Partnership and CSDP 
With	regard	to	CSDP	policy	and	partnership,	from	2003	several	programmes	and	
instruments	were	developed.	So-called	Framework	Participation	Agreements	(FPA)	with	
partner countries were adopted to facilitate their participation in CSDP missions and 















EUBG,135participated in the EU mission in Kosovo, such as the US, or trained with the EU, 
such as China and Japan. 
	 The	primary	objective	of	the	EU	member	states	and	organs	in	cooperating	in	the	
field	of	CSDP	with	partners	was	to	maximise	CSDP	operational	activities.136 The aim 








130  The legal and political basis for third states to participate in missions and operations. 
131  See:  European Council/Council of the European Union, ‘Eastern Partnership’, n.d., available at: www.consilium.europa.
eu/en/policies/eastern-partnership/, accessed 5-4-2016.
132  See: EU Neighbours, ‘The European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI)’, n.d., available at: https://www.euneighbours.eu/
en/policy/european-neighbourhood-instrument-eni, accessed 4-7-2018.
133  The Joint Communication, April 2015.
134  Rehrl, J. (Ed.), ‘Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union’, Third edition, 2016, 
p. 177. 
135  Some of the participating countries were Fyrom, Norway, Turkey and Ukraine.
136  Rehrl, J. (Ed.), ‘Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union’, Third edition, 2016, 
p. 174. 
137  Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the 
Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Warsaw Declaration, 8 July 2016.
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had	joined	the	EUBG	and	training.138	CSDP	partnership	ranged	from	formal	cooperation,	
for example the US participation,139	and	more	flexible	and	informal	forms	of	participation,	
such	as	the	EU’s	partnership	with	Kosovo.140 
	 As	a	result	of	changes	in	the	balance	of	power	in	Europe,	due	to	the	newly	acquired	
position	of	Russia	and	the	terrorist	attacks	that	shook	Europe,141 the EU partnership policy 
had	to	take	into	account	that	other	powers	now	necessitated	other	regional	geostrategic	
neighbourhood	policies.	After	the	intervention	in	Ukraine	(2014)	and	the	terrorist	attacks	
on EU soil, it became clear that the technocratic approach of the EU towards partnership 
could	no	longer	account	for	security	and	that	it	hampered	the	ENP,	because	the	division	
between	internal	and	external	security	was	fading.142 The same development could be 
observed	in	the	Mediterranean	and	Middle	East	region,	because	of	the	 ŕemarkable	
















138  China and Japan.
139  See: European Union External Action, ‘Framework Agreement between the United States of America nd the European 
Union on the participation of the United States of America in European Union Crisis Management Operations’, 
2011, available at: ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.
do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=8961, accessed 4-7-2018.
140  See: EEAS, ‘Kosovo* and the EU’, 2016, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/kosovo_en/1387/Kosovo%20
and%20the%20EU, accessed 4-7-2018.
141  Treaty on the European Union, Article J4.
142  Gaub, F., Popescu, N., ‘The EU neighbours 1995-2015: shades of grey’, Chaillot Papers, no. 136, December 2015, p. 10.
143  Keukeleire. S., Delreux, T., ´The Foreign Policy of the European Union ,́ The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 261.
144  Ibid, p. 271.
145  Blockmans, S., Faleg, G., ‘More Union in European defence’, Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2015, p. 8.
146  Keukeleire. S., Delreux, T., ´The Foreign Policy of the European Union ,́ The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 272.
147  Russia is promoting closer relations with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as an alternative to further association and 
integration with the EU.






mobile	roaming	tariffs’	in	2017.148 These aspects are, however, beyond the scope of this 
research.
5.4.4 The EU Path of Widening 
The	EU	path	of	broadening	developed	from	full	membership	to	a	varied	web	of	members	






























148  European Parliament Newsroom, MEP’s want to reward reforms made by Eastern partners, accessed 15-11-2017.
149  Facts on EU-Russia trade see: Russia - Trade - European Commission (europa.eu), accessed 27-4-2020.















towards new members, accompanied by stricter requirements. Nevertheless, cooperation 
in	the	CSDP	area	developed	from	there.	Furthermore,	in	contrast	with	enlargement	
and association, the EU had to deal with various forms of opt-out. In addition, apart 
from	coalitions	within	the	organization	and	different	opt-in	and	opt-out	clauses,	from	
2016	onwards,	CSDP	had	to	deal	with	member	states	stepping	out	of	the	organizational	










third phase followed on from the previous one, combined with the aim of cooperation on 
themes,	such	as	by	terrorism,	instead	of	cooperation	with	specific	states.	
 





150  Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia.
151  Kosovo and Bosnia. 
152  Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘The European Union as a System of Differentiated Integration: 
Interdependence, Politicization, and Differentiation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 22: 6, 2015, p. 18. 
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5.5.2 Participating States 
The	Paris	Summit	in	1990	was	retitled	the	Peace	Conference	of	the	Cold	War.	It	was	
compared	to	the	Conference	of	Versailles	of	1919	or	the	Congress	of	Vienna	of	1815	in	its	
ambition to reshape Europe as a constitution for the European security architecture, 
encompassing	all	European	states.	An	architecture	where	pluralist	democracy	and	market	






















5.5.3 Partner States 
Although	the	OSCE’s	mandate	with	regard	to	security	lies	within	the	organization	and	
a strict division was made between internal and external security, as the concept of 
cooperative security implies, the OSCE did cooperate with states outside the OSCE area. 
153  CSCE Paris Summit Declaration, 1990.
154  As the OSCE is a political based instead of treaty-a based organization. The states are called participating states instead 
of member states. In total the OSCE has 56 participating states, 1-1-2018. 
155  Sarotte, M. E., ‘1989.The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe’, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014. 
156  OSCE, ‘OSCE Minsk Group’, n.d., available at: https://www.osce.org/mg, accessed on 12-8-2017. 














to military facilities, all on a voluntary basis.160	The	aim	of	these	partner	programmes	was	
to	share	information	on	relevant	developments	and	areas	of	common	concern	with	regard	
to	common	security	challenges,		ensuring	a	broad	approach	in	OSCE’s	cooperation	with	










Partners for Cooperation were focused on anti-terrorism, border security, water 
management,	environmental	security	challenges,	migration	management,	intercultural	




157  OSCE, ‘Factsheet on OSCE Partners for Co-operation’, 2011, available at: https://www.osce.org/partners-for-
cooperation/77951, accessed 4-7-2018.
158  Japan (1992), Republic of Korea (1994), Thailand (2000), Afghanistan (2003) and Australia (2009). Mongolia (2004) and 
became a participating State in 2012. 
159  Algeria, Egypt, Israël, Morocco and Tunisia were associated since 1975. Jordan became a Partner in 1998.
160  To become an OSCE Partner for Cooperation, a formal request is made to the OSCE Chairman. A consultation process 
follows, during which the 57 participating States take into consideration several factors. Partnership is decided upon by 
consensus. 
161  A special focus of the US was the participation of the OSCE in Afghanistan. 
162  OSCE, ‘Asian Partners for Co-operation’, n.d., available at: https://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation/asian, 
accessed 4-7-2018.
163  OSCE, ‘Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation’, n.d., available at: https://www.osce.org/partners-for-cooperation/
mediterranean, accessed 4-7-2018.
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democratic	institutions	and	administering	elections.	In	2007,	a	Partnership	Fund	was	
created, which included a broad variety of issues.164 
 
































164  Including: border security and management, countering terrorism, migration management, tolerance and non-
discrimination, media self-regulation, electoral assistance, combating trafficking in human beings, gender issues and 
environmental challenges.
165  Ghebali, V. Y., ‘Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organization’, p. 68 in: Tardy, 
T., (eds.), ‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, 
Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.
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From	its	creation,	the	OSCE	has	been	the	organization	that	geographically	encapsulated	
the	area	from	Anchorage	to	Vladivostok,	which	remained	unchanged	after	the	end	of	




OSCE territory became partners of the OSCE.  
 






development of a European security architecture.















transatlantic relation and a European security and defence identity. The key actors involved 
all	proposed	models	for	a	new	security	architecture,	but	all	were	different.	The	differences	
were	the	result	of	specific	interests,	visions	and	strategies	to	accomplish	a	new	security	




166  For an elaboration on the development of the European security architecture and specifically the models, see: Sarotte, 
M. E., ‘1989.The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe’, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, p. 9; Webber, M., 
Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 2-4.
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Europe	would	be	governed	by	concepts	of	the	liberal	world	order	and	multilateralism.167 
In	this	Europe	whole	and	free,	the	US	and	the	SU	initially	focused	on	the	reunification	of	
Germany and its position in a broader European architecture. However, on 12 November 
1989	the	US	pressed	for	a	German	reunification	including	a	NATO	membership.	On	the	
one	hand	a	difficult	point	for	the	SU,	although	on	the	other	it	was	in	the	interest	of	the	
SU to keep the US military presence in Europe to prevent solitary German rearmament. 
So,	the	process	of	the	reunification	of	Germany,	together	with	NATO	membership,	was	







of a European confederation.170	France’s	interest	lay	in	the	preservation	and	strengthening	
of the political unity of the EU, the diminishment of US military dominance in Europe 
and	a	prevention	of	broadening	of	NATO	together	with	the	encapsulation	of	both	of	the	
Germanies.	The	alternative	to	NATO	revival	and	widening	for	France	was	a	European	





For some, this would include NATO and the WP. For others, this pan-European house would 











167  Speech of US president Bush in Mainz, Germany, 31 May 1989.
168  NATO Strategic Concept 1990.
169  Sarotte, M. E., ‘1989. The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe’, Princeton University Press, 2014, 
170  New Year’s address of French President François Mitterand, 31 December 1989.
171  Sarotte, M. E., ‘1989.The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe’, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014, p. 175. 
172  Stated by NATO Secretary-General Werner, autumn 1990. 
173  NATO Strategic Concept, Rome, 1991. 
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The CSCE Charter of Paris stated an inclusive pan-European framework based on a 
























and broadened, the two Germanies united and became a NATO member, the WP ended. 
NATO thus remained and, driven mainly by the US and West Germany, drew the contours 
of	a	new	security	architecture	based	on	a	framework	of	interlocking	institutions	between	
NATO, the EU, the UN and the CSCE. 







which the development of the European security architecture will be discussed.
174  Paris Charter, 1990. 
175  NATO Strategic Concept 1991, par. 29 and 33.
176  OSCE Summit Lisbon, 1996.
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between NATO and the EU. 
 The initial plan for cooperation between the EU and NATO was launched in 1996 and 
again	in	1999	at	the	NATO	Washington	Summit.	NATO’s	strategic	concept	stated	that	‘the	
resolve of the EU is to have the capacity for autonomous action where the Alliance as a 
whole	is	not	engaged’	and	furthermore	enabled	‘ready	access	by	the	EU	to	the	collective	
assets and capabilities of the Alliance for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is 
not	engaged	militarily’.177	This	resulted	in	a	NATO-EU	Summit	in	2001178, followed by a 
first	meeting	of	the	NAC	and	the	EU’s	Political	and	Security	Committee	(PSC).	At	NATO’s	
Prague	Summit	in	2002,	NATO-EU	cooperation	was	confirmed	and	NATO	and	the	EU	were	
seen	to	‘share	common	strategic	interests’.179 One of the reasons was that the US wanted 
to	monitor	the	quick	institutional	build-up	of	the	EU’s	security	and	defence	policy.	For	the	
Europeans, this initiative created access to NATO, and US, capabilities. Finally, in December 
2002	at	the	EU-NATO	Brussels	meeting,	an	‘EU-NATO	Declaration	on	ESDP’	was	issued	
and	finalised	in	March	2003.	A	framework	came	into	being	with	the	so-called	Berlin	Plus	
agreements	in	the	case	of	crisis	management	operations	of	the	EU.180 As a result, the EU 
gained	access	to	NATO	capabilities,	such	as	the	command	structure,	and	the	possibility	of	
the	exchange	of	classified	intelligence	information	was	created.181 From now on, there were 
several	options	for	NATO	and	the	EU	to	initiate	crisis	management	operations:	a	NATO-only	
campaign,	possibly	with	the	Combined	Joint	Task	Forces	(CJTF)	concept,	the	Berlin	Plus	
agreements182 where EU-led operations were supported by NATO,183 the framework nation 





177  NATO Strategic Concept, Washington Summit, April 1999.   
178  24 January 2001. 
179  NATO Prague declaration, 2002, par. 11. 
180  Started on 16 December 2002 and concluded on 17 March 2003. 
181  The underpinning line of this cooperation has always been the prevention of duplication of capacities; the 3 Ds stated by 
the US Secretary of State Madeline Albright in 2003; ‘Decoupling’, ‘Duplication’ and ‘Discrimination’ and the ‘right of first 
refusal’ for the Atlantic Alliance.
182  The first operation under the umbrella of Berlin Plus was the EU operation Concordia in Macedonia (2003) followed by 
operation Althea in Bosnia Herzegovina (2004), where the EU took over the command of NATO’s operation SFOR.
183  If an EU mission is executed with NATO capacities and command structure., D-SACEUR has OPCOM. 
184  Five EU member states deliver headquarters: UK, Greece, France, Italy and Germany. Operation Artemis in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in 2003 and 2004 is an example of this cooperation. 
185  Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, p. 92-98.   

















strengthened	cooperation189 at the NATO Summit in Warsaw,190 which were approved at the 
NATO	foreign	ministers	summit	at	the	end	of	2016,	including	an	implementation	plan.191  
Themes	included	cyber	defence	and	improvement	of	intelligence	sharing	and	logistics,	as	
described above.  
	 The	themes	of	consultation	between	the	two	organizations	have	broadened	and	
widened	ever	since	2003.	Along	with	Russia,	which	has	been	high	on	the	agenda	since	2014,	
consultations have also covered the Western Balkans, Libya, Africa and the Middle East. 
Together	with	operations,	capability	development	has	been	an	area	where	cooperation	
has been essential. The NATO-EU Capability Group was therefore established in May 
2003	to	ensure	the	coherence	and	mutual	reinforcement	of	NATO	and	the	EU	capability	
development	efforts.	Experts	from	the	EDA	and	NATO	contributed	to	this	Capability	
Group, partly to address common capability shortfalls, such as improvised explosive 
device	countermeasures	and	medical	support.	Staff	were	also	ensuring	transparency	
and	complementarity	between	NATO’s	work	on	‘smart	defence’	and	the	EU’s	pooling	and	
sharing	initiative.192 Other cooperation issues included the combat of terrorism and the 
186  US state secretary Albright, M., NATO summit, 8 December 1998. 
187  Simon, L., ‘The EU-NATO Conundrum in Context: Bringing the State Back in’, p. 112, in: Galbreath, D., Gebhard, C., 
‘Cooperation or Conflict. Problematizing Organisational Overlap in Europe’, Routledge, 2011.
188  WEU, ‘The EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreement’, European Security and Defence Assembly/Assembly of Western European 
Union, Assembly facts Sheet No. 14, Paris, November 2009. 
189  Including hybrid threats, enhancing resilience, defence capacity building, cyber defence, maritime security, and 
exercises.
190  ‘Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the 
Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’, NATO Press Release (2016) 119, July 8, 2016, www.nato.int, 
accessed July 10, 2016. 
191  Meeting of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Brussels, December 2016.
192  For an elaboration: Faleg, G., Giovannini, A., ‘The EU between Pooling & Sharing and Smart Defence: Making a virtue 
of necessity?’, CEPS Special Report, May 2012; Graeger, N., ‘European Security as Practice: EU_NATO communities of 
Practice in the Making?’, European Security, Volume 25, issue 4, 2016. 











Centre	of	Excellence	for	Countering	Hybrid	Threats.195 This was followed by the EU-NATO 
joint	declaration	on	strategic	partnership	signed	at	the	NATO	Warsaw	Summit	(2016).	This	





















operative Security, which was launched by the OSCE in 1999 at the Istanbul Summit and was 
supposed to be a revival of the European security architecture. Via this platform, the OSCE 
could	call	upon	the	international	organizations	whose	members	adhere	to	their	principles	
193  Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the 
Secretary-General of NATO, Warsaw, 8 July 2016.
194  February 2016. 
195  See Chapter 6.
196  1 June 2017, Helsinki.  
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and	commitments	to	reinforce	their	inter-organizational	cooperation	in	order	to	restore	
democracy, prosperity and stability in Europe and beyond. 
	 Rationally,	due	to	the	political	rather	than	legal	agreement	underlying	the	OSCE	
organization,	but	most	of	all	the	partnership	between	both	the	US	and	Russia	and	the	
OSCE, institutional interaction between NATO and the OSCE was developed at a low 
institutionalized	non-legal	level.	However,	as	a	result	of	operating	in	the	same	security	and	
domain areas and to a certain extent overlap in members and partners, their relationship 
was	emphasised	in	a	number	of	documents,	such	as	the	OSCE’s	Strategy	to	Address	Threats	
to	Security	and	Stability	in	the	Twenty-First	Century	(2003)197 and thematically addressed a 













Charter for European security in 1999. From there, the scope of cooperation between the 










197  OSCE, ‘OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century’, 2003, available at:  
https://www.osce.org/mc/17504, accessed 3 November 2016.
198  Combating transnational threats, including terrorism and cyber threats, border management and security, disarmament, 
small arms and light weapons, confidence- and security-building measures, regional issues and exchange of 
experience on the respective Mediterranean Dimensions. See: OSCE, ‘NATO’, n.d., available at: https://www.osce.org/
partnerships/111485, accessed 3-4-2017. 
199  NATO Istanbul Summit, June 2004, par. 17. 
200 Stewart, E. J., ‘Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention’, Contemporary Security Policy, 
Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2008, p. 267.
201  Address by Javier Solana, EU High Representative of the CFSP to the Permanent Council of the OSCE, September 2002. 
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cooperation mostly included the civilian aspects of security, as the military aspects were 
too problematic.204 







5.6.5 A Widening European Security Architecture 
The	1990	OSCE	Paris	Summit	was	the	first	to	address	a	European	security	architecture;	a	
security	system	involving	all	countries	of	the	greater	Europe.	This	greater	Europe	included	





system between NATO, the EU, the former WP countries and the OSCE.207 
	 During	the	1990s,	several	concepts	were	proposed	for	a	security	architecture,	
particularly	by	the	US,	Russia,	the	UK	and	the	EU	bloc	of	Germany	and	France	together	with	
202  EU Council conclusions, November 2003.
203  EU Council conclusions, December 2004. 
204 Judicial and police reform, public administration, anti-corruption measures, democratization, institution-building 
and human rights, media development, small and medium-sized enterprise development, border management and 
combating human trafficking and elections.
205  Consultations between the OSCE Troika, including the OSCE Secretary General, and the EU at both the ministerial and 
ambassadorial/Political Security Committee levels. Contacts between the Secretary General and the High Representative 
of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and other high-level EU officials. Annual staff-level talks on topical 
issues that are on each organization’s agenda. See: OSCE, ‘The European Union’, n.d., available at: https://www.osce.org/
partnerships/european-union, accessed 4-11-2017. 
206 Stewart, E. J., ‘Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention’, Contemporary Security policy, 
Vol. 29, No. 2, August 2008, p. 280.
207  NATO Strategic Concept, Rome Summit, 1991, par. 33 and 59.
194 Chapter 5 - The Path of Widening 
NATO	and	the	OSCE.	Initiatives	that	were	taken	included	mandating	the	OSCE	in	1994	as	
the anchor of the European security architecture. It was stated that the OSCE would be ‘a 
primary	instrument	for	early	warning,	conflict	prevention	and	crisis	management’.208 The 
idea	was	to	legitimize	the	OSCE	as	the	overall	organization	for	peacekeeping	operations	










supported by NATO. 




alliance and several countries of the former WP chose this option. At that time, the Russian 
president	Yeltsin	agreed	that	Poland	could	become	a	NATO	member	in	the	future,	giving	
NATO	a	re-entrance	into	European	security	matters.210	Russia	agreed,	because	it	was	













208 Budapest Summit Declaration, 1994. 
209 Koops, J. ‘The European Union as an Integrative Power? Assessing the EU’s ‘Effective Multilateralism’ towards NATO and 
the United Nations’, Brussels University press, 2011, p. 53. 
210  For an elaboration: Asmus, R. D., ‘Opening NATO’s Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era’, Columbia 
University Press: New York, 2004. 
211  Terrorist attacks from separatists and ethnic-based groups in Russia’s North Caucasus and outside the North Caucasus 
increased between 2007-2010, exemplified by the bombing of the Moscow subway system March 2010, resulting in over 
40 deaths and many injuries.








This is illustrated by the fact that all three had security platforms for the Middle East and 
Africa	with	overlapping	goals	and	tasks.	In	addition,	their	respective	officials	debated	the	







 Furthermore, the observed interaction had mostly been bilateral between the security 
organizations,	meaning	from	one	organization	to	the	other	instead	of	an	all-encompassing	
security	architecture,	as	described	above.	The	reasons	were	Russia’s	participation	in	the	






between the EU and NATO, which was created because of operational requirements, as the 
EU	and	NATO	were	operating	in	the	same	area	geographically	and	had	an	overlap	in	tasks.	
The same applied to the operations of the EU and the OSCE in the Balkans. However, a 









security architecture, due to the overlap of member states, of interests and of missions 
212 Ham, P., ‘EU, NATO, OSCE: Interaction, Cooperation, and Confrontation’, in: Hauser, G., Kernic, F., Routledge, London, 
2006, p. 24.
213  Gowan, R., ‘The EU and Human Rights at the UN, 2009 Annual Review’, European Council on Foreign Relations, 10 
September 2009. 
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build a security architecture, such as ESDI and CJTF. The third phase showed an increase 
214  Duke, S., ‘The EU, NATO and the Lisbon Treaty: still divided within a common city’, Studia Diplomatica, 2011, p. 3. 
215  Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, New York: International Peace Institute, June 
2016, p. 4. 




with low institutionalized structures. The third phase added rivalry and hostility between 
the	actors	in	the	OSCE	area	and	simultaneously	strengthened	cooperation	between	NATO	
and the EU. 


















NATO EU OSCE IO-IO
Before 1990 Enlargement Enlargement Mediterranean 
partners since 
‘Helsinki’ (1975)  
1990 NACC CEEC Initiative on partners 
for cooperation 
in Asian and 
Mediterranean region 
1991 Rome Summit: 
initiative on European 
security architecture, 
NACC 
Initiative on European 
security architecture. 
Widening with former 
SU states 
1992 Oslo Summit; adoption 
OSCE CRO, link to other 
organizations 
OSCE regional 
organization under UN 
charter 
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1993 Copenhagen criteria 
for enlargement  
1994 Launch PfP, MD 
1995 Study on enlargement Barcelona process
1996 EU-NATO Berlin 
arrangements 







1999 Round 1 (3 states), 
invitation 9 states, 
PMF, MAP 







Invitation 10 states EU-OSCE,
Berlin Plus agreement
2003 Invitation 2 states UN-EU cooperation, 
EU-NATO cooperation 
and capability group,  
EU-OSCE declaration 




delegation in OSCE 
2004 Round 2 (7 states),
MD, ICI





OSCE cooperation  
2005 EU Cell at NATO SHAPE
2006 Dialogue with Japan, 
Australia, South Korea 
and New Zealand
Formal EU 
participation in OSCE; 
rules of procedure 
and cooperation 
institutional levels 
2007 Round 2 (2 states) Partnership Fund UN-EU strengthening
2008 Invitation Ukraine, 
Georgia 
Mediterranean Union 
(as well as SAP)
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2009 France full member, 
Albania and Croatia 
members 
2010 PPC, strengthening 
PMF






platform new partners, 
PCSC successor of 
PPC, strengthening 
cooperation with 
Finland, Sweden within 
PfP, DCB,
framework for the 
South and PCSC 
PCA, ENP, EP, ENI
2015 UN-EU 
2016 Brexit EU-NATO joint 
declaration including 
support of partners 
 
Table 5.1 Overview of key moments on the path of widening of the different security organizations. 
5.7.2 Comparing the Paths of Widening of NATO, the EU and the OSCE
The	security	organizations	NATO,	EU	and	OSCE,	as	the	units	of	analysis,	are	all	regional	
organizations.	The	OSCE	contains	the	largest	number	of	participating	states,	as	all	member	











continued but developed into a more complex web of cooperation with state and non-state 
actors. 

















with states from the former bipolar world order. This enthusiasm was inspired by the 
multilateral	ideas	of	a	Kantian	world	order,	which	gave	birth	to	the	concept	of	the	European	





















216  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 56.
217  Tardy, T., ‘CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?’ Chaillot paper, No. 134, May 2015, p. 214. 




















formula of the OSCE and the NATO abstention possibility,219 which will be explored in 
Chapter	6.	Second,	differentiation	in	NATO	membership,	comparable	to	the	EU	with	the	
opt-in	and	opt-out	procedure	for	the	position	of	the	‘neutrals’	regarding	Article	42.7	and	

















218  All the members of NATO and EU, either full members or associated, are OSCE partners.  
219  Exemplified by the engagement of NATO in Libya, 2011.
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220  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 1. 
221  EU Treaty of Lisbon 2009, see Chapter 6. 
222  Tardy, T., ‘CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?’ Chaillot Paper, No. 134, May 2015, p. 216. 

















outside the European security architecture.225 
 Finally, the EU and NATO membership and partnership were characterised by an 











government,	which	was	replaced	by	the	so-called	National	Transitional	Council.228 In Mali, 
the	EU’s	cooperation	with	the	government	was		followed	by	the	EU	Framework	Strategy	for	
Sahel	and	its	Regional	Action	Plan,	including	the	Economic	Community	of	West-African	
223  Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 15.
224  Dunay, P., ‘The Changing political geography of Europe. After EU and NATO enlargements’, p. 89, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) 
‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, 
Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.
225  Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 15.
226  Smith, M. A., Timmins, G., ‘The European Union and NATO enlargement debates in comparative perspective: a case of 
incremental linkage?’, West European Politics, 22:3, July 1999, p. 23.  
227  Smith, M. A., ‘EU enlargement and NATO: The Balkan experience’, p. 7. In: Brown, D., Shepherd, A. K, The security 
dimensions of EU enlargement. Wider Europe, weaker Europe?’, Manchester University Press, 2007, p. 11. 
228  27 February 2011.
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States	(ECOWAS).229 However, this showed that operations, either civil or military, were 
mostly composed of ad-hoc coalitions outside the institutionalized framework and not 
strengthened	or	institutionalized	within	the	European	security	architecture.	Cooperation	
with	partners	in	operations	could	be	defined	as	a	combination	of	the	post-Westphalian	


























229  For the framework, see: Council of the European Union, ‘Options paper for CSDP support to Sahel Joint Force’, 2017, 
11562/17, available at: www.statewatch.org/news/2017/nov/eu-eeas-csdp-options-paper-support-g5-sahel-7-17.pdf, 
accessed 3-9-2017.
230  Cassier, T., ´The Clash of integration processes. The shadow effect of enlarged EU on its eastern neighbours ,́ in: Malfliet, 
K., Verpoest, L., Vinokurov, E. (eds), ’The CIS, The EU and Russia. Challenges of Integration’, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007, p. 73-94. 
231  Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 14.  
232  The Velvet and Orange revolution in respectively Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004) and the Crimea crisis (2014). 





of the various institutional options open to them, which hampered the development 
of	an	efficient	and	more	formal	division	of	labour	between	the	organizations	if	this	


























233  Hofmann, S. C., ‘Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1, p. 110.
234  Hofmann, S. C., ‘Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1., p. 111.
235  For an elaboration, see: Biermann, R., ‘Towards a Theory of Inter-organizational Networking. The Euro-Atlantic Security 
Institutions Interacting’, The Review of International Organizations, Volume 3, Issue 2, June 2008; Hofmann, S. C., ‘Why 
institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2011, vol. 
49, nr. 1., p. 112. 
236 Hofmann, S. C., ‘Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2011, vol. 49, nr.1, p. 108. 
237  The EGF will be explored further in Chapter 6. 




































238  Schimmelfennig, F., ‘The EU, NATO and the Integration of Europe. Rules and Rhetoric’, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2003, p. 56.
239  Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 16.
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separately	and	in	comparison,	in	their	path	of	widening,	measured	by	the	indicators	of	
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Chapter 6
Chapter 6. The Path of Deepening 
 
6.1 Introduction 
















































speeds, methods and levels of cooperation are observed, as was described in Chapter 2. 
 
6.3 The NATO Path of Deepening 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The	communist	threat	coming	from	the	SU	directly	after	the	Second	World	War	drove	the	










6.3.2 Level of Deepening








1  Quote from first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Ismay.
2  Deutsch, K. W. et al., ‘Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organisation in the Light of 
Historical Experience’, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 5.
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use	of	force	in	relations	among	the	countries	of	the	region	virtually	inconceivable.’3 With 
its	underlying	military	cooperation,	NATO	provided	the	principle	of	civilian	democratic	
control to all European states that became members, under the umbrella of its Article 2. 
	 As	well	as	the	security	community	that	NATO	provided,	the	organization	created	

























3  Duffield, J., ‘NATO’s Function After the Cold War’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 109, No. 5, p. 767. 
4  Establishment of secretary general and permanent military headquarter. 
5  Wallander, C. A., ‘Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, International Organization, volume 54, 
Issue 04, September 2000, p. 723.
6  For an elaboration on the development of NATO’s institutional structures during the Cold War: Webber, M., Sperling, 
J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 27; Sloan, 
S. R., ‘Defense   of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2016. 
7  Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, p. 27. 
8  Idem.
9  Sloan, R.S., ‘Permanent Alliance? NATO and the Transatlantic Bargain from Truman to Obama’, The Continuum 
International Publishing Group, 2010, New York, p, 132. 
10  For an elaboration, see: Hendrickson, R. C., ‘Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action After 
the Cold War’, Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006.  





















was explored in Chapter 4.16 
	 Again,	as	a	result	of	new	threats	and	the	experiences	of	the	various	crisis	management	
operations,	the	deepening	of	the	instructional	structure	evolved	and	in	2010	a	new	
Division	for	Emerging	Security	Challenges	(ESCD)17 was set up within the International 
Staff.	Not	only	rapid	response	and	decision-making,	but	the	broadening	of	the	NATO	tasks	
needed	an	answer	to	the	new	security	challenges.	The	aim	was	to	focus	on	issues	that	the	
Strategic	Concept	of	2010	explicitly	covered.18 Based on an action plan and the adopted 
comprehensive	approach,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	on	4	March	2011	the	Council	agreed	
on an updated list of tasks for the implementation of the Comprehensive Approach Action 
Plan.19	Furthermore,	as	a	result	of	the	broadening	of	tasks,	the	institutional	structure	was	
deepened	with	a	Comprehensive	Crisis	and	Operations	Management	Centre	(CCOMC).	
11  North Atlantic Council, Prague Summit, November 2002, par. 4a.
12  Ibid, par. 4c.
13  Mayer, S., ‘Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External Security’, 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 32, No. 2 (August 2011), p. 314. 
14  NATO Prague Summit, November 2002, par. 4b. 
15  Mayer, S., ‘Embedded Politics, Growing Informalization? How NATO and the EU Transform Provision of External Security’, 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 32, No. 2 (August 2011), p. 313.
16  Mouritzen, H., ‘In spite of reform NATO HQ still in the Grips of Nations’, Defense & Security Analysis, 18 October 2013, p. 
342-355. 
17  A division that deals with non-traditional risks and challenges and will also provide NATO with a Strategic Analysis 
Capability to monitor and anticipate international developments that could affect Allied security.
18  NATO Strategic Concept, 2010. 
19  March 2011, NATO.  
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The	aim	of	the	CCOMC	was	to	bring	together	civilian	and	military	expertise	on	crisis	
identification,	planning,	operations,	reconstruction	and	stabilisation	capabilities,	as	one	of	
the instruments for preventive action.






debates between Eastern and Western Europe and between the US and Europe increased. 
One of the issues was that the Russian threat was perceived as a traditional threat known to 
NATO	and	within	its	mandate,	but	the	threats	coming	from	the	south,	such	as	migration,	
necessitated a broader approach than solely the use of military capabilities.22  
All	in	all,	the	choice	was	made	in	Wales	to	renew	the	attention	for	NATO’s	task	of	collective	
defence and Article 5., Wales therefore coined the concept of reassurance for the Eastern 
members,	translated	into	a	readiness	action	plan	(RAP),	which	included	immediate	
reinforcement	of	NATO’s	presence	in	the	eastern	part	of	the	Alliance.23 This resulted in an 
increase	of	various	forms	of	differentiated	cooperation	regarding	flexible	response	and	
capacity	building.	The	concepts	of	flexibility	and	modular	cooperation	were	first	introduced	
with	the	CJTF	concept	of	the	1990s	and	the	PCC	of	2002.24 Mostly, these initiatives were 
initiated	by	the	US,	requiring	the	Europeans	to	take	more	responsibility	for	their	own	








20  NATO Wales Summit, September 2014.  
21 Since 2011 an ongoing civil war in Syria and Iraq, which led to many refugees to Europe. The Persian Gulf crisis is the result 
of intensified military tensions between Iran and the US and European allies in the Persian Gulf region together with the 
tensions over the Iran nuclear framework from 2015, which was elaborated above.  
22  Keller, P., ‘Divided by geography? NATO’s internal debate about the eastern and southern flanks’, p. 59, in: Friis, K., ‘NATO 
and collective Defense   in the 21st century. An assessment of the Warsaw Summit’, Routledge focus, 2017.
23  Aimed at reinforcement of NATO’s collective defence since the end of the Cold War.
24  NATO Prague Summit, November 2002. 
25  Doc. MC 477; description by Military Committee of seven scenarios in which the NRF could intervene, varying from 
evacuation and rescue operations to acting as the initial entry force in a hostile environment at the high end of the 
spectrum of force. The NRF has army, navy, air force and special forces components. The enhanced NRF will consist of up 
to 40,000 personnel which in contrast with the 2002 NRF consisted of about 13,000 personnel.  
26  NATO Wales Summit, September 2014. 









Russian cooperation. Nevertheless, with the consensus of the allies, the VJTF did take 
part	in	exercises	in	the	eastern	part	of	NATO.	Furthermore,	in	2015,	a	regional	so-called	
Multinational	Division	Southeast	in	Romania	had	been	established,	spreading	NATO’s	

















impetus for multinational defence cooperation.33 
27 Abts, J., ‘NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force: Can the VJTF give new élan to the NATO Response Force?’, NATO 
Research Paper no. 109, February 2015.
28  See: NATO, ‘Connected Forces Initiative’, 2016, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_98527.htm, 
accessed 3-9-2016.
29  A British initiative together with the Netherlands, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Norway outside NATO. 
30  See: HQ MND-SE, ‘Home Page’, n.d., available at: http://www.en.mndse.ro, accessed 2-8-2018. 
31  Kamp, K. H., ‘The Agenda of the NATO Summit in Warsaw’, Security Policy Working Paper No. 9/2015, Federal Academy 
for Security Policy. 
32  Ibid, p. 304. 
33  Nations participate jointly in the development of a coherent set of Alliance capabilities, facilitated by a framework 
nation. Linked to NATO shortfalls and capability targets they cluster around a lead nation. Two purposes: maintain 
existing capabilities and the multinational development of new capabilities in the medium to long term and establish a 
mechanism for collective training and exercises in order to prepare groupings of forces. 










of	existing	troops	in	an	allied	formation’.36 On the other hand, all the initiatives of Wales 
strengthened	modular	and	differentiated	cooperation	within	NATO,	as	all	these	initiatives	
were	built	on	multilateral	cooperation	and	rotation	schemes	of	NATO	member	states;	






modular cooperation. This decision was a compromise between NATO allies in favour of 
enhancing	the	NATO	presence	in	Russia’s	neighbourhood	and	the	opponents,	who	were	











34 The Flexible response strategy was a counterweight to the massive retaliation strategy. The strategy calls for mutual 
deterrence at strategic, tactical and conventional levels, to respond to aggression across the spectrum of war, not limited 
to nuclear arms.
35  Major, C., Molling, C., ‘More teeth for the NATO tiger. How the Framework Nation Concept can reduce NATO’s growing 
formation-capability gap’, p. 33, in: Friis, K., ‘NATO and collective Defence in the 21st century. An assessment of the 
Warsaw Summit’, Routledge focus, 2017. 
36  Ringsmose, J., Rynning, S., ‘Can NATO’s new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force deter?’, p. 22, in: Friis, K., ‘NATO and 
collective Defence in the 21st century. An assessment of the Warsaw Summit’, Routledge focus, 2017. 
37  Headed by the US, UK, Germany and Canada. 
38  Ringsmose, J., Rynning, S., ‘Can NATO’s new Very High Readiness Joint Task Force deter?’, p. 21, in: Friis, K., ‘NATO and 
collective Defense   in the 21st century. An assessment of the Warsaw Summit’, Routledge focus, 2017. 
39  NATO Warsaw Summit, July 2016, par. 15. 
40  NATO Wales Summit, June 2016, par. 13.
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41 NATO Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, ‘Fact Sheet’, December 2017, available at: https://ccdcoe.org/, accessed 7-7-2018.
42  NATO Wales Summit, June 2016, par. 72-73.
43  NATO Warsaw Summit, July 2016, par. 37. 
44  A proposal by the Dutch Minister of Defence, Hennis-Plasschaert, in 2017.
45  Since the end of the Cold War there have been three Strategic Concepts: 1990, 1999, 2010. 
46  For an elaboration on doctrine; Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or 
Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, p. 51-54.
47  Morillas, P., ‘Institutionalization or Intergovernmental Decision-Taking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty’, European Foreign Affairs Review 16, Kluwer International, 2011.






















of abstention, which was not formally provided for in the Treaty. As a result, the consensus 
voting	system	itself	was	under	debate	on	multiple	occasions.	In	2003,	the	US	Senate	passed	
a resolution to look for ways to enable NATO to act without full consensus and even to 
suspend	difficult	members	from	Alliance	decision-making	as	a	result	of	the	crisis	in	Iraq	
(2003).55The	least	enthusiastic	proponent	for	some	kind	of	majority	decision-making	was,	
however,	the	US	itself,	as	this	would	oppose	US	interest	and	sovereignty.56 As Sloan stated, 
‘…the	consensus	process	clearly	will	need	to	be	flexed	from	time	to	time,	as	it	has	been	in	
the	past,	but	it	seems	unlikely	to	be	‘fixed’…’.57 
48  Wallander, C. A., ‘Institutional assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War’, International organisation, volume 54, 
Issue 04, September 2000, p. 724.
49  For an elaboration on NATO’s committee structure, see: Idem.
50  International civil servants.
51  National civil servants.
52  International Staff (IS), International military Staff (IMS), Allie Command Operations (ACO) and allied Command 
Transformation (ACT), n.d., available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/structure.htm accessed 4-5-2017. 
53  Mouritzen, H., ‘In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the Grips of Nations’, Defense & Security Analysis, 18 October 2013, p. 348.
54  If there is no consensus there is no vote, or the member states are requested to explicitly approve a decision. If a 
government does not approve the proposal, it can object in writing to the secretary-general.
55  US Congress, Congressional Record-Senate, May 8, 2003, S5882.  
56  For an elaboration on decision-making within NATO: Michel, L., ‘NATO decision-making: Au revoir to Consensus?’ 
National Defense University, US National Defense University Strategic Forum, No. 2 August 2003. 
57  Sloan, S. R., ‘In Defense of the West. The European union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2016, p. 340.  




greater	risk’.58 This was a result of the system of national caveats that member states placed 
on the use of their forces in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter. This implied that the level 









who were opponents of military action in Iraq.60	Furthermore,	during	the	2003	Iraq	War,	
six	Allies	refused	to	deliver	troops	to	NATO’s	training	mission,	although	they	did	allow	





to security and stability.63	However,	NATO	engagement	in	the	early	stage	of	the	war	in	Iraq	
was	not	operationalized,	due	to	disagreement	between	the	allies,	which	caused	a	solidarity	
crisis within the Alliance.
 Prior	to	the	operation	Unified	Protector	in	Libya	(2003),64	which	again	caused	discord	
within the Alliance, Germany abstained from the UN resolution that sanctioned the use of 
force	against	Libya.65 Germany did not withhold consensus in the NAC, but chose for the 
abstention	variant	of	decision-making,	and	did	not	participate	in	the	coalition	operation.	
Likewise, Turkey was not a proponent of another invasion by NATO of a state in the Middle 
East,	after	Iraq	in	2003,	and	did	not	want	France	to	be	in	charge	of	a	possible	operation,	
58 For an elaboration on decision-making in the context of the ISAF operation; Grandia, M., ‘Deadly Embrace? The Decision 
Paths to Uruzgan and Helmand’, Dissertation, University of Leiden, the Netherlands, 2 April 2015; Sloan, S. R., ‘In Defense 
of the West. The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, Chapter 7. 
59  Sloan, S. R., ‘In Defense of the West. The European union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2016, p. 190-192.
60  Operation Iraqi Freedom: US led coalition operation started on March 20 until December 2011. NATO supported the 
mission under the provision of UNSC resolution 1546, with training and mentoring of the Iraqi security forces, under the 
political control of the NAC. 
61  For an elaboration on the relation between the US and Europe during the Iraq crisis: Terrif, T., ‘Fear and loathing in NATO: 
The Atlantic alliance after the crisis over Iraq’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Volume 5, 2004, p. 419-446. 
62  Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 196.
63  NATO, ‘Relations with Iraq’, 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_88247.htm, accessed 24-9-2018.
64  A NATO operation from 23 March 2011 enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 concerning 
the Libyan Civil War and ended on 31 October 2011. 
65  UNSC Resolution 1973, March 17th, 2011. 
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or	the	EU	for	that	matter.	In	contrast,	France	was	an	opponent	of	a	NATO	operation	as	it	





























way to know far in advance what forces member states would send to the operation. This 
meant that NATO planners were forced to develop a variety of theoretical options to present 
to their political leaders and hope that forces would be made available to implement the 
option	selected	by	NATO	officials’.70	NATO’s	secretary-general	had	played	an	important	role	
66  For an elaboration on the positions of the Allies towards the Libya operation, see: Michaels, J. H., ‘Able but not Willing. 
A critical Assessment of NATO’s Libya Intervention’, in: Engelbregt, K., Mohlin, M., Wagnsson, C. (Eds.), ‘The NATO 
Intervention in Libya. Lessons Learned from the Campaign’, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013. 
67  For an elaboration on NATO’s institutions, see: Mouritzen, H., ‘In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the grips of nations’, 
Defense & Security Analysis, 29:4, p. 345.
68  NATO Wales Summit, June 2015. 
69  Meeting of the NATO Defence ministers, Brussels, June 2015.  
70  Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 




greater	risk’.58 This was a result of the system of national caveats that member states placed 
on the use of their forces in line with Article 51 of the UN Charter. This implied that the level 









who were opponents of military action in Iraq.60	Furthermore,	during	the	2003	Iraq	War,	
six	Allies	refused	to	deliver	troops	to	NATO’s	training	mission,	although	they	did	allow	





to security and stability.63	However,	NATO	engagement	in	the	early	stage	of	the	war	in	Iraq	
was	not	operationalized,	due	to	disagreement	between	the	allies,	which	caused	a	solidarity	
crisis within the Alliance.
 Prior	to	the	operation	Unified	Protector	in	Libya	(2003),64	which	again	caused	discord	
within the Alliance, Germany abstained from the UN resolution that sanctioned the use of 
force	against	Libya.65 Germany did not withhold consensus in the NAC, but chose for the 
abstention	variant	of	decision-making,	and	did	not	participate	in	the	coalition	operation.	
Likewise, Turkey was not a proponent of another invasion by NATO of a state in the Middle 
East,	after	Iraq	in	2003,	and	did	not	want	France	to	be	in	charge	of	a	possible	operation,	
58 For an elaboration on decision-making in the context of the ISAF operation; Grandia, M., ‘Deadly Embrace? The Decision 
Paths to Uruzgan and Helmand’, Dissertation, University of Leiden, the Netherlands, 2 April 2015; Sloan, S. R., ‘In Defense 
of the West. The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2016, Chapter 7. 
59  Sloan, S. R., ‘In Defense of the West. The European union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2016, p. 190-192.
60  Operation Iraqi Freedom: US led coalition operation started on March 20 until December 2011. NATO supported the 
mission under the provision of UNSC resolution 1546, with training and mentoring of the Iraqi security forces, under the 
political control of the NAC. 
61  For an elaboration on the relation between the US and Europe during the Iraq crisis: Terrif, T., ‘Fear and loathing in NATO: 
The Atlantic alliance after the crisis over Iraq’, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Volume 5, 2004, p. 419-446. 
62  Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 196.
63  NATO, ‘Relations with Iraq’, 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_88247.htm, accessed 24-9-2018.
64  A NATO operation from 23 March 2011 enforcing United Nations Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 concerning 
the Libyan Civil War and ended on 31 October 2011. 
65  UNSC Resolution 1973, March 17th, 2011. 
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in	shaping	the	strategic	vision	and	an	increasing	institutional	role	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	
War	with	regard	to	enlargement	and	out-of-area	operations,	and	he	could	even	be	regarded	


























consensus procedure could be implemented to ensure that NATO commanders are 
71 For an elaboration on the role of NATO’s secretary-general, see: Hendrickson, R. C.,’NATO’s Secretaries-General: 
Organizational Leadership in Shaping Alliance Strategy’, Chapter 3 , in: Aybet, G, Moore, R. R., ‘NATO in search of a vision’, 
Georgetown University Press, 2010. 
72  Sloan, S., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 2016. 
73  Idem; Grandia, M., ‘Deadly Embrace? The Decision Paths to Uruzgan and Helmand’, Dissertation, University of Leiden, 
the Netherlands, 2 April 2015. 
74 Planning and conduct of decision-making procedure of the rapid response forces; 1. When a crisis escalates, the NAC, 
through the MC, instructs the SACEUR to explore deployment options. 2. The MC submits advice on the deployment 
options. 3. The NAC makes a decision based on this advice. 4. SACEUR draws up an operation plan elaborating on the 
option chosen by the NAC. 5. The MC gives its advice on the operation plan. 6. The NAC approves the operation plan and 
instructs SACEUR to initiate deployment. For an elaboration, see: Ringsmose, J., Rynning, S., ‘Can NATO’s new Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force deter?’, NUPI Policy Brief, bind 15, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2016. 
75  Advisory Council on International Affairs, ‘Deployment of Rapid-Reaction Forces’, No. 96, October 2015. 







addition to that, in practice a second scenario developed, where actions in support of 
crisis	management	operations	were	taken	on	the	basis	of	a	major	power	consensus	or	even	
outside that consensus. A third scenario was to execute operations without a UN mandate 
or	even	a	major	power	consent,	such	as	the	operation	Allied	Force	in	1999,	although	until	









6.3.3 Form of Deepening 
As	well	as	the	level	of	deepening	as	described	above,	NATO	changed	in	different	forms.	
The	first	step	towards	the	initiative	of	differentiated	cooperation	within	the	Alliance	after	
the Cold War was the ESDI. The idea of a common defence capability within Europe was 
introduced as part of the EU Treaty of Maastricht of 1992. On the one hand, the idea behind 
the ESDI concept was the possibility of a European pillar within NATO for European states 
to take the initiative for operations, with the consent of all the NATO states but not with the 





modular cooperation, was the concept of CJTF, elaborated on in Chapter 4, adopted at 
the Brussels Summit in 1994.79 The CJTF concept was based on ESDI and the idea was that 
flexible	NATO	structures	and	assets	could	be	made	available	for	future	military	missions	
76  Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 340. 
77  Mouritzen, H., ‘In spite of reform: NATO HQ still in the grips of nations’, Defense & Security Analysis, 29:4, p. 352.
78  North Atlantic Council, ‘Development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) Within NATO’, 1994, ESDI was 
created as a facilitating mechanism for an enhanced EU role in NATO.
79  Declaration of the Heads of State and Government, 10-11 January 1994, par. 1.  
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the	Cold	War	days,	encompassing	all	the	member	states86 and based on inclusive NATO 
membership	and	decision-making.	Finally,	after	years	of	capability	shortfalls	and	political	
indifference	with	regard	to	the	NRF,	it	became	operational	in	2006,	but	the	employability	











80  Declaration of the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council (‘The 
Brussels Summit Declaration’)’, 11 January 1994.
81  Reichard, M., ‘The EU-NATO Relationship. A Legal and Political Perspective’, Ashgate, 2006, p. 114. 
82  The Bosnian Peace Implementation Force is an example of a NATO operation under the flag of CJTF. 
83  Kay, S., ‘NATO and the Future of European Security’, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998, p. 132. 
84  Ruggie, J. G., ‘Consolidating the European pillar: the key to NATO’s future’, The Washington Quarterly, January the 
seventh, 1997, p. 114. 
85  NATO terminology. 
86  Waever, O., ‘Cooperative Security: A New Concept?’, in: Cooperative Security: NATO’s Partnership Policy in a Changing 
World’, Flockhart T. (eds.), DIIS Report 2014:01, Copenhagen, p. 57. 
87  US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, at NATO Defense Ministers meeting, Warsaw, September 2002. 
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As	a	result	of	the	Chicago	strategic	concept	of	2010,	modular	cooperation	was	enhanced	
with	the	concept	of	‘smart	defence’	and	the	concept	of	‘frontier	integration’.88 Like the 














allies had a preference for deployment of the NRF for collective defence tasks, the Southern 
allies	preferred	the	possibility	of	deploying	the	NRF	for	other	tasks	as	well.	Finally,	at	a	
meeting	of	ministers	of	defence	in	June	2015,	it	was	decided	that	the	NRF	could	be	expanded.91 
Allied Cooperation outside NATO










their own forces, with troop supply required simultaneously to the units of the NRF and 
EUBGs, which led to an overlap.92	All	this	highlighted	that	the	actual	deployment	of	the	NRF	
had	fallen	short,	just	like	the	EUBG,	of	the	high	level	of	military	ambition.		
88  NATO, ‘Smart Defence’, 2017, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_84268.htm, accessed 9-11-2017.
89  NATO Strategic Concept, 2010.
90  Sloan, S. R., ‘Defense of the West. NATO, The European Union and the Transatlantic Bargain’, Manchester University 
Press, Manchester, 2016, p. 272 
91  From 13,000 to 40,000 troops. Meeting of the NATO Defence ministers, Brussels, June 2015.  
92  The NRF has been deployed several times, though not in military operations as originally the main task: providing 
support during the Afghan presidential elections in 2004, patrolling the skies of Athens during the Olympic games in 
2004, providing humanitarian support operations in the US and Pakistan in 2005.
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for consultation between the allies with respect to security and defence issues within 





























consultation, placed under Article 4, and Alliance solidarity and military defence under 
Article 5, as discussed in Chapter 4. Furthermore, this resulted in a takeover of tasks 
by	states	instead	of	the	organization,	by	modular	forms	of	cooperation	or	even	other	
international	organizations.	
93  Webber, M., Sperling, J., Smith, M. A., ‘NATO’s Post-Cold War Trajectory. Decline or Regeneration?’, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2012, p. 27. 
94  Secretary-General Solana press statement at the NATO Rome Summit, 25 January 1999. 
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structure, capability development and operations. Most concepts were initiated by the 
member	states,	especially	the	US,	and	were	often	further	developed	by	NATO	organs	as	





















95  For an elaboration; Korteweg, R., ‘The superpower, the bridge-builder and the hesitant ally: How defence   
transformation divided NATO 1991-2008’, 2011. 
96  Palmer, D. R., ‘Taking Stock, Looking Ahead. Two decades of NATO operations’, 2012, available at: https://www.nato.
int/docu/review/2012/chicago/stock-looking-ahead/en/index.htm, accessed 2-4-2017; Lindley French, J., ’NATO: The 
Enduring Alliance’, Routledge, 2015. 
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6.4.2 Level of Deepening
Common Security and Defence Policy: After the Cold War 
The new Europe, at the end of the end of the Cold War, was institutionalized with the 
Maastricht Treaty.97	The	unification	of	Germany,	the	withdrawal	of	American	troops	from	
Europe and the Balkan wars were some of the reasons for Europe to embark on a European 
foreign,	security	and	defence	policy.	
	 ‘Maastricht’	offered	the	EU	possibilities	for	a	genuine	foreign,	security	and	defence			





processes.99 This empowered the mobilisation of common EU assets, for instance from 
the Commission, for security issues. Third, the CFSP enabled a closer consultation and 
coordination	process	between	member	states	on	security	policy	and	common	objectives	of	
the EU. This connected the EU security policy directly to other policies and thus adopted, 




proponents of a European security and future defence pillar, except for the Scandinavian 
countries.	The	‘new’	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries	were	likewise	proponents	
of	a	European	security	and	defence	pillar,	but	as	a	facilitator	not	a	takeover	of	the	state;	
97 Although the initiatives for a European army were launched before, like the Pleven Plan. The Pleven Plan was a French 
initiative of the premier in 1950 for a supranational European Defence Community, which was ultimately refused by the 
French assembly. 
98  The Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Maastricht, Article J4. 
99  The Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Maastricht.
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the EU to NATO in capabilities and operations. 
The	operational	starting	point	of	Europe’s	step	into	the	security	arena	was	made	by	the	
Petersberg	Declaration	by	the	WEU	in	1992,	as	discussed	in	Chapter	4.101 The European 
leaders	agreed	at	‘Maastricht’	that	the	WEU	formed	an	integral	part	of	the	EU,	tasking	it	to	
implement decisions and actions with defence implications. 








autonomy of CSDP.102 





the	broadened	Petersberg	tasks	of	the	WEU	under	the	ESDP.104 The ambition of some EU 






100  Segers. M., ‘Reis naar het continent. Nederland en de Europese integratie, 1950 tot heden’, Prometheus, 2013.
101 Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management; Western European 
Union Council of Ministers, Petersberg Declaration, Bonn, 19 June 1992, II. Par. 4. In 2002 the tasks were expanded 
with: joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention task and post-conflict 
stabilisation. 
102  For an elaboration on the position of France towards EU’s CSDP, see: Michel, L., ‘Cross-currents in French Defense and 
U.S. Interests’, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Strategic Perspectives, No. 10, Washington, D.C. April 2012; G., 
Biehl, H., Giegerich, B., Jonas, A., (Eds.), ‘Security Cultures in Europe. Security and Defense   Policies across the Continent’, 
Springer, 2013; Schmitt, O., The Reluctant Atlanticist: France’s Security and Defense Policy in a Transatlantic Context’, 
Journal of Strategic Studies, Taylor and Francis Group, 2016. 
103  Although this did not provide a solution to the position of the neutral-observer states, like Denmark, which had an opt-
out regarding defence policy ever since the Treaty of Maastricht, 1992.  
104  Treaty of Amsterdam, amending the Treaty on European Union, 2 October 1997, Article J. 7.
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of constructive abstention was introduced.107 This mechanism made it possible for member 
states	to	abstain	in	a	CFSP	related	vote	without	blocking	a	unanimous	decision	in	the	
Council, an EU tradition spill-over to security and defence policy. 
Building European Security and Defence   
The summit between the British Prime Minister Blair and the French President Chirac 







transatlantic link with the UK as an anchor.109 Furthermore, Prime Minister Blair favoured 
a	policy	of	constructive	engagement	towards	the	European	integration	process	in	contrast	
with his predecessors. France, on the contrary, had been a proponent of an autonomous 







105  The debate still continues as to whether Kissinger actually made the statement. 
106  Lodge, J., Flynn, V., ‘The CFSP After Amsterdam: The Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit’, International Relations, 
Volume XIV, no. 1, April 1998, p. 7.
107  As a general rule, all decisions taken with respect to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy are adopted 
unanimously. However, in certain cases, an EU country can choose to abstain from voting on a particular action without 
blocking it. This could arise, for example, where the EU proposes to condemn the actions of a non-EU country.
108  Franco-British St. Malo declaration, 4 December 1998. 
109  Drent, M., ‘A Europeanisation of the Security Structure. The Security Identities of the United Kingdom and Germany’, 
Dissertation, University of Groningen, the Netherlands, 7 October 2010, p. 139-166.
110  Franco-British St. Malo declaration, 4 December 1998.





launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This 
process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European 
army’.111	Furthermore,	in	Helsinki,	the	ESDP	was	given	more	substance	by	initiating	its	










and defence policy, a military structure could not be overlooked. Hence the establishment 
of	the	EU	Military	Committee	(EUMC)	and	the	Military	Staff	(EUMS),	copied	from	NATO’s	














111  European Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999. 
112  A force of 50,000-60,000 troops, deployable within 60 days and sustainable for at least one year, by 2003, European 
Council, Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999. To be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces 
of up to 50,000–60,000 personnel capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks.
113  Joint and combined troops of 1000 up to 1500, deployable within 5 to 10 days.
114  Treaty of Nice, 26 February 2001.
115  Treaty on European Union, 1992, art. 38
116  Varwick, J., Koops, J., ‘The European Union and NATO: ‘Shrewd Interorganizationalism’ in the Making?’, in: Jorgensen, 
K.E., ‘The European Union and International Organizations’, Routledge, London, 2009, p. 116. 
117  The institutional structure outlined in the annex of the Presidency Report of the Nice European Council, 2000. 
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widening	EU’s	geopolitical	scope.118 For the proponents, the ESS provided the opportunity 
to	show	the	US	that	the	EU	was	engaged	with	strengthening	European	security.	For	




an institutionalization of the security and defence policy, a combination of military and 
civilian	crisis	management	tools	and	autonomous	decision-making	institutions	within	the	
security and defence domain. 119  



















118 Security Strategy for Europe, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World’, 2003. The implementation of the ESS of 2003 was 
reviewed in 2008: European Union, ‘’ ‘ Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy- Providing 
Security in a Changing World’, 2008, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/
EN/reports/104630.pdf, accessed 3 November 2016. 
119  For an elaboration: Howorth, J., ‘European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge?’, Chaillot paper no. 43, 
WEU-ISS, 2000; Ojanen, H., ‘Participation and Influence. Finland, Sweden and the Post-Amsterdam development of the 
CFSP’, Occasional Paper 11, The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, January 2000. 
120  The process of the European constitution was elaborated in Chapter 4, section 4.4.2. 
121  This Treaty gives the EU a single legal personality (art.46A), previously enjoyed only by the European Communities.
122  Elected by the European Council by a qualified majority for a term of two and a half years. 
123  At the Lisbon Summit it was decided to change the ‘E’ of European Security and Defence Policy into the ‘C’ of Common 
Security and Defence Policy.
124  A combination of the former post of High Representative of the so called second pillar of the CFSP and the CSDP and the 
commissioner of External Relations of the Commission. 
125  Keukeleire. S., Delreux, T., ´The Foreign Policy of the European Union ,́ The European Union Series, 2nd edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, UK, 2014, p. 246. 
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Maastricht	Treaty,	which	brought	all	aspects	of	EU	foreign	and	security	policy	under	the	
roof of one treaty.126 
	 A	second	important	change	in	the	deepening	of	the	EU	foreign,	security	and	defence	




the	EU	outside	Europe,	also	on	foreign,	security	and	defence	issues.129 The power of 




relations, in particular the Directorate General for External Relations of the European 





As discussed previously, security and defence policy is usually decided unanimously. 
Nevertheless,	some	exceptions	were	made	by	dividing	decision-making	between	civil	and	
military missions and operations. 
	 A	fourth	change	involved	the	institutional	structure,	as	‘Lisbon’	formalized	the	existing	
institutional civil and military ESDP structure by the setup of the framework inside the 
treaties,	such	as	the	Crisis	Management	and	Planning	Directorate	(CMPD),	the	CPCC	and	the	
EUMS,	and	became	a	part	of	the	EEAS.		Furthermore,	with	regard	to	the	scope	of	missions,	
126  As the HR also acts as Vice–President of the European Commission, this gave the European Parliament a say on his/her 
appointment, as the Commission is accountable to the Parliament. 
127  The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 
December 2007, Article 13 A.
128  For an extensive overview on the institutional structures after ‘Lisbon’, see: Morillas, P., ‘Institutionalization or 
Intergovernmental Decision-Taking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the Lisbon Treaty’ , European Foreign 
Affairs Review 16, 2011, Kluwer International, p. 254-255.
129  Representation consists of more than 130 posts, including former posts of the Commission. 
130  Morillas, P., ‘Institutionalization or Intergovernmental Decision-Taking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty’, European Foreign Affairs review 16, 2011, Kluwer International, p. 244-251.
131  Under Article 31 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the country that constructively abstains may qualify its 
abstention by making a formal declaration. In that case, it shall not be obliged to apply this decision, but shall accept that 
the decision commits the EU. On matters not having military or defence implications, the Council may act by qualified 
majority, when adopting a decision defining a Union action or position on the basis of a decision or of a specific request 
of the European Council. However, if a member of the Council declares that, for vital and stated reasons of national 
policy, it intends to oppose the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority, the Council may, acting by 
qualified majority, request that the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity (Article 31 TEU). 
The possibility of a blocking veto remains, even though a Member State has to offer some explanations to use it. Such 
explanations are not a deterrent of veto, if one Member State is determined to defend its interests, which diverge from 
those of the majority. It transpires that the CFSP method is an improved intergovernmental cooperation method, but 
not much more than that. Even with the improvements brought by the Treaty of Lisbon, the foreign and security policy 
cannot become a ‘common policy’ by the means put at its disposal.





introduced to deepen and enhance political and military solidarity. The concept of 





which extended the concept of enhanced cooperation.135 These mechanisms entailed 











development	of	the	Union’.141 The WEU mandate was taken over by the EU, and the WEU as 
an	organization	was	dissolved	in	2011.142 
132  Including: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict 
prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace–making and post–
conflict stabilisation (art.28B). 
133 The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 
December 2007., Article 28D.   
134  Elaborated on in section 4.4.2.
135  The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 
December 2007, Articles 42 (6) and 46, as well as Protocol 10, Article 1b, Protocol. 
136  Exceptions: decisions pertaining to permanent structured cooperation, the procedures for setting up and administering 
the ‘start–up fund’ or the appointment of the High Representative, are adopted by qualified majority. On the other hand, 
the unanimity rule remains when deciding on the launch of a mission. In practice, this means that states involved in 
permanent structured cooperation may not launch an operation on behalf of the EU without having the formal approval 
of all EU Member States.
137  Based on the experience of operation Artemis, in support of the UN mission in Monuc, Congo. Operation Artemis; from 
June to September 2003. 
138  Informal trilateral cooperation between Poland, Germany and France since 1991. 
139  Rehrl, J. (Ed.), ‘Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union’, Third edition, 2016. 
140  The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 
December 2007, Articles 3 and 28. 
141  The Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, Maastricht: Declaration on the Western European Union, I-declaration.
142  From June 2010 the WEU Treaty was cancelled and the WEU was abolished from June 2011 after one year postponement, 
closing the WEU organs.









territory and the concern about a possible Brexit all necessitated a need for coordination 






















143  Novaky, N. I. M., ‘Who Wants to Pay More? The European Union’s Military Operations and the Burden Sharing Dispute 
over Financial Burden Sharing’, European Security, Volume 5, 2016, Issue 2, 15 February 2016.
144  European Union, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe –  A Global Strategy for the European Union’s 
Foreign and  Security Policy’, June 2016.  
145    European Commission, ‘European Defence Action Plan’, 2016, available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/
com_2016_950_f1_communication_from_commission_to_inst_en_v5_p1_869631.pdf, accessed 12 January 2017. 
146  For an elaboration, see: Fiott, D., ‘EU Defence Research in Development’, ISSUE Alert, 2016, available at: https://www.iss.
europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_43_Defence_research.pdf, accessed April 2017.
147  For an elaboration, see: European Defence Agency, ‘Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)’, 2016, available 
at: https://www.eda.europa.eu/what-we-do/our-current-priorities/coordinated-annual-review-on-defence-(card), 
accessed 20 November 2019.
148  Within the EU, military activities are called operations and civilian activities are missions.
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Finally,	along	with	strengthening	the	EU’s	CSDP	with	the	EUGS,	cooperation	with	NATO	was	
strengthened	in	2016,	which	was	explored	in	depth	in	Chapter	5.		
All in all, EU security and defence policy was deepened in line with a possible European 
army	and	EU	strategic	autonomy.	The	latter	has	been	called	for	enthusiastically	more	
than	once	in	the	EUGS,	stating	that	‘As	Europeans	we	must	take	greater	responsibility	for	
our security… as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level 
of	ambition	and	strategic	autonomy	is	important	for	Europe’s	ability	to	foster	peace	and	
safeguard	security	within	and	beyond	its	borders’,156 proclaimed more than once by the 
French President Macron.157 And continued with the statement that ‘full spectrum defence 
capabilities	are	necessary	to	respond	to	external	crises,	build	our	partners’	capacities,	
and	to	guarantee	Europe’s	safety’.158	However,	at	the	same	time	the	EUGS	acknowledged	




is still under scrutiny in the academic and policy world. The debates vary between a 
supranational	European	army,	including	a	nuclear	deterrence	capacity,	and	European	forces	
strengthening	the	EU	and	NATO	at	the	same	time.160 





the EU developed mechanisms and institutional frameworks to increase coordination and 
cooperation	between	these	separate	worlds.	To	a	certain	degree,	this	has	been	in	contrast	
with NATO development in the civilian domain, as discussed in Chapter 4, and with the 
OSCE development of military tasks and functions. 
156  ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy, June 2016. Eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, p. 19. 
157  French president Macron Press Conference, Helsinki 30 August 2018. French president Macron on a visit to the former 
Western Front in Verdun, 5 November 2018.
158  European Union Global Strategy, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’. A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, available at: Eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_
web.pdf, p. 10-11. 
159  Ibid, p. 20. 
160  Debates on the concept of strategic autonomy, see: Biscop, S., ‘Fighting for Europe. European Strategic Autonomy and 
the use of Force’, 2019, available at: www.egmontinstitute.be/fighting-for-europe-european-strategic-autonomy-and-
the-use-of-force/ (January 2019): Fiott, D., ‘Strategic Autonomy towards ‘European Sovereignty‘ in Defence? ‘, The EU 












illustrated by the debates between France and Germany.152 As France was a proponent of a 
small	and	ambitious	group	of	states	with	robust	capabilities,	Germany	was	an	opponent	of	
further	differentiation	within	the	EU	and	wanted	a	stronger	inclusive	approach,	especially	













who will provide the same for operational aspects. 
149  Article 31 and 41 TEU, Council Decision 2008/975/CFSP of 18 December establishing a mechanism to administer the 
financing of the common costs of EU operations having military or defence implications. 
150  Beyond the scope of this research: on 7 June 2017 the Commission launched the proposal to boost European capabilities 
through the European Defense Fund with 5.5 billion per year. 
151  Beyond the scope of this research: On 13 November 2017, 23 EU member states signed PESCO which was adopted by the 
EU Council at 11 December 2017 by 25 states. PESCO includes the traditional neutral states: Austria, Ireland, Finland and 
Sweden and excluding the UK, Malta and Denmark. 
152  For an elaboration on the position of the EU member states towards PESCO, see: Bakker, A., Drent, M., Zandee, D., 
‘European Defence Core Groups. The Why, What and How of Permanent Structured Cooperation’, Clingendael Policy 
Briefs, November 2016, available at: https://www.clingendael.nl/publication/european-defense  -core-groups, accessed 
6 February 2017; Biscop, S., ‘European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance’, Survival, vol. 60 no. 3, June–July 2018, p. 161–180.
153  November 2016.
154  For an elaboration on PESCO: Biscop, S., ‘European Defence: Give PESCO a Chance’, Survival, vol. 60 no. 3, June–July 2018, 
p. 161–180; Biscop, S., ‘Differentiated integration in Defence: a plea for PESCO’, Insitituti Affari Internazionali, 6 February 
2017.  
155  Outside the scope of this research: 13 November, the PESCO mechanism was adopted; Council conclusions on security 
and defence in the context of the EU Global Strategy, Council of the European Union, 14190/17, Brussels, 13 November 
2017.
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Finally,	along	with	strengthening	the	EU’s	CSDP	with	the	EUGS,	cooperation	with	NATO	was	
strengthened	in	2016,	which	was	explored	in	depth	in	Chapter	5.		
All in all, EU security and defence policy was deepened in line with a possible European 
army	and	EU	strategic	autonomy.	The	latter	has	been	called	for	enthusiastically	more	
than	once	in	the	EUGS,	stating	that	‘As	Europeans	we	must	take	greater	responsibility	for	
our security… as well as to act autonomously if and when necessary. An appropriate level 
of	ambition	and	strategic	autonomy	is	important	for	Europe’s	ability	to	foster	peace	and	
safeguard	security	within	and	beyond	its	borders’,156 proclaimed more than once by the 
French President Macron.157 And continued with the statement that ‘full spectrum defence 
capabilities	are	necessary	to	respond	to	external	crises,	build	our	partners’	capacities,	
and	to	guarantee	Europe’s	safety’.158	However,	at	the	same	time	the	EUGS	acknowledged	




is still under scrutiny in the academic and policy world. The debates vary between a 
supranational	European	army,	including	a	nuclear	deterrence	capacity,	and	European	forces	
strengthening	the	EU	and	NATO	at	the	same	time.160 





the EU developed mechanisms and institutional frameworks to increase coordination and 
cooperation	between	these	separate	worlds.	To	a	certain	degree,	this	has	been	in	contrast	
with NATO development in the civilian domain, as discussed in Chapter 4, and with the 
OSCE development of military tasks and functions. 
156  ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security 
Policy, June 2016. Eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf, p. 19. 
157  French president Macron Press Conference, Helsinki 30 August 2018. French president Macron on a visit to the former 
Western Front in Verdun, 5 November 2018.
158  European Union Global Strategy, ‘Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe’. A Global Strategy for the European 
Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, June 2016, available at: Eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_
web.pdf, p. 10-11. 
159  Ibid, p. 20. 
160  Debates on the concept of strategic autonomy, see: Biscop, S., ‘Fighting for Europe. European Strategic Autonomy and 
the use of Force’, 2019, available at: www.egmontinstitute.be/fighting-for-europe-european-strategic-autonomy-and-
the-use-of-force/ (January 2019): Fiott, D., ‘Strategic Autonomy towards ‘European Sovereignty‘ in Defence? ‘, The EU 
Institute for Security Studies, (November 2018).  
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For	one,	in	2003,	France	and	Italy	proposed	a	multinational	gendarmerie	force,161 which 
became	known	as	the	European	Gendarmerie	Force	(EGF).162	Although	the	EGF	does	not	fall	
under the EU umbrella, in other words it is not accommodated within the EU institutional 
framework, it created a possibility to make use of police capacity in international crisis 
management	varying	from	conflict	prevention	to	enhancement	of	international	stability	












cooperation in addition. The combination of civil and military instruments resulted in 
military operations and civilian missions and combinations of military-civilian missions, 















161  Meeting of European Union Defense Ministers, October 2003.
162  The implementation agreement was signed by the defence ministers of the five participating countries on 17 September 
2004 in Noordwijk, the Netherlands. The EGF became fully operational in 2006. See: Eurogendfor, available at: www.
eurogendfor.org, accessed 3-02-2015. 
163  European Council, Sevilla, 21-22 June 2002. 
164  Rule of Law (200 experts), governance, civil protection, police, monitoring of (pre/post) conflicts and support for EU 
special representatives.   
165  Operations Centre, planning and a small headquarters. 
166  Internal Security Strategy (ISS), 25-26 March 2010.
167  European Council, ‘Declaration on Combatting Terrorism’, Brussels, 25 March 2004. 
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command	structure	in	situations	where	a	joint	civil-military	response	was	required.	For	
the	planning	of	civilian	missions	a	civilian	planning	and	conduct	capability	(CPCC)	was	











by an institutional framework for civil and military missions and operations and an 
















above, a supranational mechanism for enforcement was never adopted: ‘The Council and 
the	High	Representative	shall	ensure	compliance	with	these	principles’.173 If no common 
168  Operational Headquarters for the civilian CSDP Missions, August 2007.
169  Under this cooperation is police cooperation and customs, protection of the borders and juridical cooperation. European 
Council, February 25, 2010, Article 71.
170  For a terrorist attack or natural disaster, within and outside EU territory. See: European Commission, ‘EU Civil Protection 
Mechanism’, n.d., available at: ec.europa.eu/echo/what/civil-protection/mechanism_en, accessed 7-7-2018.
171  For an elaboration on EU and CSFP-CSDP institutionalisation, see: Vanhoonacker, S., Dijkstra, H., Maurer, H., 
‘Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy: The State of the Art’, European 
Integration online Papers, Vol. 14, 2010; Vanhoonacker, S., Pomorska, K., ‘The European External Action Service and 
agenda-setting in European Foreign Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 20, Taylor and Francis Group, 2013. 
172  The Treaty of Lisbon, amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 13 
December 2007. 
173 Ibid, Articles 25, 28 and 29. 
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position was to be found, it was not determined which line would be followed: consensus 
or abstention.174 
	 Like	NATO,	the	EU’s	decision-making	in	the	defence	domain	was	intergovernmental	
and therefore decided upon by the member states, represented in the Council and 
supported	by	the	Secretariat	and	the	High	Representative.	Nevertheless,	the	Nice	Treaty	
of	2001	extended	the	use	of	qualified	majority	voting,	including	international	agreements	
under the second pillar.175 Equally, the concept of enhanced cooperation, or in other words, 
differentiated	or	modular	cooperation,	was	extended	to	the	security	and	defence	domain.176 
However, this did not have any military or defence implications, because the new EU 























external relations and security and defence policy, a complex institutional framework of 
174  Best, E., ‘Understanding EU Decision-making’, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, The Netherlands, 
2016, p. 115. 
175  Treaty of Nice, 26 February 2001. 
176  Enhanced cooperation: if a number of Member States (at least eight are required – nine under the Lisbon Treaty) want to 
work more closely on a specific area, they are able to do so.
177  Teunissen, P. J., ‘Strengthening the Defence dimension of the EU’, European Foreign Affairs review, 4, 1999, p. 337. 
178  Sjursen, H. (eds.), ‘The EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Quest for Democracy’, Journal of European Public 
Policy Series, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London, 2012, p. 3. 
179 Ibid, p. 28.
180  Howorth, J., ‘Decision-making in security and defence policy: Towards supranational inter-governmentalism?’, 
Cooperation and Conflict, Sage Publications, 2012, p. 449 









combination	with	NATO,	built	by	EU	and	NATO	experts	and	officials.183 Civilian missions 
were	planned	by	EU	experts	and	officials,	outside	the	range	of	national	planners,	both	
in Brussels.184 As a result, institutional practice has implemented the Treaty of Lisbon by 
agenda	setting	and	the	management	and	conduct	of	operations	and	missions,	such	as	the	
Haiti	earthquake	(2010)	and	the	Flotilla	crisis	in	Gaza	(2010).185 








mechanism of enhanced cooperation.187 
	 With	regard	to	the	CSDP	area,	the	concept	of	modular	cooperation	started	with	the	
BG concept, reiterated at the French-British Summit188 based on their cooperation in 
the	context	of	the	EU	operation	Artemis	in	the	DR	Congo.189	The	Treaty	of	Lisbon	(2009)	
incorporated several mechanisms to further cooperation for states that desire this, 
181  Piris. J. C., ‘The Lisbon Treaty. A legal and Political Analysis’, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 250. 
182  Dijkstra, H., ‘The Influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence’, European Security, 21:3, p. 312.
183  Military operations are decided upon by the member states, civilian missions are decided upon the Council in 
combination with the EP. 
184  Dijkstra, H., ‘The Influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence’, European Security, 21:3, p. 311-312. 
185  Morillas, P., ‘Institutionalization or Intergovernmental Decision-Taking in Foreign Policy: The Implementation of the 
Lisbon Treaty’ , European Foreign Affairs review 16, 2011, Kluwer International, p. 252.
186  Treaty of Maastricht 1992, Articles 20 and 326-334.
187 Enhanced cooperation can be submitted by a proposal of the European Commission at the request of at least nine 
member states. To block the cooperation a quantitative quorum is needed (the ‘blocking minority’ referred to in Article 
16, paragraph 4 of the Treaty of Maastricht) and the non-participating members remain involved and can join at any time. 
The European Parliament is involved in the decision-making and as a result monitoring and accountability are in place. 
Though it is questionable as to whether MEPs from opt-out countries should have a say in the associated legislation. 
Finally, enhanced cooperation is governed by EU law and is therefore under the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice. Hence 
the clear division of tasks and competences.  
188  4 February 2003, Le Touquet, France. 
189  Operation Artemis was the first EU autonomous military operation outside Europe and independent of NATO to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in the summer of 2003. 
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Cooperation outside the EU
In addition to an increase in modular cooperation within the EU, there was also an increase 
in	informal	cooperation	outside	the	organization.	Member	states	have	initiated	many	
bi-	and	multilateral	concepts	to	further	cooperation	and	integration	in	the	security	realm	
























190  ‘Europese Defensie samenwerking: soevereiniteit en handelingsvermogen’, nr. 78, 10 februari 2012; ‘Gedifferentieerde 
integratie: verschillende routes in de EU-samenwerking’, AIV rapport, nr. 98, 24 november 2015. 
191  Rehrl, J. (Ed.), ‘Handbook on CSDP. The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union’, Third edition, 2016. 
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provider	of	security	and	defence	policy,	as	it	was	not	in	charge	of	military	operations.	These	
were executed by national or multinational headquarters or in combination with NATO. 
Furthermore, these military operations were executed on an ad-hoc basis, a process driven 
by	practice.	In	addition,	these	operations	were	often	a	combination	of	civil	missions	and	













operations and missions. 
	 Regarding	the	form	of	the	path	of	deepening,	the	EU	was	built	in	a	modular	manner.	
Modular	and	flexible	cooperation	have	been	inherent	to	EU’s	institutional	development	
process	since	the	Schengen	agreements.192 Security and defence cooperation were certainly 
no	exception	to	this.	It	started	in	NATO	with	the	ESDI	concept	and	was	integrated	into	the	















192  The Schengen Agreement is a treaty that was signed on 14 June 1985. The treaty led to the creation of Europe’s Schengen 
area in which internal border checks have largely been abolished.
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Minorities	(HCNM),198	in	view	of	the	erupting	crises	in	Europe	combined	with	‘missions	
of	long	duration’	and	in	view	of	the	process	of	much-needed	democratization.	The	Code	
of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security was also adopted, an instrument 
aiming	for	the	peaceful	settlement	of	disputes	between	states,	which	operationalised	and	





Control mechanisms included the Vienna risk reduction mechanism201 and the Moscow 
mechanism.202	The	emergency	mechanisms	included	the	Berlin	emergency	mechanism203 
and	the	Valetta	mechanism.204	Neither	the	latter	nor	the	Conciliation	Commission	have	











Lisbon, this resulted in the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe in 
the 21st century. The idea behind this OSCE Security Model was to broaden and deepen 
198  For an elaboration on the HCNM: Mosser, M. W. ,’Embracing ‘Embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant 
role in the European security architecture’, European Security, Routledge, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 591; Kemp, W., ‘OSCE 
Peace operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, International Peace Institute, New York, June 2016. 
199  Revised in 2014. 
200 See: OSCE, Compendium of OSCE Mechanism and Procedures, Sec.gal/121/08, 20 June 2008, available at: https://www.
osce.org/cio/32683, accessed 12-3-2017.
201  The Vienna Mechanism of 1990 on unusual military activities allows for an emergency meeting of all OSCE participating 
states at the request of only one state: the Vienna risk reduction mechanism.
202  The Moscow mechanism allows rapporteur missions to be sent to a state even without the state’s permission.
203  The Berlin mechanisms allows for the convening of a special meeting within the OSCE framework with the consent of 
only 13 states, 1991.
204 The Valletta mechanism provides the selection of one or more individuals, from a register of qualified candidates 
maintained by the CPC, and in the setting-up of a OSCE institution for the peaceful settlement of disputes, responsible for 
advising the parties in their choice of an appropriate dispute settlement procedure. In addition, the Valetta mechanism 
helps the parties to find a solution to the dispute, for instance the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration may be used for those purposes 1991
205  For an elaboration on these mechanisms: Stenner, C., ‘Understanding the Mediator: Taking Stock of the OSCE’s 
Mechanisms and Instruments for Conflict Resolution’, Security and Human Rights, Volume 27, 2016, nos. 3-4, p. 261. 












6.5.2 Level of Deepening 























193  CSCE, Helsinki Final Act, 1975. 
194  Moller, B., ‘European Security. The roles of Regional Security Organisations’, Ashgate, 2012, p. 246.
195  See: OSCE, ‘Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the CSCE’, 1992, available at:  https://www.osce.org/
cca/111409, accessed 5-9-2016. 
196  CSCE Budapest Summit Declaration, 1994.
197  Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, New York: International Peace Institute, June 
2016, p. 1-4. 
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Minorities	(HCNM),198	in	view	of	the	erupting	crises	in	Europe	combined	with	‘missions	
of	long	duration’	and	in	view	of	the	process	of	much-needed	democratization.	The	Code	
of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security was also adopted, an instrument 
aiming	for	the	peaceful	settlement	of	disputes	between	states,	which	operationalised	and	





Control mechanisms included the Vienna risk reduction mechanism201 and the Moscow 
mechanism.202	The	emergency	mechanisms	included	the	Berlin	emergency	mechanism203 
and	the	Valetta	mechanism.204	Neither	the	latter	nor	the	Conciliation	Commission	have	











Lisbon, this resulted in the Common and Comprehensive Security Model for Europe in 
the 21st century. The idea behind this OSCE Security Model was to broaden and deepen 
198  For an elaboration on the HCNM: Mosser, M. W. ,’Embracing ‘Embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant 
role in the European security architecture’, European Security, Routledge, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 591; Kemp, W., ‘OSCE 
Peace operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, International Peace Institute, New York, June 2016. 
199  Revised in 2014. 
200 See: OSCE, Compendium of OSCE Mechanism and Procedures, Sec.gal/121/08, 20 June 2008, available at: https://www.
osce.org/cio/32683, accessed 12-3-2017.
201  The Vienna Mechanism of 1990 on unusual military activities allows for an emergency meeting of all OSCE participating 
states at the request of only one state: the Vienna risk reduction mechanism.
202  The Moscow mechanism allows rapporteur missions to be sent to a state even without the state’s permission.
203  The Berlin mechanisms allows for the convening of a special meeting within the OSCE framework with the consent of 
only 13 states, 1991.
204 The Valletta mechanism provides the selection of one or more individuals, from a register of qualified candidates 
maintained by the CPC, and in the setting-up of a OSCE institution for the peaceful settlement of disputes, responsible for 
advising the parties in their choice of an appropriate dispute settlement procedure. In addition, the Valetta mechanism 
helps the parties to find a solution to the dispute, for instance the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration may be used for those purposes 1991
205  For an elaboration on these mechanisms: Stenner, C., ‘Understanding the Mediator: Taking Stock of the OSCE’s 
Mechanisms and Instruments for Conflict Resolution’, Security and Human Rights, Volume 27, 2016, nos. 3-4, p. 261. 
206 OSCE Council of Ministers Stockholm, part of the Decision on Peaceful Settlement of Dispute, 1992, available at: https://
www.osce.org/cca/111409?download=true, accessed 1-7-2018
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the	OSCE’s	mandate,	aiming	at	a	genuine	European	security	architecture.	Nevertheless,	
with	the	upcoming	NATO	enlargement	and	the	rising	tensions	between	Russia	and	the	
West as a result of the Balkan wars,207	‘Lisbon’	did	not	set	a	strong	security	model,	the	first	
decline	in	building	the	European	security	architecture	due	to	the	diverging	interests	of	the	
participating	states.	
 The treaties about conventional arms within the OSCE area, the CFE treaties, were a 
path	of	deepening	alongside	the	security	model	development.	In	Lisbon,	the	states	that	
were	party	to	the	Treaty	on	CFE	of	1990	signed	an	agreement	to	launch	negotiations	to	





















207  Since the Yugoslav crisis broke out Russia had been a member of the Balkans Contact Group, but tensions rose due to the 
NATO operations in the area. For the first time since the end of the Cold War Russia vetoed a Security Council resolution in 
1999 as Russia had difficulty in agreeing to the idea of military action against its Serbian ally in the Balkans. Furthermore, 
Moscow did not want Kosovo to set a precedent for further interventions, especially not in its near abroad, like in 
Georgia. Russia’s veto in the UNSC was a turning point in Russia’s relations with the West. 
208 Thirty states joined at the moment of signing the CFE agreement. Russia suspended the observance of its treaty 
obligations on July 14, 2007 and in March 2015, Russia announced that it had taken the decision to completely stop its 
participation in the Treaty. 
209 See Chapter 4. 
210  Hill. W. H., ‘OSCE Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Past and Future’, OSCE Security Days Event, National War 
College Washington DC., 16 September 2013. 
211  See: OSCE, ‘Operational Document- the Platform for Co-operative Security’, 1999, available at: https://www.osce.org/
mc/17562, accessed 2-2-2016. 











around the end of the twentieth century.213The three pillars of the OSCE military domain of 
arms control – the CFE, the Vienna document on CSBMs and the Open Skies Treaty, not all 
under the umbrella of the OSCE – thus either became outdated or were abandoned due to a 
lack of transparency and distrust.214







mandate and has always been chaired215	by	one	of	the	participating	states.	In	addition,	the	
Secretary-General’s	main	task	was	to	assist	the	Chairman	of	the	Permanent	Council.	The	
Forum	for	Security	Cooperation	(FSC)	was	principally	concerned	with	issues	relating	to	




was therefore appointed. In combination with the HCNM, the ODIHR was installed as 
one	of	the	three	autonomous	organs.217 The ODIHR was installed to assist the former 
212  Kemp, W., ‘OSCE Peace Operations: Soft Security in Hard Environments’, New York: International Peace Institute, June 
2016, p. 4. 
213  Zellner, W. (Co), ‘Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community. From Vision to Reality’, IDEAS, 2012, p. 13. 
214  See the principles or ‘rule of cooperation’ between the OSCE members in the ‘Helsinki Decalogue’, Helsinki Final Act, 
1975. 
215  The Chairmanship rotated on an annual basis and was chaired by one of the participating states. This Chairman was 
assisted by the previous and future Chairman in Office (CiO), the so-called Troika. The state that held the position of (the) 
CiO could request for missions to be carried out and could put topics, such as terrorism, on the agenda.
216  A frozen conflict is a situation in which active armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or other political framework 
resolved the conflict. As a result, legally the conflict can start again at any moment, creating an environment of insecurity 
and instability.
217  Often debated, but the activities of HCNM and ODIHR are not tied to consensus approval of the Permanent Council, 
though their heads and budget approval is, see: Dunay, P., ‘The OSCE in crisis ‘, Chaillot Paper, no 88, Paris, EUISSP, 2006, 
p. 30. 
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Communist	countries	in	their	transition	process	to	democratic	political	systems	through	
the	promotion	of	free	elections,	for	instance	by	training	and	providing	observers.	These	


























218  For an elaboration on the tasks of ODIHR; Mosser, M. W. ,’Embracing ‘Embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but 
significant role in the European security architecture’, European Security, Routledge, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 591.
219  OSCE handbook, 2016, secretariat of the OSCE, Vienna.
220  Galbreath, D. J., ‘The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’, Routledge Global Institutions, 2007, Great 
Britain, p. 44.  
221  Stewart, E. J., ‘Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 
29, no. 2, August 2008, p. 268.
222  Galbreath, D. J., ‘The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’, Routledge Global Institutions, 2007, Great 
Britain, p. 95-98.
223  Ghebali, V. Y., ‘Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation’, p. 55, in: Tardy, T. 
(eds.), ‘European Security in a Global Context’, 2009, Routledge.  
224  Mosser, M. W. ‘Embracing ‘embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 24:4, p. 591.
225  Kropatcheva, E., ‘Russia and the role of the OSCE in European Security: a forum ‘for dialog or a Battlefield ’of interest?’, 
European Security, 21:3, 2012, p. 373. 



























dramatically and the idea of the OSCE as the pivot of the European security architecture 
was	lost.	States	were	less	engaged	with	the	OSCE,	which	resulted	in	a	lack	of	political	




of a mediation-support capacity in the OSCE secretariat. Mediation within the executive 
structures was institutionalised, for instance by the adoption of a Mediation Support Team 
226  Medvedev President of Russia, Berlin, June 2008. 
227  Goetschel, L., ‘Kleinstaaten im multilateralen Umfeld der OSZE’ in: Goetschel (ed.), ‘Vom Statisten zum Hauptdarsteller. Die Schweiz 
und ihre OSZE-Präsidentschaft’, Verlag Paul Hapt, 1996, p. 29-50. 
228  Galbreath, D. J., ‘The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’, Routledge Global Institutions, 2007, Great 
Britain, p. 62.





towards a political resolution. A remarkable step, because the OSCE was both a formal 
participant	within	the	TCG	and	a	mediator	through	the	position	of	the	CiO	and	the	Special	
Representative	in	the	conflict.	Furthermore,	the	OSCE	was	involved	in	these	conflicts	at	a	
time when relations between Russia and the West were at an all-time low. Nevertheless, 






















229  See: OSCE, ‘Mediation and Mediation Support’, n.d., available at:  https://www.osce.org/secretariat/107488, accessed 30 
April 2018. 
230  See: OSCE, Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements, 2015, available at: https://www.osce.
org/cio/140156, accessed 13 September 2018.  
231  Lanz, D., ‘Charting the Ups-and-downs of OSCE Mediation’, in Security and Human Rights, Netherlands Helsinki 
Committee, Volume 27, 2016, Nos. 3-4, p. 252.
232  The Transnistrian conflict was an armed conflict that broke out in November 1990 in Moldova between pro-Transnistrian 
forces (supported by Russia) and pro-Moldovan forces. A cease fire was declared on 21 July 1992, which has held. In 2011 
talks were held under the auspices of the OSCE, Russia, Ukraine, the US, the EU and the UN. 
233  For an elaboration on Russia’s position towards the OSCE after the 2014 Crimea crisis; Shakirov, O., ‘NoSCE or Next 
Generation OSCE?’, in Security and Human Rights, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, Volume 27, 2016, Nos. 3-4, p. 290-
308.
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Russia	accused	the	West	of	applying	double	standards,	because	the	West	focused	on	the	




follow-up had been received with more ambivalence. For the US, NATO had always been the 
organization	to	deal	with	the	‘hard’	security	issues	of	Europe	due	to	the	regular	inability	of	
















a	Rules	and	Procedures	Handbook	was	adopted	and	implemented	in	2006.240 There were 
some	modest	results,	but	those	did	not	lead	to	recognition	of	the	OSCE	as	a	full	standard	
international	organization	or	reform	of	the	less	effective	organs.241 
234  Ghebali, V. Y., ‘The OSCE between Crisis and Reform: Towards a new lease of Life’, Policy Paper no. 10, Geneva centre for 
the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005, p. 13-15. 
235  Stewart, E. J., ‘Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 
29, no. 2, August 2008, p. 271.
236  Hopmann, T. P., ‘The United States and the OSCE after the Ukraine Crisis’, Security and Human Rights, Brill and Nijhoff 
publishers, volume 26, 2015, no. 1, p. 33. 
237  EU voting in OSCE. 
238  Lanz, D., ‘Charting the Ups-and-downs of OSCE Mediation’, in Security and Human Rights, Netherlands Helsinki 
Committee, Volume 27, 2016, Nos. 3-4, p. 248-249.  
239  See: OSCE, ‘Common Purpose, Towards a more effective OSCE’, 2005, available at:  https://www.osce.org/cio/15805, 
accessed 12-9-2017.
240 OSCE Ministerial Council Decision No. 17, Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE’, Ljubljana, 6 December 2005, MC/
DEC/17/05, available at http://www.osce.si/mc-docs/mc_17_05.pdf, accessed 20-07-2017.
241  Ghebali, V. Y., ‘Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation’, p. 65-66, in: 
Tardy, T., (eds.) ‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, 
Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.















case decisions could be taken by consensus-minus-one, in order to accommodate 
action	against	a	non-complying	state.	This	was	the	first	form	of	flexibilization	within	
the European security architecture.245 The consensus-minus-one procedure was even 











242  For an elaboration on the development of decision-making within the OSCE: Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘embedded 
security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security architecture’, European Security, 24:4, p. 
585.
243  Mosser, M. W. ‘Embracing ‘embedded security: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 24:4, p. 585.
244 The Prague Document on Further Development of OSCE Institutions and Structures, January 1992. 
245  The only application of this mechanism was May 1992 to suspend Serbia and Montenegro from further participation in 
the OSCE process. 
246 Meeting in December 1992, the Council introduced the possibility of a decision being taken in accordance with the rule of 
consensus minus two in regard to the peaceful settlement of disputes. 
247  Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 586.
248 Up to now this option has only been used in 1992 when Yugoslavia was excluded because of its responsibility for various 
serious human rights violations. 
249 Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 586.








minus-one, in that its ‘…ostensible normative interpretation is thin cover for traditional, 







the OSCE itself operated with many mechanisms. These mechanisms were separated 
from	the	decision-making	cycle	and	were	not	hindered	by	the	decision-making	process	




discontinued as a result.254






in	bilateral	or	multilateral	meetings.255 These mechanisms were activated frequently at the 
250  The procedure has developed since the adoption, in November 1990, of the Charter of Paris for a New Europe, which 
stipulates that it be used for the appointment of the first Director of each institution (paragraph 14 of the Procedures and 
Modalities concerning OSCE Institutions). Finally, the July 1992 Helsinki Decisions also make provision for the use of that 
procedure for the setting up of an ad-hoc steering group on a proposal from the Chairman-in-Office (Chapter I, paragraph 
18). 
251  Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 589.
252  Idem.
253  Stewart, E. J., ‘Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 
29, no. 2, August 2008, p. 268.
254  For example, the closure of the field office in Yerevan by Azerbaijan. 
255  Except for the Vienna mechanism, which can be activated by a single state, the other mechanisms require a minimum of 
a qualified minority.











Russia and the US.
6.5.4 The OSCE Path of Deepening 
From	its	creation,	the	OSCE	had	a	normative	focus,	with	high	standards	in	relation	to	






normative focus, the institutional build-up of the OSCE took place in policy areas like the 
human	dimension,	such	as	the	institutes	of	HCNM	and	ODHIR.	In	the	early	1990s,	the	ideas	












256  See: US Mission to the OSCE, ‘Human Rights Abuses in Chechnya: 15 OSCE Countries invoke Vienna Mechanism’, 
2018, available at: https://osce.usmission.gov/human-rights-abuses-in-chechnya-15-osce-countries-invoke-vienna-
mechanism/ , accessed 12-9-2017.  
257  Williams, P. D., ‘Security Studies. An Introduction’, Routledge, Oxon, 2018.
258  Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 580.
259  Zellner, W. (Co), ‘Towards a Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security Community. From Vision to Reality’, IDEAS, 2012, p. 11.   
260 Hill. W. H., ‘OSCE Conflict Resolution and Peacekeeping, Past and Future’, OSCE Security Days Event, National War 
College Washington DC., 16 September 2013, p. 1.
261  Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 586.





























Final Act.266 Within the OSCE, it was made clear that the concept of cooperative security, 
human	rights	and	inclusiveness	conflicted	with	state	sovereignty.	This	left	the	OSCE	as	a	
functionalist	and	specialist	organization	for	the	difficult,	unsolvable	conflicts	in	the	OSCE	
262  Ghebali, V. Y., ‘Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation’, p. 68, in: Tardy, 
T., (Eds.), ‘European Security in a Global Context’, Routledge, 2009.
263  Holsti, K. J., ‘International Politics: A Framework for Analysis’, 7th international ed., Prentice-Hall International, 1994, p. 25. 
264 Mosser, M. W., ‘Embracing ‘embedded security’: the OSCE’s understated but significant role in the European security 
architecture’, European Security, 2015, 2015, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 584. 
265  Ghebali, V. Y., ‘Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation’, p. 65, in: Tardy, 
T., (eds.), ‘European Security in a Global Context’, Routledge, 2009.  
266 Sargsyan, H., ‘Syntheses of Common Challenges: Multifaceted Obstacle Course for the OSCE and all Parties Concerned’, 
Security and Human Rights, Netherlands Helsinki Committee, Volume 27, 2016, Nos. 3-4, p. 520.





















6.6 The Tower of Babel: A Cross-case Comparison on the Path of Deepening









267  Stewart, E. J., ‘Restoring EU-OSCE Cooperation for Pan-European Conflict Prevention’, Contemporary Security Policy, vol. 
29, no. 2, August 2008, p. 268. 





Previous to 1990 Creation 1949 Creation 1952 Creation 1975
1990 Paris Summit; European 
security architecture 
1991 NSC, ESDI, start change 
structure; planning staff, 
crisis coordination centre, 
reduction HQ 
1992 CSDP, Petersberg declaration Prague Summit; consensus 
minus 1+2,
convention on conciliation and 
arbitration
1994 CJTF, C2 and HQ CSCE=OSCE, Chapter VIII 
organization UN, HCNM, 
ODHIR, Code of Conduct, 
Convention on Conciliation 
and Arbitration. Institutional 




1997 C2 transformation Strengthening Petersberg 
tasks, start institutional 
building, 
constructive abstention 
1998 St. Malo Summit; ESDP
1999 NSC, HQ and C2 Treaty of Amsterdam, HHG 
(civil and military), crisis 
management, creation PSC/
COPS for missions, five 
national operational HQ
Istanbul, ACFE and 
strengthening CSBMs 
2001 Treaty of Nice; 
institutionalisation PSC, 
EUMC, EUMS, 
EGF, ECAP. WEU=EU, except 
for Article 5
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2002 NRF, change institutional 
structure; committees, HQ, 
C2 split ACT-ACO, PCC
2003 C2 reform; ACO and ACT ESS,
EDA, EGF
2004 Civilian headline goal; counter 
terrorism coordinator, civilian 
response teams 
2006 BG
2007 Strengthening Petersberg 
tasks, operations centre, 
CPCC, sitcen  
2008 CPCC, civilian HQ
2009 Treaty of Lisbon; ESDP=CSDP, 
EEAS, HR, PESCO, Art 42.7 and 
222, CMPD, CPCC





Internal Security Strategy 
2011 CCOMC mediation-support capacity
2013 FNC (Germany)
2014 RAP, NRF extension, VJTF, 
IFFG, FFG, RAP, CFI, JEF
2015 Multinational Division 
South-East
2016 Cyber attacks under Article 
5, CCD, C2 reform
EUGS IPSD, PESCO, EDAP, 
CARD, EDF, COSI, ECPF, CCD 
and involvement Commission
 
Table 6.1 Overview of key moments of the path of deepening of the different security organizations.




between East and West.268 The institutional build-up of the OSCE was based on the 
268 Holsti, K. J., ‘International Politics: A Framework for Analysis’, 7th international ed., Prentice-Hall International, 1994, p. 25. 
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policy areas for which the OSCE was mandated: the human dimension and minorities 

































 Finally, the EU and CSDP built its competences on treaties and amendments and 
developed from there. From these treaties, such as the Maastricht, Amsterdam and Lisbon 
Treaties, the competences and institutional structures for security and defence policy were 
built incrementally and sequentially, case by case, based on operations and missions. 
269 23 November 1959, Strasbourg.
270  Hofmann, S. C., ‘Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2011, vol.49, nr.1, p. 106.

























Form of Deepening 
Along	with	the	observed	change	in	the	level	of	deepening	of	international	security	
cooperation,	another	finding	from	the	path	of	deepening	refers	to	the	form	of	
international security cooperation. An increase of modular cooperation was observed, 
which	gave	member	states	the	possibility	of	cooperation	with	a	smaller	group,	based	on	




mechanism271 and Article 42.7, with opt-in and opt-out possibilities. Lisbon was preceded 
271  Biscop, S., Coelmont, J., ‘Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence of the Obvious’, Security Policy Brief 11, June 
2010.
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the ESDI and the CJTF concept, followed by NRF, FNC and VJTF, which created a possibility 




Minsk process.  
Another	observation	was	bottom-up	and	top-down	cooperation.	Bottom-up	cooperation	
was	illustrated	by	NATO’s	NRF	and	the	EUBG.	Top-down	cooperation	was	illustrated	by	




and an increased form of horizontal interdependency. 
 In	short,	modular	cooperation,	illustrated	by	plug-in	and	plug-out	and	double-hatted	
forces,	has	led	to	processes	of	top-down	and	bottom-up	cooperation	simultaneously.	In	
addition, a combination of national and international forms of cooperation was observed: 











possibilities to operate outside the institutional frameworks they had set up themselves.275 
Apart	from	contact	groups	like	those	for	Syria,	member	states	of	NATO	and	the	EU	
272  The ‘Ghent Initiative’ of November 2010, by Germany and Sweden, to strengthen the Pooling and Sharing capacities within 
the EU. The ‘Weimar Initiative’ of February 2011 of France, Germany and Poland to strengthen EU’s defence policy by 
initiating an EU headquarters. 
273   The ‘entente frugale’, the two major military powers of the EU agreed on numerous cooperative measures to reduce 
defence spending while maintaining effectiveness.
274  Cooperation on capability generation is increasingly taking place ‘bottom-up’ among the member states. 
275  E.g., Operation Enduring Freedom, Afghanistan and Operation Unified Protector, Libya 2011 initiated by the UK and 
France and NATO providing the ‘tools’ and post-hoc legitimacy.
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established a wide network of bi- and multilateral initiatives for cooperation, employable 
for both NATO and the EU, but not the OSCE.276	Furthermore,	the	concept	of	a	smaller	group	
of	states	to	cooperate	with	was	also	integrated	within	the	organizations,	for	example,	the	




evident that operations were initiated within the formal institutionalized multinational 
frameworks	of	these	organizations.	In	other	words,	‘it’s	not	the	coalition	that	determines	




the	form	of	a	training	or	advisory	mission…’.280    




low institutionalized level.  









in international security cooperation. Nevertheless, actual implementation of several 
modular cooperation initiatives, such as NRF and BG, were not activated. 
276  The Nordic countries established a comprehensive defence framework called the Nordic Defence Cooperation 
(NORDEFCO); the UK and France signed the Lancaster House Treaties creating an unprecedented level of bilateral defence 
cooperation; six smaller Central European countries (Austria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia) 
founded the Central European Defence Cooperation (CEDC) for both practical and political collaborations; and the Baltic 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg) and ‘Visegrad Four’ countries (Poland, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary) reinvigorated their defence cooperative frameworks established during the 1990s.  For 
an elaboration, see: Rehrl, J., F. Mogherini, H. Peter Doskozil, and C. Fokaides, eds. Handbook on CSDP: The Common 
Security and Defence Policy of the European Union. 3rd ed. Vienna, Austria: Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the 
Republic of Austria, 2016 
277  The Minsk Group spearheads the OSCE’s efforts to find a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, co-chaired 
by France, the Russian Federation, and the US.
278  Already the first contact group that was settled during the Balkan wars at the beginning of the 1990s.
279  According to the American Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, October 18, 2001.  
280  Biscop, S., ‘Peace without money, war without Americans: challenges for European strategy’, International Affairs, 89, 
2013, p. 1129. 
281  Clegg, S. R., Hardy, C., ‘Studying Organisation: Theory and Method’, SAGE, 1999, p. 15. 
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coalition.282  Examples are bi- and multilateral cooperation concepts such as the OSCE 
Minsk	Group,	EU	PESCO,	pooling	and	sharing	within	the	EU	and	NATO’s	smart	defence.	




 Finally, it was observed that member states, if it was in their interest, opted for 
informal institutionalized cooperation or even de-institutionalized cooperation outside 









282  Major, C., Molling, C., ‘More teeth for the NATO tiger. How the Framework Nation Concept can reduce NATO’s growing 
formation-capability gap’, p. 33, in: Friis, K., ‘NATO and collective Defence in the 21st century. An assessment of the 
Warsaw Summit’, Routledge focus, 2017. 











even the UK who, in various coalitions, have been the drivers behind the EU security 
framework,283 either unilaterally,284 bilaterally285 or multilaterally. 
 Furthermore, this path-dependent element, derived from historical institutionalism, 
of	flexible	and	modular	cooperation	forms	was	not	limited	to	cooperation	within	the	
security	organizations;	it	was	likewise	observed	between	the	security	organizations,	





















283  Biscop, S., ‘Peace without money, war without Americans: challenges for European strategy’, International Affairs 89: 5, 
2013, p. 1141. 
284 France was the driver behind operations in Libya, Syria and Mali.
285  St. Malo declaration, 4 December 1998 and its follow-up.
286 Dijkstra, H., ‘The Influence of EU officials in European Security and Defence’, European Security, 21:3, p. 312.
287  Military operations are decided upon by the member states, civilian missions are decided upon the Council in 
combination with the EP. 






deepened its structure and developed a well-institutionalized setup, especially in the 



























288 Ghebali, V. Y., ‘Where is the OSCE going? Present role and challenges of a stealth security organisation’, in: European 
Security in a Global Context’, p. 63-66, in: Tardy, T., (eds.) ‘European Security in a Global Context. Internal and external 
dynamics’, Contemporary Security Studies, Routledge, Oxon, Great Britain, 2009.
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Chapter 7
Chapter 7. Cross-path Comparison: A Comparative Perspective  



























chapter thus seeks to address the comparative part of the main question of this research: 
how	and	why	have	the	paths	of	the	security	organizations	changed	their	institutional	
structure in comparison with each other? 
Finally,	the	influence	of	the	possible	drivers	on	the	paths	of	change	will	be	addressed,	
although	only	the	key	findings	based	on	the	larger	picture	given	in	Chapters	4	to	6.3
1 Hopkin, J. ‘Comparative methods’, in: Marsh, D., Stoker, G., ‘Theory and Methods in Political Science’, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2002, p. 249. 
2 BÖrzel, T. A., ‘Mind the gap! European integration between level and scope’, Journal of European Public Policy, Routledge, 
April 2005, p. 220. 
3  The elaboration on the key findings drawn from Chapters 4 to 6 does not exclude other possible important findings of 
the research.
267




















European	Monetary	Union	(EMU)	without	a	European	Political	Union	(EPU)’,4 as some of 
the	members	emphasized	the	long-desired	autonomy	from	US	leadership	and	some	aimed	














decrease in the paths, both of which will be explored in detail below.  
4  One of the subjects of the negotiations between Germany and France after the 1989 revolutions resulting in the 
Maastricht Treaty was the subject of the ‘politics-for-economics deal’: no economic integration without political 
integration.  
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Group, either based on consensus or on bi- and multilateral5	decision-making.	

















an institutional link with Russia in the form of the NATO-Russia Council and the EU 
5  Cooperation on capability generation is increasingly taking place ‘bottom-up’ among the member states. 
6  AIV advies: ‘Gedifferentieerde integratie: verschillende routes in de EU-samenwerking’, nr. 98, 24 november 2015.
7  From 2017, Belgian and Dutch air forces agreed to share surveillance and protection of the Benelux air space. 














































between memberships as well as partnerships and the participation of non-member states 
in	all	sorts	of	operations,	the	result	was	an	increase	of	deepening	in	the	form	of	complex	



























and NATO.  
8 Schimmelfennig, F., Leuffen, D., Rittberger, B., ‘Differentiated Integration. Explaining Variation in the European Union’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 15.
9  Tardy, T., ‘CSDP in action. What contribution to international security?’ Chaillot paper, EU-ISS, No. 134, May 2015, p. 216. 
10 The term frozen conflict refers to a situation in which active armed conflict has ended, but no peace treaty or political 
framework has resolved the conflict.  
11 Transnistria is an autonomous territorial region with a special legal status within the state of Moldova. It mainly consists 
of a Russian minority. A fight for independence started in March 1992 and was concluded by a ceasefire in July 1992. 
Transnistria is internationally recognised as a part of the state of Moldova. 
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So,	although	the	OSCE,	the	EU	and	NATO	have	become	complementary	and	mutually	
interdependent, the multilateral framework of European security has become more 
complex	and	fragmented.	Bi-	and	multilateralism	have	increased	within	the	security	
organizations	as	well	as	outside	the	security	organizations	and	have	led	to	much	more	ad-
hoc and non-institutionalized cooperation schemes. 
 






































with a broad approach towards security and defence rather than NATO. On the other hand, 
NATO did acquire some capacities in line with a broader approach due to lessons learned 
from NATO operations. In particular, the US and the UK preferred NATO to have a mandate 










 However, the research illustrated cooperation dynamics that can also be explained 
by the functionalist mechanism of spill-over12	and	Keohane’s,	Nye’s	and	Deutsch’s	
interdependence. Even more so, these mechanisms were not only observed in the EU, 






observed within NATO, and vice versa. Not only the process of political, institutional and 






 To a certain extent, constructivist institutionalism addresses bureaucratic processes 
of	change	by	an	increase	or	decrease	of	institutionalization,	in	new	members	or	partners	
and in the powers that be. However, the observed spill-over dynamics of the theory of 
neo-functionalism, which can explain a certain amount of automatism in the paths of 
change,	lacks	attention	in	the	bureaucratic	analysis	of	the	constructivist	institutionalism.	
12  Rosamond, B., ‘The uniting of Europe and the foundation of EU studies: revisiting the neo-functionalism of Ernst B. 
Haas’, Journal of European Public Policy, Routledge, April 2005, p. 245. 
13  Koops, J. A., NATO’s Influence on the Evolution of the European Union as a Security Actor’, in: Costa, O., Jorgensen, K.E., 
‘The Influence of International Institutions on the EU. When Multilateralism hits Brussels’, Palgrave Studies in European 
Union Politics, 2012. 
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These	mechanisms	can	be	defined	as	functional	spill-over14 or political spill-over,15 or as 
dynamics	of	disintegration	or	‘spill-back’,	being	the	opposite	of	spill-over.16 Over the years, 
























14  Functional spill-over occurs when cooperation in one sector or policy leads to cooperation in another sector or policy 
defined by: Jensen, C.S., ‘Neo-functionalist Theories and the Development of European Social and Labour Market Policy, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2000, p. 72-73. 
15  Political spill-over is initiated by political actors or interest groups striving for more cooperation to solve common 
problems. Jensen, C. S., ‘Neo-functionalist Theories and the Development of European Social and Labour Market Policy, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 2000, p. 76. 
16  Schmitter, P. C., ‘Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neo-functionalism’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2005, 12, 2, p. 
257-258. 
17  From the 1990s, neo-functionalism was modified and updated, see: Sandholtz, W., Sweet, A. S., ‘European Integration 
and Supranational Governance’, Oxford University Press, 1998; Rosamond, B., ‘Theories of European Integration’, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2000; Sandholtz, W., Sweet, A. S, Fligstein, N., ‘The Institutionalization of Europe’, 
2001; Schmitter, P. C., ‘Ernst B. Haas and the Legacy of Neo-functionalism’, Journal of European Public Policy, 2005, 12, 
2; Sandholtz, W., Sweet, A. S., ‘Neo-functionalism and Supranational Governance’, paper, 2009;  Nelsen, B. F., Stub, A. 
(eds.), ‘The European Union. Readings on the Theory and Practice of European Integration’, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2014.  
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Part Three 
Conclusions and Recommendations   
‘Everyone behaves badly, given the chance’. 
Ernest Hemingway, The Sun Also Rises, 1926
Chapter 8
Chapter 8. Conclusions 
 
 














actors within the European security architecture or the inability and incompetence of the 
‘Brussels’	institutions.	
	 Simultaneously,	ever	since	the	end	of	the	Cold	War,	the	security	organizations	of	






individually and in comparison to one another as part of the European security architecture 
between	1990	and	2016?	
 To answer the research question, the relevant concepts, the theoretical approach and 
framework	for	analysing	change	of	security	organizations,	which	were	addressed	in	Chapter	
2	and	3,	will	be	summarized	in	this	chapter.	Next,	the	empirical	findings	that	were	observed	





1  See: Heisbourg, F., ‘War and Peace After the Age of Liberal Globalisation’, Survival, Vol. 60, no. 1, Routledge, February-
March 2018, p. 211-228; Luce, E., ‘The Retreat of Western Liberalism’, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2017. 
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8.2 Analysing European Security Cooperation: Puzzling Form and Function
The aim of this chapter is to summarize the research observations and answer the research 














answer the research question, this dissertation resorted to three approaches within new 






















theoretical framework, as was elaborated on in Chapter 2. Finally, apart from this 
comprehensive	framework,	the	research	analysed	the	paths	of	change	through	a	dual	
comparison:	cross-case,	whereby	change	of	the	security	organizations	was	analysed	within	










which were drawn from the data collection to determine which drivers and interests were 
at stake. By these methods, the derived assumptions from the selected approaches of new 
institutionalism could be analysed consistently with the three selected cases - NATO, the EU 










chapters and, as a result, will provide a theoretical explanation of the observations. The 
combination	of	the	selected	approaches	of	new	institutionalism	offered	the	possibility	to	
reveal	a	unique	pattern	of	dynamics,	drivers	and	mechanisms	causing	the	paths	of	change.		
8.3 Paths of Change of the European Security Organizations: A Never Ending Story 















































level and form, caused by various drivers. Furthermore, an expansion and even a mix was 
observed	of	the	traditional	concepts	of	security	organizations:	collective	defence,	collective	
security	and	cooperative	security,	questioning	the	adage	of	form	follows	function,	which	
will be discussed below. In other words, this research observed a combination of an 
increased	multilateral	cooperative	security	architecture,	together	with	a	more	traditional	
European	order	built	on	geopolitics,	deterrence,	ad-hoc	alliances	and	a	system	of	collective	
2  Clegg, S. R., Hardy, C., ‘Studying Organisation: Theory and Method’, SAGE Publications, 1999, p. 15. 
3  Haftendorn, H., Keohane, R. O., Wallander, C. A., ‘Imperfect Unions, Security Institutions over Time and Space’, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 1999, p. 5.









8.4 Explaining the Paths of Change of the European Security Organizations: Clashing 
or Compatible Theories  
Introduction
Now	the	time	has	come	to	theoretically	explain	the	observed	paths	of	change	based	on	the	









 In Chapter 1, it was stated that developments in the security environment and security 
architecture,	caused	by	both	state	and	non-state	actors	as	well	as	specific	mechanisms,	led	
to	changes	along	the	paths	of	broadening,	widening	and	deepening	of	the	organizations	in	
the European security architecture. It was assumed that the complex security architecture 
with	overlapping	members,	partners	and	tasks	were	linked	and	interdependent.	Acting	
in a complex institutional security environment necessitated a research framework that 
included	all	possible	drivers	of	change.	










established by states to promote or protect their interests in a reduction of uncertainty, 
transaction-cost approach. 


















defence cooperation to maximize its own national utility: the transaction-cost approach. 
	 Nevertheless,	it	was	also	observed	that	change	did	not	only	occur	in	response	to	
the	needs	and	interests	of	state	actors.	The	question	was	often	raised	as	to	why	NATO	
or the OSCE still existed, while their functions of collective defence, collective security 






and non-state actors as well. 
	 Furthermore,	it	was	shown	in	this	research	that	apart	from	the	struggle	for	
interests, state actors were simultaneously inspired or voluntarily constrained by 
structural	conditions	of	the	organizations,	as	is	claimed	by	other	approaches	within	







could be scrutinized, and its life cycle analysed. This focus on the life cycle of the security 
4  At the time this research was written, the final outcome of Brexit and British participation in the EU’s CSDP was not yet 
clear. The possibility is often proposed that the UK keep a link with the EU’s CSDP as a logical consequence of the UK 
membership in NATO and the bi- and multilateral agreements between the UK and other EU members, like France and 
Poland.    







same. Indeed, collective defence and additional command structure had always remained 
the	backbone	of	NATO’s	existence	ever	since	its	creation,	and	although	NATO’s	mandate	
broadened,	its	military	structure	simply	remained	an	adjusted	alliance	organization	with	
an additional structure. Furthermore, not all tasks and functions of the three security 
organizations	that	were	once	adopted	and	politically	or	legally	laid	down	in	treaties	and	
agreements	were	enhanced	or	even	executed,	such	as	the	modular	cooperation	forms	like	
the NRF and BG concept of both the EU and NATO, but they were never eliminated either.  
 A valuable contribution of historical institutionalism to address the research question 
was	the	analysis	of	the	paths	of	change	over	time,	which	offered	the	opportunity	to	explore	
multiple	(un)expected	drivers.	In	other	words,	this	research	not	only	focused	on	the	direct	
consequences of one catastrophe such as 9/11. 
 The path-dependent approach of historical institutionalism indicates a need for 







 The notion of path dependency emphasised political and policy continuities in the 
paths	of	change	due	to	built-in	structural	dynamics.	One	example	was	the	observed	
acceptance of structural conditions and moral expectations, such as solidarity, even when 
they led to constraint by states when they cooperate in an institutionalised international 
organization.	Simultaneously,	the	argument	of	critical	juncture	stressed	gradual	but	
substantial reforms, such as the adoption of new members and tasks, sometimes directly 
in response to a crisis and sometimes not. Finally, it was shown that institutionalization 




of historical institutionalism on continuity and stability, as the concept of path dependency 
and its multiple mechanisms5	imply,	proved	to	be	difficult	when	explaining	the	role	of	
5  Keohane, R. O., ‘Observations on the Promise and Pitfalls of Historical Institutionalism in International Relations’, p. 
326-329, in: Fioretos, O. (eds.), ‘International Politics and Institutions in Time’, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 
2017.
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outside	actors	and	mechanisms	of	exogenous	and	endogenous	change	or	even	shocks.6 






all these observations could be explained by solid and deep historical roots, as claimed by 
historical institutionalism. 
Constructivist Institutionalism 





























6  Mahoney and Thelen have identified the pitfalls in HI and diversified different types of incremental change in: Mahoney, 
J., Thelen, K., ‘Explaining Institutional Change’, Cambridge University press, Cambridge University Press, 2010.    
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illustrated	that	these	actors	had	the	power	to	address	and	influence	issues	that	align	with	
values	held	by	the	organization,	in	combination	with	the	organizations’	expertise	to	frame	


























Political as well as functional spill-over mechanisms were therefore observed within 
paths	of	change	of	the	selected	organizations,	as	described	in	Chapter	7.	Broadening	of	
the	EU’s	security	and	defence	mandate	started	with	crisis	management	tasks,	but	almost	




it became almost inevitable that they were to be institutionally linked. In addition, as the 
form	and	level	of	cooperation	differentiated	in	one	task,	an	adjacent	sector	followed.	An	
example	is	NATO’s	multinational	concepts	of	CJTF,	NRF	and	VJTF,	which	were	applied	to	
7  Hofmann, S. C., ‘Why institutional Overlap Matters: CSDP in the European Security Architecture’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 2011, vol.49, nr.1, 2011, p. 111. 
8  Keohane, R. O., ‘International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory’, Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1989, p. 101.
























untouched	by	not	incorporating	these	dynamics	of	the	system.9 This research labels 
these	mechanisms	as	a	new	form	of	cross-organizational	spill-over,	and	not	only	within	
the	EU’s	path	of	integration,	which	could	contribute	to	the	approach	of	constructivist	




9  Wijk, R., ‘NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium. The Battle for Consensus’, Brassey’s, London, 1997. 
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perspectives, derived from the selected approaches of new institutionalism, proved to 
be	complementary	rather	than	competitive	or	substitutive.	As	suggested	in	Chapter	1,	





Finally, as well as state actors, other actors and mechanisms were likewise under scrutiny in 
this research. In contrast with rational choice and historical institutionalists, institutions 







 Combined, it has been proven that they presented a more complete framework to 
explain	the	observed	paths	of	change,	and	their	strengths	and	weaknesses	complemented	



























interests in the security and defence domain to reduce uncertainty for which the rational 
choice approach proved to be a valuable one, substantiated by historical institutionalism, 
as	these	organizations	were	built	from	the	fifties	onwards,	which	left	its	marks	on	the	
paths	of	change.	However,	precisely	due	to	the	increase	of	different	actors,	complex	
institutional structures, driven on norms and values in the European security architecture, 
constructivist	institutionalism	offered	a	more	comprehensive	approach	to	analyse	the	how	
and	why	question	of	change	of	these	highly	institutionalized	security	organizations	and	
their functional and dysfunctional paths. 
 
8.5 Change of Security Cooperation and Organizations: Two Worlds Apart-together 
After	the	debate	of	the	research	question	above,	the	assumptions	that	have	steered	this	
research will be further scrutinized below. The case studies of this research presented a 
mixture	of	the	traditional	division	between	pure	intergovernmental	and	supranational	
cooperation in the security and defence area had been observed as a result of an 











incompatible: we can combine any two of the three, but never have all three simultaneously 
and	in	full’.		To	a	certain	extent,	this	trilemma	is	applicable	to	the	world	of	international	











































amount of path dependency and spill-over mechanisms. This can be illustrated by the 
adoption of the mutual defence concept by the EU,  yet most of the EU member states were 








one, form does not only follows function, or the reverse, solely as a result of the will and 
interest of the state, but likewise as a result of other drivers. Furthermore, the problem is 
that both form and function have become hybrid. Hybrid in form, as cooperation schemes 
vary	from	intergovernmental	to	supranational,	and	everything	in	between,	from	high	to	





and scrutiny within the security and defence realm.
 
Third,	the	strict	traditional	division	of	security	organizations	into	the	concepts	of	collective	
defence, collective security or cooperative security with which this research commenced 
has become problematic. 
Traditionally, concepts that are based on the more Kantian concept of multilateralism clash 




of NATO and the EU. In other words, a contrast is observed between war and the primary 







The developments observed bear consequences for the tasks, form and functions of the 
security	organizations	as	well	as	for	the	national	security	providers,	such	as	the	armed	
forces.	Although	both	sides	of	the	traditional	dichotomy	between	the	more	realist	and	
constructivist approaches within new institutionalism address security cooperation, it 
became	inherent	to	the	way	security	cooperation	developed	that	a	contradiction	emerged.	
What	was	observed	was	the	domination	of	state	sovereignty	in	the	domain	of	high	

















 Theoretically, the results of this study support the case for the need to combine 
theoretical approaches of new institutionalism to analyse the complex world of security 
cooperation. In the security domain, not only the more traditional approaches need to 
be consulted, the results also demand an inclusion of other, sometimes unexpected, 







































combined with bilateral cooperation within and outside institutionalized structures, 
accompanied	by	inter-organizational	cooperation.	It	has	been	proven	that	these	trends	
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to include more emphasis on creation. Its opposite, the termination of international 













collective defence be replaced or complemented by other NATO tasks or will they all remain 
prominent?	And,	in	addition,	can	a	difference	between	collective	defence,	collective	
security and cooperative security still be made, theoretically as well as empirically? 
From singular to linked Security Organizations 







policy of member states, such as Dutch security and defence policy, which should not 
choose	between	the	EU	or	NATO,	the	‘either-or’	scenario,	but	should	opt	for	both.	
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for	instance	by	including	other	methods	of	data	gathering,	such	as	interviews,	especially	in	






















or decrease their diversity and should be taken into account when they are compared. 
Nevertheless,	combining	comparative	research	with	structured	focused	comparison	and	
process	tracing	in	time	and	space	has	proven	to	be	of	added	value.		















EU, which was especially feared by Trans-Atlantic states like the Netherlands, it foresaw a 
forthcoming	battle	between	these	two	institutions.	Second,	former	US	Defence	Secretary	
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